#81 Maghreb: The Neglected Terror Base

In an article, "#58 The North African Breeding Ground for Radical Islam," published here in April last year, specific mention was made of the fact that little to no attention was being given by mainstream media to the terrorist bloodshed occurring in the Maghreb region, particularly in Algeria. It appears since then little has changed. Just a few weeks back, on 02 January, 4 police officers died when a car bomb exploded near a police station in Naciria, a town east of the Algerian capital, Algiers. A much more deadly attack occurred less than one month earlier in the capital, when two suicide bombings targeting U.N. offices and a government building killed at least 37 people. As if this were not enough, in July 2007 a suicide bomber blew up a truck inside a military barracks southeast of Algiers, killing 10, and later in September, at least 28 people died after an explosives-packed vehicle rammed into a coast guard barracks in the northern town of Dellys. All attacks were claimed by a local al-Qaeda branch.

The argument used last time that ignoring these events when engaging in a so-called war on terror is not only dangerous but downright harebrained continues to hold true, but this has somehow not yet reverberated on Western leaders. This time around there is new data to highlight the importance of North Africa in the fight on terror. In a recent study, U.S. Military Academy researchers found documents that show 112 of the 595 foreign nationals who entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007, or 19%, were Libyans, compared to no more than 4% in previous research. The majority still come from Saudi Arabia, but countries like Libya, Algeria and Morocco are increasingly sending more fighters. In fact, basing its information on the same research, the Washington Post reported that overall, North Africans account for 40% of the foreign fighter ranks.

It is incomprehensible that the issue of terrorism in North Africa is so low on the list priorities of anti-terror units, when statistically there is a rapid increase in attacks, a growing effect on other hotspots in the world in the way of recruits, and geographically the most pertinent threat to Europe other than threats from within. Even more striking is the lack of media attention generated by the attacks themselves. Hopefully attitudes will change soon, because if not, we are silently witnessing the maturing of the next batch of enemies that need to be fought.

#76 The Hypocrisy and Short Sightedness of the American Immigration System

This coming September, driven by an ambition to increase the bloc's economic competitiveness and facing a foreseeable aging of the population and labor shortages in the next decades (expected to peak by 2050), the European Commission legislators are prepared to present for approval a proposal for an implementation of a new system of temporary resident permits to be selectively allocated to highly-qualified non-EU residents. Since this proposal would necessitate an infamously difficult to attain unanimity between the 27 member states, it is reasonable to expect a significant phase of debate. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the adoption of such a system is merely a matter of time. The legislators behind the initiative relate the recommended system to the US Green Card scheme, even dubbing it “Blue Card,” for some peculiar reason disregarding a conceptual and substantial difference between the contemplated European system and the American one - a difference that, at a closer look and comparison, divulges the relative irrationality and farce of the current US general immigration system.

The paradox of the world’s most symbolically representative immigration country - a country which even George Bush declared is “a nation of immigrants” and that thrives on its entrepreneurial newcomers - is that it is presently the one missing an open-door qualified immigration system. Legally immigrating to the United States is not easier. In fact, it is unexpectedly harder than in many other, even historically non-immigrant, developed countries; i.e. a potentially economically productive and professionally qualified or entrepreneurial immigrant candidate would find virtually no open options to immigrate by self-initiative.

The aforementioned US Green Card is either available to somebody previously resident in the country and legally permitted to stay for a longer time, or is distributed on a lottery (!), i.e. random numbers basis to unrestricted applicants over 18 from around the world. Once one is aware of this fact, it makes sense that European legislators, despite their claims, ironically, can only be color context-wise inspired by the Green Card.

Other immigration-dependent countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand (and recently the U.K.) have a long time ago adopted points-based open-door qualified and business immigration systems - with slight variations - without first having potential immigrants find an offer of employment or without an employer required to fund the visa, classifying migrants on their skills, personal qualities, suitable age, work experience, achievements in the field, past earnings, even achievements of the applicant's partner, and potential contribution to the countries' economies and societies in general; supported by ongoing emphasis on the economic returns of such migration, and are considering ways to expand the associated quotas even further.

Contradictorily in the US, the only initially temporary immigration option open to qualified non-residents is the H1-B visa, allowing American companies to hire, albeit with notoriously burdensome legal and financial difficulties, highly-skilled foreign workers, the limited yearly number of which has in October 2003 been groundlessly cut by US Congress from the even then insufficient 195,000 to 65,000, despite grave concerns of and active lobbying by the information technology companies.

The further deterioration of the currently inadequately cumbersome and bureaucratically thorny immigration system, inclusively for the already legally-residing aliens such as skilled employees and potentially socially valuable graduating students, and the lack of an open-door, even if competition based, legal system for qualified immigration simply leads to the only possible immigration most likely to prevail – illegal, and naturally unqualified. As opposed to the duplicity of the US state of affairs, EU justice spokesman behind the “Blue Card” proposal Friso Ascam Abbing admits that "We had better manage immigration properly as it is going to happen anyway."

Tightening and restricting legal immigration in traditionally migrant-reliant countries - the single one practically accessible for restriction - leads to it being automatically substituted by illegal, chaotic immigration. The previous statement is neither intended to denigrate the significant economical importance of illegal immigrants widely employed in agriculture, construction, hospitality and other industries, benefiting both businesses and consumers, and the Americans' dependence on them in a multitude of diverse sought-after menial and unskilled jobs, nor to advocate a need for severe curbing of unqualified immigration, since it eventually instigates continuous illegal immigration, as the need for immigrant labor has a natural tendency to be convened by supply.

The American immigration system, with its insufficient legal immigration provisions, regularly tacitly expected general pardon and consequential naturalization of illegal migrants in itself implies an initial breach of law – can it get any more hypocritical than that?

A governmental bipartisan group's recent months' attempts to manage the illegal immigration phenomenon by a - even though still strategically flawed - bill comprising of clauses for the strengthening of the south border security, encouragement of currently illegally residing immigrants to return to their home country and reapply for working permits through a system which also integrates a points-based format, where education and skills, including English ability, could contribute to an applicant’s case, and a stipulation of issuing of 400,000 further amended to 200,000 visas a year to the future temporary workers permitted to stay for two years at a time and renewed up to three times, periodically separated by a year's break between each visit, have disappointingly failed, even in spite of initial public opinion support.

The constant debate about immigration in America has an irrational inclination to pitch all issues into one large jumble, intermixing causes and consequences, revolving around all types of suspected problems caused by illegal residents, which include border issues, pressure on public services and criminal allegations, further fuelled by economically unreasonable fears that immigrants weaken the wages of the native-born citizens. Hence, public concerns about - as some economists and politicians argue - the falsely assumed negative consequences of illegal immigration and the allegedly threatened national security, exaggerated by the government's failure to satisfactorily deal with it, leads to an ignorant absence of differentiation of and antagonism towards immigrants, and consequential psychological and bureaucratic aggravation of the already ill-reputed naturalization process for the legally residing temporary and aspiring workers, making the US a decreasingly attractive destination for talented people from all over the world.

Considering current tech companies' widespread outsourcing, combined with the recently emerged phenomenon of inverse brain-drain and other developed and promising markets' ever -increasing competitiveness for talent acquisition, what kind of potential immigrants and most importantly - how is the US naively, or even better put – overly self-confidently hoping to lure in the future?

In the end, the United States, with its notoriously weak social support and welfare system can only attract generally self-reliant and motivated people who want nothing but to work industriously, be it a farm worker from Mexico or a qualified doctor from India; therefore not offering sufficient people an administratively accessible opportunity to do so will inexorably lead to the negatively perceived effects caused by the vicious circle of illegal, irrepressible immigration or alternatively, and even concurrently – economical underperformance provoked by competent personnel scarcity.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Julia Socolov

#71 Europe’s Unequal Siblings: Monetary Economics in Central Europe

The great experiment that is Europe still needs to overcome a number of obstacles until it truly becomes an economic entity. Especially when looking at the integration of new member states to the economic, political and cultural entity that Europe seeks to be. Central Europe can be seen as a collection of younger siblings in the family of European states. In many ways states such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are like restless teenagers on their way to adulthood.

Current president of the Czech Republic, Mr. Václav Klaus, is known to be a vivid enthusiast of Milton Friedman and his dogmatic free markets. You might therefore think it would only be natural for this liberal economic fervor to wash over to the lower political echelons. But this is not the case, because these badly needed fiscal reforms hurt those people in the economy who need government protection the most. Leftist and Populist parties make good use of this and find great support from the disadvantaged, disenfranchised and elderly sections of the electoral masses. In "old" Europe these type of factions do not enjoy the same level of support because the West has already gone through many of these transitions over the last several decades, albeit one small step at a time.

Europe’s Central European siblings want to take larger steps on the road to economic prosperity and future European economic integration. Fiscal discipline is an important prerequisite, but Central Europe's budget deficits are not heading in the direction of 2-3% of GDP. In fact, they are actually showing a widening trend. This, coupled with inflation, is not going to strengthen currencies and reduce the purchasing power parity gap. Yet, there are some unique forces at work. Skilled labor is much more mobile in Europe than unskilled labor. Wages of highly skilled laborers are even on a road to parity, while if they work abroad they are often already in parity. But for the majority of laborers in Central European countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, the question remains how long it will take until there is a true convergence of per capita income.

The good news is that there is actually downward wage pressure in countries such as Germany and Austria as a result of this imbalance between per capita income differentials. This is inherently a good thing because it makes the rest of Europe more competitive.

When visiting the capitals of Central Europe such as Budapest and Prague, one can definitely observe a boom. Low interest rates, economic vitality, wage growth and speculation are driving new real estate development and pushing property prices up. This boom is to a large extent a local driven phenomenon, at least when looking at the residential market. Most of residential housing stems from large Communist residential development; giant, dated and somewhat drab apartment complexes still form the mainstay of housing of Central European residents. But with a growing segment of the population being upwardly mobile and flush with cash, they are driving a residential building boom. People want to move out of their dated Socialist housing arrangements into new housing and apartments. An increase in interest rates could bring some much needed revaluation into the property market and blow off some steam.

This seems unlikely to happen in the short term as central banks are keen to keep the economy going. Inflation doesn’t appear to be at the forefront of their worries. Economists and central bankers should keep their eyes on the horizon because there are some worrisome circumstances. Some of the currencies such as the Hungarian Fórint have been quite volatile compared to the relative stability of the Euro and the Swiss Frank. Additionally, many Central European Economies have fallen behind in their fiscal reforms and will find pushing painful reforms through in the various parliaments a difficult task to say the least. Sure, bumps on the road to maturity are imminent and even unavoidable for the Central European teenagers. Some central bankers also argue that the type of inflation we are witnessing is completely natural and to a certain extent outside of their influence.

EU taxes on regulated goods such as alcohol and tobacco is an important inflationary presence, especially is Central Europe, where alcohol and tobacco consumption tends to be larger. My final worry lies in the close correlation between Central European currencies, which tend to move fairly together, even though political and economic circumstances are rather different between Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. There is the fear that we could be oversimplifying those dynamics, assuming too much and questioning far too little. Undeniably the dissimilarity of growth is as much an opportunity as it is a threat to the economic entity of Europe as a whole. Nonetheless, if Central European governments do manage to get their fiscal responsibilities together, there is little to fear besides a few bubble bumps on the road. Projected rate increases in Euroland should inspire the central banks in Central Europe to do the same.

#65 Political Tectonics: The Slow Drift

The recent souring of EU-Russia relations and U.S.-Russia relations is a greater cause for concern for the post Cold War status quo than most people realize. Gone are the Yeltsin years of warm rapprochement between nuclear super powers Russia and America. The realities of multipolarity are beginning to dawn on the recently predictable Pangaea world of diplomacy. The post 911 world has shaken the "stable" world order on its foundations. What we are in fact witnessing is the start of a slow drift to a truly multipolar world. A world of divided power and divided interests.

This divided world comes at a rather bad time in world history. Humanity needs to make a series of concerted, fundamental global changes in an array of areas ranging from energy security to climate change and poverty. Instead of focusing on these critical issues that are beneficial to the well being of all mankind, we are increasingly distracted by the deplorable and volatile political situation in Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

The gradual but steady shift in Latin American political attitudes vis a vis the United States should also not be underestimated. In the case of Venezuela, Chavez is not only talking the talk, but clearly walking it as well. The recent moves to nationalize the oil industry and pull out of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank is a vivid example of how the combination of self interest and anti-Americanism is shaping a new diplomatic paradigm in world politics. The trend of resource nationalization is a trend that should be followed with absolute caution, be it in Russia, Myanmar, Bolivia, or Venezuela.

In fact, we are only at the beginning of a long energy squeeze that is bound to exacerbate, in great part due to the current climate of global political fragmentation. The up and coming leadership change in the White House comes at a critical moment in time: can a new President repair the years of void respect for American political leadership and lack of Democratic enlightenment?

In any case the new presidency faces a number of tough challenges. A new administration and President in the United States is going to face a much harsher international diplomatic climate for reaching consensus. Unilateralism is surely a no go area now, something which even current President George Bush Jr. has understood given the precarious international political climate that has arisen in large part due to this unilateralism. The imminent talks with Iran are a good example of this. They are by no means a stroke of enlightened political leadership, but rather a measure of acute desperation.

#63 The Energy Champion

Every time we hear about Russia in the news in reference to oil and gas, it seems to be about Russian muscle flexing. In the past few years alone, Russia has used her vast energy reserves as a weapon in times of disagreement against not only the European Union, but also Georgia, Ukraine, her ally Belarus and, most recently, Estonia. But credit must be given where credit is due: Moscow is in a league of its own when it comes to securing her energy interests.

The proof? Just today (May 12, 2007) Russia announced an agreement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build a new natural gas pipeline north from the Caspian Sea, carrying gas from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russia. This is a major smack in the face of the EU, which had hoped to lessen their dependence on Russian gas by finding an alternative supplier in the form of Turkmenistan. This was to be done by creating a new pipeline under the Caspian Sea that would go through Turkey to Europe, thereby bypassing Russia. The gas routes as they stand today can be seen in the picture above (source: the Economist).

Even if the idea proposed by the EU were to take hold, some analysts doubt whether it would make a significant difference. ICG energy analyst Charles Esser pointed out that the EU could count on at most 20bn cubic metres of gas per year from a Caspian pipeline, which amounts to no more than 4% of EU consumption in 2004. Nevertheless, given the fact that the exact amount of gas present in Turkmenistan is unclear, a significantly high number could lead to the expansion of current plans and seriously reduce EU dependency on Russian gas in the long term. In any case, the deal announced today is a clear victory for Russia, as it effectively means that Turkmen and Kazakh gas will only be exported to Europe via Russia, putting the Europeans at the mercy of Russian caprice more than ever before.

China will no doubt see this deal as a loss as well, since they too were vying for direct control of Turkmen gas in their global quest to secure their energy needs in the most far-flung of places. In April 2005, deceased Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov had blessed the construction of a pipeline to China that would send 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China starting in 2009. Whether this deal will now go through is uncertain, though it seems unlikely that the Russian-Turkmen agreement will affect it. It does, however, give Gazprom and Russia a powerful bargaining tool in any future discussion, negotiation or conflict with China.

Say what you will of the Russian mafia-like monopolizing tactics, but effective they most certainly are.

#58 The North African Breeding Ground for Radical Islam

The daily suicide bombings in Iraq have become so frequent that they barely generate more than a blink of the news watcher's eye. That is, if it actually makes the news, for a mere 15 people dead has become too common to report on. Perhaps if about 100 people die at the account of a suicide bombing (or any other form, for that matter), some hearts will skip a beat, causing short-term grief and a quick thought for the victims.

This phenomenon might simply be explained by the fact that such bloodshed is no longer shocking, simply because it occurs on a daily basis. It made me wonder, however, how come such little attention has been paid to the recent bombings by and clashes with Islamic terrorists in North Africa? There seems to be an eerie silence when it comes to the risks posed by radical Islamists in countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt (the bombings in Cairo, the resort towns of Dahab, Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba in the last 3 years that killed scores of Westerners generated great media interest). Perhaps the fact that Westerners are directly effected by the occasional bombings in Egyptian resorts might explain for the relatively large attention given to these bombings when compared to those in neighbouring countries.

Few people know that in January this year, 12 militants were killed in Tunisia after a fierce gun battle with security forces. The Tunisian authorities said they were militants who had crossed the border from Algeria. Equally few people know that just last March 11, a man entered a cafe in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in order to use the Internet, but when the cafe's owner refused him permission to log on to radical websites, he detonated the explosives that he had hidden under his clothes, killing 1 person and wounding 3 others. Or even more recently, on April 10, Casablanca was the site of a major security operation against suspected Islamic militants, resulting in three suspected militants detonating their suicide belts in order to prevent arrest. A fourth was shot dead by police as he tried to detonate his device. The police claim to have foiled a plot to target foreign and strategic interests by these suicide bombers.

The most deadly of bombings in the region this year occurred in Algeria's capital Algiers, where two bombs killed at least 33 people and injured a couple hundred, just a few days ago, on April 11. I barely recall the bombings getting any mention in the press headlines. The bombings were the work of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which changed its name to the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb in January. The group's aim is to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and was a major player in the Civil War of the 1990s (and part of the 21st Century as well) in which some 150,000 people died. Finally, last Saturday, April 14, Casablanca was once again the scene of a suicide bombing. Two brothers blew themselves up near the US consulate and its cultural center, injuring one passer-by.

Not only were the two brothers wanted in connection with the March Internet cafe bombing, but the police also found another explosives belt that linked the brothers with the men who blew themselves up on April 15. What's more, officials stated that one of the three suspected militants who blew themselves up during the police raid is the brother of the Internet cafe bomber. All men are thought to have played key roles in the 2003 terror attack in Casablanca, where suicide bombers killed more than 40 people and are believed to belong to the Algerian group mentioned before - the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly known as GSPC. The group has also been said to be active in Tunisia and Mauritania, thus uncovering an interconnected and well-organised Islamic terror group/cell in North Africa.

With Westerners seemingly only able to understand an immediate threat or one that is too late to act against, it is worth putting all this into a socio-geographical perspective. For one, there are no non-European nations closer to Europe than Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Furthermore, of the estimated nearly 20 million Muslims in Europe, only Turkey has more emigrants in Europe than Algeria and Morocco. Ignoring the increasingly visible threat posed by Islamic terrorists is tantamount to Europe begging for problems. The Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian authorities must be helped by strengthening political and economic ties. This does not mean pandering to the whim of Dictators against the will of ordinary people, but it does mean standing up for what you believe is right and aiding those who seek the same results.

#57 REPLY to Article #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

As the Iraq War’s broad unpopularity causes a number of governments—including at least one branch in the United States—to consider the political consequences of continued participation, it's important to keep some perspective about the relative importance of the conflicts in which the West is now engaged. While a principled case must be made for continued American involvement in Iraq, it need not be done at the expense of the vital mission being carried out by NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In his March 14 piece for the Weekend Economist (#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?), Westbrook Sullivan argues that the focus of the international community on the war in Afghanistan is disproportionate to that nascent democracy's impact on world affairs. Sullivan tells us that Afghanistan is “impoverished and isolated,” largely irrelevant to America's strategic interests, essentially no more than an inconvenient central Asian backwater. A failed state at the heart of Central Asia, Sullivan contends, “would be an annoyance to America and its allies, [but] would have little more effect than that on the international community.” This assessment could scarcely be more flawed.

There is little doubt that Iraq is the most significant conflict zone in which the U.S. is presently involved, if only as a consequence of the sheer numbers of American troops involved. A successful—or at least not-disastrous—resolution to the sectarian strife and anti-coalition insurgency there is absolutely vital to the maintenance of American security. While arguments abound about the legitimacy or necessity of the initial intervention in Iraq, the fact remains that the total collapse of the American-led enterprise there would have disastrous consequences for regional and global security.

Just the same, those reservations have helped to ensure that the war in Iraq is an American operation. One would be remiss not to mention the contribution of both combat forces and service-support troops from a number of coalition forces, but the fact remains that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would not have taken place without the specifically American rationale presented by the Bush Administration. The time to make he case for multilateral involvement and burden-sharing in Iraq was four years ago, not the spring of 2007. Most governments have long since reached the decision that further contributions to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI) will needlessly erode their popularity without many of the attendant benefits associated with participation in the initial war effort. Americans should not be surprised that the Blair government would draw similar conclusions.

Sullivan dismisses this sort of calculation as nothing more than a form of political self-preservation, dismissing the redeployment of assets from Iraq to Afghanistan is merely a “relatively safe alternative” for politicians “not wanting to look weak on security issues.” How can we criticize the political leadership of another state when a politically expedient course of action also happens to help secure that nation's vital interests? Iraq is a sinking ship, and the UK is one of the last on the lifeboats. Few should be shocked that the Blair government is unwilling to go to the bottom of the sea.

Leaving aside the politically-charged question of whether or not preemptive war in Iraq was justified, one must concede that a great deal of international goodwill and moral force was squandered through the unnecessary and inaccurate conflation of the war in Iraq with the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few nations opposed the bombardment and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, as such action was viewed as a necessary and natural response to the atrocities visited upon the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was considerably less well-received. Even those allies who were convinced to make contributions to the war effort had little reason to suspect that they’d be involved in a multi-year occupation. So why now should those faithful members of the coalition be slandered for re-assessing their priorities? Have the preceding four years not convinced Mr. Sullivan that the U.S. should accept and encourage what contributions other nations choose to make to missions deemed important to American interests?

British patience for the mission in Iraq has waned, but the UK’s contributions in Afghanistan can still be vital. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in that country, composed of troops from 37 nations, not only makes an important contribution to mission accomplishment but also to the prospects of future security burden-sharing. As NATO allies and other states are compelled to develop broader capacity in support of ISAF’s mission, U.S. policymakers can be more confident in the capabilities of partner states when called upon in future conflicts. With a territorial defense mission seemingly obsolescent in the 21st century, NATO’s future utility to its member states will be defined by the ability of multinational, mission-focused task forces to conduct out-of-area operations. Further expansion of the alliance (and the attendant effect on U.S.-Russia relations) is an open question at present. As such, the future of NATO is in the balance; if ISAF fails in Afghanistan, so too does the institution that has formed the bedrock of European security and transatlantic cooperation for the last six decades.

All this considered, the critical question addressed by Sullivan is whether or not a stable and well-governed Afghanistan is vital to international security. We shouldn’t be surprised to find that those who answer the question in the negative do so in the face of a staggeringly broad consensus to the contrary. Documentary filmmaker Sam Kiley, who recently spent time with NATO forces in Afghanistan, puts their mission in stark terms: “NATO and the Afghan government want to win this war to prevent Afghanistan returning to Taliban rule and becoming a base once again used by international terrorists.” There seems very little doubt that ISAF’s failure would result in exactly such a scenario.

American—and global—security is increasingly wedded to the maintenance of state control over territory; the future must be one of less failed states, not more. Sullivan’s dismissive reference to Afghanistan as “almost entirely impoverished and rural” is puzzling; do these two factors somehow render instability in the country less threatening? The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan is very real. Porous borders with Pakistan and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia destabilize important allies in the region, as well as making the task of tracking terrorists’ movement exponentially more difficult. Kidnapping raids launched into Iran by Baloch separatists (like Jundullah, which American intelligence community sources have recently alleged is financially and materially supported by the U.S. government) complicate the already-delicate relationship between Washington and Tehran. Ungoverned territory in Afghanistan provides further opportunity for these groups to take dangerous and destabilizing actions against Iranian targets, increasing tensions and the likelihood of a destructive and unintended war.

Abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, however attractive it may seem in light of the attention and effort commanded by the steady dissolution of the nascent free Iraq, would be a perfect public diplomacy storm of military failure, sacrificed international goodwill, and eroded American credibility. It seems absurd to suggest that the most appropriate way to secure the most robust future contribution of allied support for American interests is to abandon the war widely viewed as just and necessary in favor of the one most reject as an illegitimate flight of neoconservative fancy. The loss of moral force associated with such an abdication of a just and necessary mission is one from which the United States would not soon recover.

- This article was written in response to Westbrook Sullivan's #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?. It was first published on CJMEWETT and provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Christopher Mewett.

#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

With the recent announcement by Prime Minister Tony Blair that the English involvement in the American-led Iraq War was entering its final stages, the question of American involvement in an increasingly unpopular war has once again been brought to the front burner. The fact that the English withdrawal coincides with an increase in the troop deployment in Afghanistan highlights the differences between these two theaters of war. With the exception of the United States, the coalition in relation to the Iraq War is fading. Simultaneously, however, the idea that the war in Afghanistan is a ‘just cause’ and one (in the eyes of the rest of the world) worth fighting for has raised some interesting contradictions.

While the obvious links to the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. should not be understated, I am questioning the relevancy of Afghanistan and its role in relation to American strategic interests. Of course Afghanistan is a hot-bed for terrorist activity and has played host to some of the most infamous international terrorists. But so has Pakistan. I contend that even although a failed Afghanistan would be an annoyance to America and its allies, it would have little more effect than that on the international community. In fact, the overall economic and strategic position of Afghanistan is extremely limited. With the exception of Kabul, the country is almost entirely impoverished and rural. Two-thirds of the Afghan population lives on less than two dollars a day and it is estimated that one-third of its economy is based on the production of poppy seeds.

What exactly are we going to accomplish in this impoverished and isolated country of 30 million? The Soviets found that they were unable to accomplish their mission even without the watchful eyes of the international community. Afghanistan’s limited role in Middle East affairs and its virtually non-existent role in international relations, means that even a successful mission by the international community bears no real fruit.

Conversely, the situation in Iraq necessitates the presence of the international community. As a central figure in the Middle East and a major oil producer, the importance of Iraq far exceeds that of Afghanistan. A failure in Iraq would open the door to a new level of anti-American extremism which would in turn threaten the international community at large. Failure would further strengthen the tyrannical regimes of Iran and Syria and lead to an increased likelihood of a prolonged civil war. The consequences to the international community are profound. By removing themselves from Iraq and increasing their presence in Afghanistan, the English have revealed their true colors. The English and the European Community as a whole are once again in the position of transferring the real responsibility to the Americans.

With the international community fleeing Iraq, but not wanting to look weak on security issues, the conflict in Afghanistan is a relatively safe alternative. Dozens of nations continue to support the American-led Afghanistan war and the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Where are the supporters of the Iraq war? While the international community can clean its hands of the Iraq war and not feel the guilt associated with its failure, the long term consequences are severe. The rise of anti-American, anti-war rhetoric concerning the Iraq war may appease some in the international community, but in the end not only fails to solve the problem, but could potentially reinforce it.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Westbrook Sullivan

#39 Time For EU to Sit Down With Mugabe

As Zimbabwean President Robert Gabriel Mugabe turns 83 today, there is little to celebrate for the citizens of the Southern African country. Annual inflation has skyrocketed to 1,593.6 percent, food shortages are gripping many parts of the country, badly-needed professionals have left, education and healthcare services, once the best on the continent, are deteriorating. The list goes on. Yet Mugabe seems unaffected by Zimbabwe’s predicament. If anything, Mugabe doesn’t think there are any problems in Zimbabwe. If there are any, then he believes the West is to blame.

It pains to see Zimbabwe sink to such low levels. Few would doubt Zimbabwe’s potential; statistics speak for themselves. Zimbabwe had the highest literacy rate in Africa put at 95.2 percent by UNICEF in 2000. With production levels of 237 million kg, Zimbabwe was the world’s third largest tobacco producer after Brazil and the United States prior to the land invasions in 2000. It remains the fifth largest producer of gold in the world. Unknown to many, Zimbabwe also possesses two-thirds of the world’s reserves for metallurgical grade chromite and until recently, Zimbabwe was the second largest producer of floriculture in Africa after Kenya. More so, Zimbabwe remains the world’s fifth largest producer of white asbestos, after Russia, Canada, China and Brazil.

So what has gone wrong? Mugabe’s hands are dirty. That’s a fact. The EU, on the other hand, is seeking to clean those hands with clearly logical yet unworkable tactics. Angered by Mugabe’s controversial distribution of white-owned commercial farms to mainly landless blacks and his disputed re-election in 2002, the EU introduced its so-called targeted sanctions against Mugabe and his top officials. The sanctions include an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on Mugabe and members of his governing ZANU PF party. In sanctioning a dictator of Mugabe’s size and magnitude, the EU is hoping to change policy in Zimbabwe.

But frankly speaking, that’s not working: five years after the sanctions were introduced, Mugabe hasn’t changed his policy. In fact, it seems to have gotten worse. What people like me will never understand is the EU’s eagerness to continuously renew the sanctions when there is no credible evidence to prove Mugabe is shifting policy.

You don’t really hurt Mugabe much by telling him “Mr. Mugabe, you are banned from coming to the EU.” In this era of globalization, Mugabe and Jan Pieter Balkanende can wear similar suits from the same chain, only that Mugabe will buy his in Kuala Lumpur or Shanghai, while Balkanende will get his in The Hague or Amsterdam. Neither do you really expect Mugabe to change policy by telling him “Robert, you are not allowed to open a bank account in the EU.” He will simply say “Okay,” before taking a flight to Singapore. Even better, considering the power he has, there isn’t any need for Mugabe to keep his money and assets in a foreign bank. For him, the state house is perhaps nearer and more convenient. Worse still, Mugabe and his officials have travelled to the EU on several occasions during the sanctions’ five-year tenure, rendering them somewhat pointless. Portugal is reportedly prepared to invite Mugabe to the EU-Africa summit in April because it fears Mugabe’s failure to attend may influence other African nations to boycott. Most recently, the South African President cancelled his plans to attend the French-Africa summit, a day after it was revealed that Mugabe wasn’t invited. Of course Mbeki gave other reasons for a no-show, but some of us who are familiar with the cordial relationship of the two, won’t buy into them.

The Western media, politicians and NGOs working in Zimbabwe at times badly underestimate Mugabe’s support. I know many people will not agree with me, but I am confident when proclaiming that Mugabe has got what it takes to easily win a free and fair election in present day Zimbabwe. Here is how he does it: brainwash people. Mugabe is in control of the media, so it’s easy to indoctrinate them. In 2002, I told my late grandmother to vote for the opposition. You can guess what kind of answer I got. “You want the British to take over Zimbabwe again?” In African politics, rural dwellers should be on your side if you want to win a national election. Nobody knows that more than Mugabe. With a bit of some intimidation, rural folks are given food to vote for Mugabe. Of course, you wouldn’t call this ‘free and fair,’ but it is a tactic which seems acceptable in African politics. While Mugabe’s support is diminishing in big cities such as Harare and Bulawayo, the same cannot be said about the rural areas, where he enjoys huge support.

Then there are those who just support Mugabe for who he is. Mugabe is seen as a liberator, a true freedom fighter who somehow, like South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, fiercely fought for racial equality in Zimbabwe. After many years of white rule, it was Mugabe who in 1980 introduced equal education and healthcare for blacks in Zimbabwe. Although I can safely say he is partially destroying what he built, Mugabe is still seen as a hero by many people in Zimbabwe and beyond. Mugabe’s fierce rhetoric against ‘Western imperialism’ attracts some sympathy and support in Zimbabwe.

In short, sanctions have only helped Mugabe become more stubborn. Buoyed by his ‘Look East’ policy, he is eager to prove to the West that his regime can last as long as those of emerging economies like China exist. I spent two months in Zimbabwe late last year, and I was quite astounded by the ubiquitous presence of Chinese products in the country. Everywhere you go in Zimbabwe, you will be greeted by what locals have termed ‘zhing-zhongs,’ a derogatory word deriding Chinese goods’ lack of quality. With most of the industries closing shop, it was hardly surprising to note that even the toilet paper was coming from Beijing. China has become one of Mugabe’s last remaining friends. Clever as he has always been, Mugabe knows that with China on his side, the UN Security Council cannot question his policy.

So what’s the benefit of talking rather than isolating Mugabe? Perhaps the EU doesn’t realize Mugabe’s influence in African politics. Zimbabwe and Mugabe in particular, was heavily involved in ending the armed conflict in Mozambique in the late 1980s. Why not use Mugabe’s experience to end other conflicts in Africa? Even so, some African leaders feel Africa is incomplete without Zimbabwe, which is why Mugabe will certainly be lobbying for an African boycott of the EU-Africa summit. He has done it before and he will do it again.

Zimbabwe, whose economy also depends on tourism, cannot afford to have negative publicity anymore. Over the years, Western tourists have shunned Zimbabwe and millions working in the industry have lost their jobs. Although he is the target of EU sanctions, Mugabe isn’t affected by that in any way. Talking to him would help improve Zimbabwe’s battered image and bring in badly-needed foreign investors.

Zimbabwe, like the Great Lakes region of Africa and stubborn Sudan in particular, is a trouble spot. The EU’s foreign chief Javier Solana has appointed special representatives in many of these these hot spots, but has left out Zimbabwe. Why? Does that make Zimbabwe less troubled?

It’s not going to be easy to talk to Mugabe, but if the EU has another solution for Zimbabwe, they should table it now. Sanctions might be logical and right, but there are no signs that they will influence policy in Zimbabwe. Instead of isolating Mugabe, the sanctions indirectly isolate the Zimbabwean people. By talking with Mugabe, the EU is at a much better position to influence Zimbabwean policy. Talk to people who have links with Zimbabwe. Most of them will tell you, Zimbabwe will stay the same as long as Mugabe is in power. Negotiating with him may pave the way for his retirement. Talking to Mugabe may also help the position of the remaining 1000 white farmers, whose future looks bleak under his rule. And finally and more importantly, with Mugabe gone, educated professionals like me and over two million Zimbabweans living abroad, will be prepared to go back and rebuild the country that we dearly love and miss.

- This article was first published in the NRC Next (a Dutch national newspaper) on February 21, 2007. It was provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Bruce Mutsvairo.

#37 Turkmenbashi Lives On

With the death of Turkmen "President-for-life," Saparmurat Niyazov, last December, hope emerged that maybe Turkmenistan would be able to finally get a taste of Democracy. The election as new President last Sunday of heir-apparent, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov - who won with the surreal number of 89.23% of the votes in a matter of only four hours of voting, with a 95% turnout according to the Central Election Commission - has put a quick damper on such hopes. On a more positive note (for Turkmenistan, that is), the continuation of Niyazov's legacy will mean that Turkmenistan will likely become neither a Russian nor a European proxy state.　

There was talk that the death of Niyazov provides a golden opportunity for the European Union to lessen its dependency on Russian gas, while also allowing for Russia to regain some of its lost Cold War influence in the hermit state. With Turkmenistan being home to the fifth-largest natural gas reserves in the world (proven reserves of 3 Trillion Cubic Meters) and substantial oil reserves as well (Turkmenistan has proven oil reserves of 546m barrels, estimated reserves of more than 2 bn barrels, and large areas that are yet to be explored), the Central Asian nation is of extreme interest particularly to the EU. It could serve as the perfect partner in the realization of an energy corridor from Central Asia to Europe.　

There are, however, doubts about Turkmenistan's oil and gas reserves, or at least the potential to make use it. Former vice Prime Minister and head of the Central Bank of Turkmenistan, Khudaiberdy Orazov, noted that "Everyone had to make do with information from Niyazov about Turkmenistan's gas reserves, which were said to be 22 trillion or even 44 trillion cubic meters. But in reality the only gas field in Turkmenistan was opened under the USSR and has been being exploited ever since...It is completely possible that Turkmenistan has a lot of gas. But first it has to be found, a gas field has to be opened, and extraction has to begin. And no one has done that for 15 years, and in the meantime the Geology Ministry has been disbanded and many specialists have left for Russia or let the profession lapse."

If we are to assume that the country is capable of becoming a major player in the world's energy market, recent signs provide no clue as to who will benefit most. Turkmenistan is scheduled to continue providing Gazprom with 50 billion cubic meters of gas a year at below-market prices through the old Soviet-era pipeline and, starting from 2009, the Chinese are to receive 30 billion cubic meters of a gas a year. On the political front, the current festivities in the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat, don't provide any hints either, as they are attended by leaders and senior diplomats from a wide range of countries, including European officials, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, a vice-chairman of China's parliament, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia, and even Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Turkmenbashi lives on for now, meaning little change within the country and no foreseeable near term impact on the energy and geopolitical chess boards. However, in the hopeful words of an unnamed Western Diplomat in Ashgabat who defended the policy of engagement, "You can take an obese person and tell them that they need to lose weight. Until you see the pounds coming off there's so proof they've absorbed the message...but a crash diet is bad, because you're looking for sustainable change." In other words, the West is choosing to grant Berdymukhamedov and co. the benefit of the doubt for now, allowing for time to implement the necessary changes. Or if you look at it another way, they are hoping to befriend the new leader so as not to alienate the gas-rich nation and increase their own chances of striking some juicy deals.

See also Post #5 Turkmenistan up for Grabs

#14 Transnistria at the Gates of the EU

The ringing in of the New Year has brought the EU two new members: Romania and Bulgaria. While this in itself provides plenty of space for discussion, a different, more obscure issue will undoubtedly begin to garner more attention in the coming years due to this event. The recent enlargement means that the European Union now borders Moldova; a notoriously impoverished country. While mass immigration to Romania and possibly further into the EU is a possible scenario, it is another issue that merits special attention.

In the East of Moldova, bordering the Ukraine, lies an area called Transnistria (also know as Transdniestr, while the official name is Pridnestróvskaia Moldávskaia Respública, or Pridnestrovie in short). It is a sovereign region that sought to remain a part of the Soviet Union and declared independence on September 2, 1990. Internationally Transnistria is considered part of the Republic of Moldova, although de facto control is exercised by a local separatist administration.

Transnistria has a reputation for being a haven for criminal activity such as smuggling and trading weapons, women, drugs, and counterfeit goods. The European Parliament's delegation to Moldova has even named Transnistria "a black hole in which illegal trade in arms, the trafficking in human beings and the laundering of criminal finance was carried on."

Of the approximately 700,000 inhabitants of Transnistria, almost one seventh is also citizen of Russia. Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians constitute approximately an equal percentage of the population (around 30% each), only complicating the situation even more. Prior to the Second World War, 8% of Transnistrians were Jewish, but this has dropped to below one fourth of a percent today.

Transnistria is a close ally of Russia and the main reason for the relatively cold relations between Chisinau (the capital of Moldova) and Moscow. It has also caused friction between Russia and the EU, whose views of the status of Transinstria are rather different. On September 17, 2006, a referendum was held in Transnistria. 97.2% voted in favor of 'continued' independence and a free association with Russia, while 95% voted against a possible reunification with Moldova (Tiraspol Times). Voter turnout was 78.6%. The referendum was recognized Russia, but not by the European Union.

Right at the border of Romania, in the south of Moldova, lies another autonomous region known as Gagauzia. The majority of people here are Gagauz; a Turkic people who are predominantly Christian. Fortunately this region is rather peaceful, with the autonomy-granting "Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia" passed by the Moldovan government on December 23, 1994, resolving peacefully the dispute that existed between Gagauzia and Moldova. Indeed, many European human-rights organizations recognize Gagauzia as a successful model for resolving ethnic conflict.

Such a resolution does not seem imminent in Transnistria however, meaning the EU will have to deal with the situation more proactively. This will have to include direct talks with Russia on the matter, which, being EU's main supplier of gas, automatically makes Europe weak kneed. The further East the EU goes, the closer it gets to mother Russia. Let's just hope that the increase in size that the EU gains by expanding eastward will also mean an increase in muscle. While the former Soviet states that are now in the EU were less tacitly influenced by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is the territories that are now left between the EU and Russia where Russia's arm is still very strong today. Any move beyond the current EU borders will most certainly provoke a significant Russian response.

Reference

Tiraspol Times, http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/216

For an interesting take on the capital, Tiraspol, visit the following website: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/journeys/feature/tiraspol06.cfm

#11 A New Security Paradigm?

The previous bipolar contestation between East and West was based upon which economic doctrine should prevail. Today’s primal security concern is that of energy resources. In Europe, the recent squabble between Russia and Belarus is threatening to disturb the ease with which Western Europe is able to turn up the thermostat in the (so far) mild winter.

The big change is that Russia seems more interested in earning top dollars for its resources, rather than subsidizing its neighbors and allies. Russia is no longer interested in “giving” its gas resources away cheaply when there are well paying, gas hungry customers around the corner. This could be good news for Europe, as this signals the intent of Gazprom to be more of a business partner rather than a political instrument: although in reality it is clearly both.

According to spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov, Gazprom is not Santa Claus. Isolated and dictatorial Belarus was accustomed to buying gas at a nearly 70% discount relative to market prices (around 46$ per 1000 cubic meters). Gazprom wants around 200$ per 1000 cubic meters. In the newly announced deal, Belarus will now pay around 100$ per 1000 cubic meters, which, looking at current prices, can still be considered a sweet deal.

If the re-pricing had been more aggressive, it would have created more pressure on Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko by effectively ending a multibillion subsidy. Although the re-pricing is a welcome step in the right direction, it is merely Russia flexing its muscles. However, in the long term these are good signals to shareholders who are not keen on Gazprom being used as a political subsidy agent.

Looking at Western Europe, their dependence on foreign hydrocarbon sources remains a critical issue because, as the Economist put it, “a new hegemony, based on pipelines rather than tanks, is advancing”. As Europe's thirst for Russian resources increases, their independence decreases; and this time there is no “Iron Curtain” to hide behind.

#5 Turkmenistan up for Grabs

Although generating surprisingly few headlines, the death of Turkmenistan's authoritarian president Saparmurat Niyazov is a very big deal. Granted, Commandante Fidel's loss (we believe he is still alive of course, but clearly not in a condition to rule the way we are used to of him) is a more high profile case, but Turkmenistan has much more to offer the world in economic terms.

Turkmenistan is home to the fifth-largest natural gas reserves in the world (proven reserves of 3 TCM) and holds substantial oil reserves as well (Turkmenistan has proven oil reserves of 546m barrels, estimated reserves of more than 2 bn barrels, and large areas that are yet to be explored). Niyazov ruled Turkmenistan with an iron fist for 21 years, commanding more than only the post of President of the nation. This has meant that there is now a serious possibility of chaos in the nation as, according to Turkmen law, the president is succeeded by the head of the People's Assembly - a post that was held by Mr Niyazov himself!

A serious possibility is that Russia's long arm will reach deeper into Turkmen affairs, given Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's swift response that "We hope a new leadership will act to benefit co-operation with Russia and to benefit the region as a whole." Perhaps all the days, cities, airport and meteorite that were named after Niyazov will now be renamed in the honour of soon to be departing Comrade Putin. The many statues might even suddenly find themselves with blond hair and blue eyes.

But on a more serious note, if Russia does gain more influence in Turkmenistan, this does not bode well for Europe's energy addiction. If, on the other hand, Europe steps in quickly to ensure a swift transition in the country, it might have found itself the perfect alternative to the fix provided by the mafia pushers in Russia. A big plus; Turkmenistan does not need Russia, thanks to her own rich energy resources, and can thus become a loyal ally if Europe plays its cards right...and quick.

See also post #37 Turkmenbashi Lives On

#3 Africa - China's Training Ground

If the term "failed state" is used to define those states where government is unable to perform its basic duties, then Africa could be considered a "failed continent." Indeed, in the 2006 'Failed States Index' published by the US think-tank, The Fund for Peace, and by US magazine, Foreign Policy, 4 out of the top 5 failed states are located in Africa: 1. Sudan, 2. Democratic Republic of Congo, 3. Ivory Coast, 4. Iraq, 5. Zimbabwe.

Africa, however, is blessed with an impressive endowment of mineral wealth, which has not gone by unnoticed by the risk-loving Chinese. China is eager to snatch its share of Africa's near-global monopolies of platinum (89%) and diamonds (60%) and her significant proportion of the world's cobalt (53%), Zirconium (37%), and gold (28%) reserves (Jonah, 2005). Africa further boasts very sizeable reserves of coal, uranium, copper, nickel, natural gas, and most importantly, oil. While Africa currently accounts for 7% of the global total estimated proved oil reserves (EIA, 1999), the region has the potential to supply 25% of the U.S.'s oil imports by 2015 and already accounts for 30% of China’s imports of oil, according to Forbes. In fact, Angola has recently become China’s largest oil supplier, surpassing Saudi Arabia.

While Africa’s natural wealth is not a new phenomenon, China’s significant investments in the continent is. To highlight the stunning growth of trade between China and Africa, in 1999 the value of trade between the two was $2 billion, which grew to $29.6 billion in 2004 and is expected to reach $50 billion by the end of 2006 (IMF). In some countries, China has set up a near-monopoly in trade, importing 81% of Sudan’s global oil exports and 72.5% of Congo’s global exports in metals, while simultaneously accounting for 14.2% of Sudan’s total global imports and 9.1% of Ghana and Tanzania’s total imports (Kaplinsky, 2006).

The phenomenon of China’s trade in Africa presents the continent with a renewed opportunity to climb out of its current misery and forever shed the stigma of failure. What it also presents, however, is a perfect stage on which China can learn the ways of a global superpower. China is able to build her clout relatively quietly, while the old guard focuses their attention elsewhere. Not only is the Middle Kingdom securing crucial resources to sustain her incredible growth, she is also ‘playing the field’ politically. A similar pattern is emerging in Latin America; where China is slowly becoming a pain for the US, as Latin American countries that are fed up with the Americans for whatever reason now see China as the perfect alternative. Chavez’s open flirting with China is a good example of this. Given Chinese support to such rogue regimes as the Sudanese government and Mugabe in Zimbabwe, increased global Chinese influence is sure to rile the US further.

It is therefore imperative that the US takes note of China’s dealings in Africa, as it is sure to be merely the testing ground for further expansion. The US and the EU should engage with China in Africa, rather than compete directly, as it is impossible to beat the conditions given to African nations by the Chinese (China follows a policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and thus pays no mind to issues like corruption). China has already provided crucial infrastructure and real estate in exchange for trade deals and has provided loans and given debt relief to countries such as Angola, which was refused loans by the West unless it met certain governance requirements. Such conditions cannot be provided by the USA, EU or Japan, as it would mean a major loss of credibility, giving China a clear advantage. Only by engaging China in Africa can the US continue to exert influence and retain her credibility in the continent. The ultimate question is how to go about doing this. The US has little leverage in regard to China, seeing as the Chinese are supplying most of the credit to the US. The EU remains the largest investor in Africa, while the US is second and China third, suggesting that Europe should play a key role in engaging China.

One way to do this is by asking China to join the African Partnership Forum (a grouping of key African governments, Western development donors and African and international organizations), as suggested by Leni Wild and David Mepham of the IPPR. China should also be involved in other Western forums concerning Africa, while Europe and the US should ask to join existing Chinese forums discussing various issues with their African partners. The EU/China Co-operation Program should also put the issue on her agenda. It should be made clear to China that her image will be seriously tarnished unless corporate governance is incorporated into her dealings in the African continent. The African Union’s commitment to good governance should help in this respect.

In sum, China’s rising influence in Africa is a topic that consists of many branches (many more than have been touched upon above) and should prove to be of great significance in a global context. Other postings on the Weekend Economist will be sure to cover the issue from different angles.

References

EIA (1999) A snapshot of Oil and Gas in Africa Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, Energy Information Administration

Forbes (2006) http://www.forbes.com/business/energy/2006/10/06/energy-african-oil-biz-energy_cx_jc_1009beijing_energy06.html

IMF Direction of Trade Statistics

Jonah (2005) Presentation by Sam Jonah, former President of AngloGold Ashanti, University of South Africa, unpublished.

Kaplinsky R (2006) Winners and losers: China’s trade threats and opportunities for Africa, The New Sinosphere.