#81 Maghreb: The Neglected Terror Base

In an article, "#58 The North African Breeding Ground for Radical Islam," published here in April last year, specific mention was made of the fact that little to no attention was being given by mainstream media to the terrorist bloodshed occurring in the Maghreb region, particularly in Algeria. It appears since then little has changed. Just a few weeks back, on 02 January, 4 police officers died when a car bomb exploded near a police station in Naciria, a town east of the Algerian capital, Algiers. A much more deadly attack occurred less than one month earlier in the capital, when two suicide bombings targeting U.N. offices and a government building killed at least 37 people. As if this were not enough, in July 2007 a suicide bomber blew up a truck inside a military barracks southeast of Algiers, killing 10, and later in September, at least 28 people died after an explosives-packed vehicle rammed into a coast guard barracks in the northern town of Dellys. All attacks were claimed by a local al-Qaeda branch.

The argument used last time that ignoring these events when engaging in a so-called war on terror is not only dangerous but downright harebrained continues to hold true, but this has somehow not yet reverberated on Western leaders. This time around there is new data to highlight the importance of North Africa in the fight on terror. In a recent study, U.S. Military Academy researchers found documents that show 112 of the 595 foreign nationals who entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007, or 19%, were Libyans, compared to no more than 4% in previous research. The majority still come from Saudi Arabia, but countries like Libya, Algeria and Morocco are increasingly sending more fighters. In fact, basing its information on the same research, the Washington Post reported that overall, North Africans account for 40% of the foreign fighter ranks.

It is incomprehensible that the issue of terrorism in North Africa is so low on the list priorities of anti-terror units, when statistically there is a rapid increase in attacks, a growing effect on other hotspots in the world in the way of recruits, and geographically the most pertinent threat to Europe other than threats from within. Even more striking is the lack of media attention generated by the attacks themselves. Hopefully attitudes will change soon, because if not, we are silently witnessing the maturing of the next batch of enemies that need to be fought.

#75 Japan Forced to Rethink Its Energy Policy

The red hot Indian and particularly Chinese economies are unquestionably having a major impact on the world. While discussions often rage about whether or not this is a good thing (e.g. with environmentalists pointing out the devastating effect this is having on the environment and business leaders arguing it provides for opportunities not seen in decades), there are a myriad of micro areas where the effect of their growth is clear for all to see. One such interesting area is in Japan's energy policy.

For centuries Japan has been the largest economy in Asia, as well as the dominant political player (this has more to do with their financial muscle than with actual influence exerted). Subsequently, the country experienced a hunger for natural energy resources such as gas and oil that far surpassed that of any of its neighbors. With the rapid growth of India and China, this is beginning to change. While, according to the CIA World Factbook, Japan is still the world's second largest (after the USA) importer of oil with 5.43 million barrels of oil per day, China follows closely with 3.18 million and India with 2.01 million. More interestingly, China already consumes more oil than Japan, with China's consumption standing at 6.53 million barrels per day, Japan's at 5.6 million and India's at 2.5 million (the USA is still the world's largest consumer of oil). This means an increasingly larger portion of China's oil has to come from abroad, which directly and adversely affects Japan's supply. Given the fact that Japan's demand for oil has remained and, according to projections, will continue to remain steady for the coming years, the country is justifiably worried that it is no longer as interesting a market as the rapidly growing Chinese and Indian ones are for petroleum exporting countries.

Japan imports a whopping 90% of its oil from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia is Japan's largest oil supplier, shipping 458 million barrels, or 30% of Japan’s total import; UAE second with 387 million, or 25.4%; Iran third with 176 million, or 11.5%; and Qatar fourth with 156 million, or 10.2%). Japan - the world's largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) - is similarly dependent on one geographical location for its gas imports (three quarters of Japan's imports come from Australasia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Australia. Qatar is Japan's fourth largest supplier after Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia).

In the meanwhile, China and India have been scavenging the world - particularly Africa - for new areas from which to secure their oil supply. China has been so successful in Africa that it has even managed to create a very balanced oil importing picture (in 2006, the Middle East accounted for 45% of China's crude oil imports, Africa for 32%, the EU and the Americas for 18.3% and Asia Pacific for 4%, according to the Chinese General Administration of Customs). All the while the oil prices have been skyrocketing, allowing for countries like Russia and Venezuela to play their oil cards and flex their muscles.

Given all these worrisome facts, the Japanese government decided it was time to prioritize the securing of the country's energy supply. In May 2006, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published a revealing document entitled "The New Energy Strategy." In it (and in later documents and high level speeches even more so), we find some key shifts away from their old policy. As Jan-Hein Chrisstoffels, a Japan specialist at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, points out, the formerly abundant references to liberalization, globalization and the free market are nowhere to be found. The new pillars are: Strengthening of bilateral relations with oil and gas producing countries; Increasing imports from oil and gas projects that are led by Japanese firms abroad; Decreasing the use of oil in the transport sector; Using more nuclear energy; And cooperation with China in the field of energy.

Another major shift in policy is the increased role that the Japanese government seeks to play. Japan feels Chinese oil firms have an unfair advantage given a government that pumps money into seemingly economically unprofitable extraction projects simply in order to secure supply. Therefore, the Japanese government has now set out to increase subsidies to Japanese oil firms and provide more favorable loans and investment guarantees. In other words, there is to be little left of the free market policies and non interference from the government that took the overtone until now. Much like China - which woos potential oil suppliers by promising preferential loans, the building of large infrastructure projects and a policy of non-interference in internal affairs - Japan has embarked upon a quest of securing her energy supply through tit-for-tat policies. One success story can already be found in former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Kazakhstan in August 2006, followed by Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Amari Akira's visit this year. They ensured that Kazakhstan's (which has the world's second-largest uranium reserves after Australia) current supplies of only 1% of Japan's uranium imports will jump to 30-40% in the near future, in exchange for Japanese expertise in uranium enrichment.

It appears India and especially China are having a major impact on the policies of other nations such as Japan, which in this case can be considered as a blow to proponents of the free market. It is even likely to extend beyond the oil and gas sectors, as this year China - the world's largest consumer of coal - for the first time became a net importer thereof. The country imported 4.7 million metric tons of coal in January, a rise of 81.1% from a year ago, according to figures from the customs bureau. Although Japan is not at all a major consumer of coal, it might very well affect other formerly free market adhering countries.

#68 China Playing in America's Backyard

China has managed to use its increasing economic muscle - and thereby global clout - to persuade yet another country to recognize it over Taiwan. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias announced on June 6 that his country has broken diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established relations with China, pointing out that Costa Rica needed to strengthen ties with China in order to attract foreign investment. This follows a string of successes for China, who refuse to have diplomatic ties with nations that recognize Taiwan, regarding it as a breakaway republic. During the late 1960s, Taiwan had full relations with 67 countries, but Chinese pressure has led to this figure dropping almost threefold to just 24 states today.

China's success does not really come as a huge surprise, given the fact that China is now the Central American nation's top trading partner, buying more than $1 billion worth of Costa Rican exports in 2006. The fear is that after Costa Rica's decision, other nations such as Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay will follow suit, leaving Taiwan practically abandoned in Latin America. After the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2004 and Costa Rica did the same on Wednesday, today only Paraguay, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala officially recognize Taiwan.

In the last couple of years, China has been particularly active in Latin America, not only to shore up its political influence, but also to secure natural resources that are crucial to sustain the country's red hot economy. Venezuela is particularly keen to court the Chinese with oil, seeing the country as the perfect escape from the grip of the "evil American empire." Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Peru and even Mexico are also seeing large increases in trade and deals (particularly in oil and gas exploration) with China. According to the Inter-American Dialogue, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold, at a pace of some 60% per year, to an estimated $50 billion in 2005. What's more, Chinese investment in Latin America represents half of the country's foreign investment overseas, promising to increase it from $6.5 billion in 2004 to $100 billion by 2014.

US trade with Latin America is still almost 10 times larger, but given the growth of Chinese trade with the region and the severe hostility the Americans encounter in a number of Latin American countries, this is certainly an issue that the need to monitor closely. China is rapidly encroaching upon America's backyard. China's dealings in the region are not limited to securing energy needs, other natural resources and isolating Taiwan. The business of selling of arms and technology to the region (with Venezuela being a key buyer) is also flourishing, while cooperative aerospace deals are being forged with Brazil and possibly key intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba are being used by the Chinese to intercept U.S. communications.

#64 The Non-Genocidal Face of Sudan

Sudan, Africa's largest country, is best known for the crisis (others would call it genocide) in Darfur. But there is another story to Sudan as well. A much more positive one. Sudan happens to be one of Africa's fastest growing economies and, ironically, one of the more stable as of late. What's more, Sudan is currently also one of the world's fastest growing economies.

Sudan's President Omar Al-Bashir announced recently that the country's economic growth rate reached 8% in 2006, adding that the growth rate is expected to increase to between 9-13% in the next year. In fact, according to IMF figures, real GDP growth has reported an average of 6.7% over the past seven years: 8.4% in 2000, 6.2% in 2001, 6.4% in 2002, 4.9% in 2003, 5.2% in 2004, 7.9% in 2005 and 8% in 2006. Other sources put the GDP figure even higher at an average annual growth rate of slightly more than 7% over the past seven years. GDP in 2005 stood at US$ 6,747,748, compared to a mere US$4,950 in 1980. This is remarkable given the grave situation in Darfur and the economic blockade imposed by a large number of nations, as well as the long North-South Civil War that ended with the official signing by both sides of the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005, granting Southern Sudan autonomy for six years, to be followed by a referendum about independence.

Not surprisingly, two major factors in the growth equation are China and oil. Oil revenues have become a major part of GDP, contributing to 49% of the total GDP in 2004, compared to 5.9% in 1999. China imported 81% of Sudan's entire oil exports to the world, while oil accounted for 98.8% of Sudan's exports to China. Of Sudan's total exports to the world in 2003, 40.9% went to China. China is indeed by far Sudan's most valuable trading partner, as, according to the OECD, Sudan's main partners 2004 were China (64.3%), Japan (13.8%) and Saudi Arabia (3.7%). In terms of Sudan's importance for China's economy, Sudanese oil accounted for no more than 5.5% of China's total imports of oil in 2004. Sudanese activist Ali Askouri has gone so far as to proclaim Sudan "The first country to become a Chinese colony."

Another interesting fact that is very much worth noting is that Arab investments in Sudan surged by more than 15 times from US$657 million in 2004 to US$2,341 in 2005. Despite all this, however, we should hope that the crisis in Darfur is not permitted to fade any more into obscurity than it already is. If the figures provided by the United Nations are correct, more than 200,000 people have been killed and two million displaced in the fighting. This should not be worth an economic boom. Khartoum says only 9,000 people have died, but this is not taken seriously by many. In any case, China, for one, does not seem inclined to budge even one inch from their principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries (a policy that was established more than 50 years ago by then foreign minister Zhou Enlai). Without China, little can be done in Darfur. Without China, little economic growth would be witnessed in Sudan. China reigns supreme.

#61 A Beleaguered Ethiopia

Ethiopia has had a busy year so far and it's starting to shape up to be a rough one. After invading Somalia back in July 2006 in order to crush the Islamic insurgency, the Ethiopian troops swiftly proceeded to defeat the enemy and reach Mogadishu by the end of December. Victory was clear and it was time to leave and let the African Union (AU) or the United Nations send the necessary peace keepers. But this did not happen. Instead, the AU did not make good on its pledge to send 8,000 troops (only 1,200 have been deployed), leaving the much reviled Ethiopians to face an increasingly resurgent enemy that can bank on local support when it comes to opposing what many Somalis see as invading Ethiopian forces.

While contending with the troubles in Somalia, tension with another neighbor is starting to flare up. Ethiopia has consistently accused the Eritrean government of supporting and sponsoring various terrorist groups and elements such as Al-Qaeda backed Al-Shabat, operating in Somalia. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said recently that one of the main goals was to defeat Eritrean-backed groups in order to "make it difficult for Eritrea to take the option it has taken thusfar - destabilizing through sending elements to Ethiopia and the horn." He said putting Eritrea's accomplices "out of the game" will leave Eritrea with one option: aggressing Ethiopia on its border - a step deemed unlikely, given the result of the 2000 border war with Ethiopia and the likely backlash from the international community (perhaps most importantly from China).

Eritrea, on it's part, released eight Ethiopian citizens who were kidnapped in the northern Afar region in March. Five Europeans had also been kidnapped, but were released 12 days after their capture. Despite this gesture of apparent goodwill, it appears most east African states support Ethiopia and the transitional government of Somalia, while Eritrea openly supports the Islamists. This, in part, has led to Eritrea leaving the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), signaling increased instability in the region. Eritrea released a document explaining their decision to suspend their membership of IGAD, accusing Ethiopia and the U.S. of intentionally causing havoc in the Horn of Africa in order to restore U.S. dominance in the region.

Besides the escalating conflict in Somalia that is starting to entrap the Ethiopians and has caused a massive refugee problem, Ethiopia was rudely awakened by a massive shooting rampage in Abole, a small town about 120km (75 miles) from the regional capital, Jijiga, in the Somali (not to be confused with the country, Somalia) region. Gunmen from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) killed at least 74 people in an attack on an exploratory drilling site run by a subsidiary of the Chinese government-owned giant oil company, Sinopec. Sixty-five of the dead were Ethiopians and nine were Chinese oil workers. Seven Chinese were also taken captive. Ethiopia has launched a rescue operation to try and secure the release of the Chinese, accusing Eritrea of backing the ONLF in the process. The safety of Chinese interests in Ethiopia is crucial for the African nation, since China is Ethiopia's largest trading partner, with trade worth $450 million in 2006.

China is sure to learn lessons from this attack as well, as the killing of 9 Chinese and the abduction of 7 others comes on the backdrop of 16 Chinese oil workers being kidnapped in Nigeria and a Chinese engineer being killed and another injured in Kenya this year alone. This poses a major dilemma for China, that swears on her policy of non-interference. Until the recent murders and kidnappings of Chinese civilians, this policy has worked very much in China's favor, allowing it to gain access to resources in far flung regions where unsavory types run the show. But once the Chinese themselves become targets, the feasibility of such a policy is brought into question. Perhaps the recent stunning discovery of 2.2 billion barrels of oil in Bohai Bay (northeastern China) will temporarily quench China's thirst for foreign oil and gas, though this is highly unlikely.

#58 The North African Breeding Ground for Radical Islam

The daily suicide bombings in Iraq have become so frequent that they barely generate more than a blink of the news watcher's eye. That is, if it actually makes the news, for a mere 15 people dead has become too common to report on. Perhaps if about 100 people die at the account of a suicide bombing (or any other form, for that matter), some hearts will skip a beat, causing short-term grief and a quick thought for the victims.

This phenomenon might simply be explained by the fact that such bloodshed is no longer shocking, simply because it occurs on a daily basis. It made me wonder, however, how come such little attention has been paid to the recent bombings by and clashes with Islamic terrorists in North Africa? There seems to be an eerie silence when it comes to the risks posed by radical Islamists in countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt (the bombings in Cairo, the resort towns of Dahab, Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba in the last 3 years that killed scores of Westerners generated great media interest). Perhaps the fact that Westerners are directly effected by the occasional bombings in Egyptian resorts might explain for the relatively large attention given to these bombings when compared to those in neighbouring countries.

Few people know that in January this year, 12 militants were killed in Tunisia after a fierce gun battle with security forces. The Tunisian authorities said they were militants who had crossed the border from Algeria. Equally few people know that just last March 11, a man entered a cafe in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in order to use the Internet, but when the cafe's owner refused him permission to log on to radical websites, he detonated the explosives that he had hidden under his clothes, killing 1 person and wounding 3 others. Or even more recently, on April 10, Casablanca was the site of a major security operation against suspected Islamic militants, resulting in three suspected militants detonating their suicide belts in order to prevent arrest. A fourth was shot dead by police as he tried to detonate his device. The police claim to have foiled a plot to target foreign and strategic interests by these suicide bombers.

The most deadly of bombings in the region this year occurred in Algeria's capital Algiers, where two bombs killed at least 33 people and injured a couple hundred, just a few days ago, on April 11. I barely recall the bombings getting any mention in the press headlines. The bombings were the work of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which changed its name to the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb in January. The group's aim is to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and was a major player in the Civil War of the 1990s (and part of the 21st Century as well) in which some 150,000 people died. Finally, last Saturday, April 14, Casablanca was once again the scene of a suicide bombing. Two brothers blew themselves up near the US consulate and its cultural center, injuring one passer-by.

Not only were the two brothers wanted in connection with the March Internet cafe bombing, but the police also found another explosives belt that linked the brothers with the men who blew themselves up on April 15. What's more, officials stated that one of the three suspected militants who blew themselves up during the police raid is the brother of the Internet cafe bomber. All men are thought to have played key roles in the 2003 terror attack in Casablanca, where suicide bombers killed more than 40 people and are believed to belong to the Algerian group mentioned before - the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly known as GSPC. The group has also been said to be active in Tunisia and Mauritania, thus uncovering an interconnected and well-organised Islamic terror group/cell in North Africa.

With Westerners seemingly only able to understand an immediate threat or one that is too late to act against, it is worth putting all this into a socio-geographical perspective. For one, there are no non-European nations closer to Europe than Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Furthermore, of the estimated nearly 20 million Muslims in Europe, only Turkey has more emigrants in Europe than Algeria and Morocco. Ignoring the increasingly visible threat posed by Islamic terrorists is tantamount to Europe begging for problems. The Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian authorities must be helped by strengthening political and economic ties. This does not mean pandering to the whim of Dictators against the will of ordinary people, but it does mean standing up for what you believe is right and aiding those who seek the same results.

#45 Eternal Leaders Part 2 - Mobutu

In this first analysis of a number of the 'eternal leaders,' the track record of former heavyweight Mobutu Sese Seko (former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; then known as the Republic of Zaire) will be analyzed. Mobutu might very well be one of history's most brutal and miserable dictators, bringing his country's economy to ruin and implementing a reign of fear.

Born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu on October 14, 1930, Mobutu Sese Seko - as he later became known - would grow up to brutally lead the Republic of Zaire for 32 years (1965-1997). Through his career in Journalism, Mobutu met future Prime Minister of Belgian Congo (as the nation was called at the time) Patrice Lumumba in Belgium in the late 1950s. The two got along well and, upon return to Belgian Congo, Mobutu was offered the position of colonel and chief of staff of the Congolese army, following the granting of independence on June 30, 1960. From this day forward, Mobutu's true character came to light. He first deceived his friend Lumumba within months of his appointment, siding with President Joseph Kasavubu and deposing of Lumumba in a coup d'état. Lumumba would later be captured by soldiers loyal to Mobutu, beaten in plain sight of television cameras on a number of occasions (including in Mobutu's villa), and was finally executed.

Not long after, on November 25, 1965, the army took over power and Mobutu's 32 year reign began. Opponents were taken out and a cult of personality ensued. His Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Party became the only legal political party in 1967, all unions were put under government control and in 1970, legislative and presidential "elections" were held, where voting was compulsory and Mobutu was the sole candidate. He won with 99% of the popular votes. Having crushed an attempted coup in 1967, co-opted or murdered his opponents, Mobutu now had a solid grip on power.

This led to experimentation with far-reaching policies such as renaming the country the Republic of Zaire in October 1971, ordering citizens to drop their Christian names for African ones (he named himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga - "The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake" - in 1972), imprisoning priests for baptizing a Zairian child with a Christian name, banning Western attire and ties, and forcing men to wear an abacost (a lightweight short-sleeved suit, worn without a tie).

Economically, Mobutu was a disaster, and a highly corrupt one at that. In 1973 Mobutu decided to nationalize all economic assets owned by foreigners, leading to a catastrophic decline in national productivity and wealth. The major failure of this policy eventually led Mobutu to return farms and factories to their original owners in 1977, but it was too little too late. While the country suffered major economic woes, Mobutu allegedly had amassed a fortune estimated to amount to US$5 billion in 1984, according to Fortune magazine. He also owned and traveled in his fleet of Mercedes-Benz vehicles and numerous palaces, while infrastructure virtually collapsed and public service workers went months without being paid. Inflation was a direct result of his policies, which was only exacerbated by the equally prevalent kleptochratic environment and nepotism.

In terms of foreign policy, Mobutu proved to be a relatively reliable ally for the West (mainly the US) in the Cold War. Nevertheless, Communist leader of Romania, tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu, was a close friend of Mobutu's, while Zaire also enjoyed good relations with China. Western disgust of Mobutu became apparent after the end of the Cold War, however, when he was no longer needed, shunning him in a rather hypocritical fashion.

After superficially agreeing to end the ban on other political parties and appointing a transitional government that would lead to promised elections in 1990, Mobutu retained power for another seven years, when he was overthrown in the First Congo War by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1997. This was a direct result of his support for Rwandan Hutus in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when Mobutu issued an order in November 1996 forcing Tutsis to leave Zaire on penalty of death. Kabila was supported by the Tutsi governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda and got rid of the ailing Mobutu in a quick and effective manner. Mobutu died soon after in Morocco, where he lies buried in, ironically, a Christian cemetery.

Although having economically ruined a resource-rich nation, butchering thousands and embezzling billions of dollars, Mobutu can be credited for maintaining the peace in Zaire. In the 5 years of independence before his rule, almost one million Congolese had died in conflict. His hard hand ensured that high profile torturing and assassinations of dissidents instilled a fear of the military and government that would prevent any such recurrence of violence. No matter how you look at him, he certainly qualifies as an "eternal leader."

Please have a look at #43 Eternal Leaders Part 1 for the list of the world's longest serving leaders.

#39 Time For EU to Sit Down With Mugabe

As Zimbabwean President Robert Gabriel Mugabe turns 83 today, there is little to celebrate for the citizens of the Southern African country. Annual inflation has skyrocketed to 1,593.6 percent, food shortages are gripping many parts of the country, badly-needed professionals have left, education and healthcare services, once the best on the continent, are deteriorating. The list goes on. Yet Mugabe seems unaffected by Zimbabwe’s predicament. If anything, Mugabe doesn’t think there are any problems in Zimbabwe. If there are any, then he believes the West is to blame.

It pains to see Zimbabwe sink to such low levels. Few would doubt Zimbabwe’s potential; statistics speak for themselves. Zimbabwe had the highest literacy rate in Africa put at 95.2 percent by UNICEF in 2000. With production levels of 237 million kg, Zimbabwe was the world’s third largest tobacco producer after Brazil and the United States prior to the land invasions in 2000. It remains the fifth largest producer of gold in the world. Unknown to many, Zimbabwe also possesses two-thirds of the world’s reserves for metallurgical grade chromite and until recently, Zimbabwe was the second largest producer of floriculture in Africa after Kenya. More so, Zimbabwe remains the world’s fifth largest producer of white asbestos, after Russia, Canada, China and Brazil.

So what has gone wrong? Mugabe’s hands are dirty. That’s a fact. The EU, on the other hand, is seeking to clean those hands with clearly logical yet unworkable tactics. Angered by Mugabe’s controversial distribution of white-owned commercial farms to mainly landless blacks and his disputed re-election in 2002, the EU introduced its so-called targeted sanctions against Mugabe and his top officials. The sanctions include an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on Mugabe and members of his governing ZANU PF party. In sanctioning a dictator of Mugabe’s size and magnitude, the EU is hoping to change policy in Zimbabwe.

But frankly speaking, that’s not working: five years after the sanctions were introduced, Mugabe hasn’t changed his policy. In fact, it seems to have gotten worse. What people like me will never understand is the EU’s eagerness to continuously renew the sanctions when there is no credible evidence to prove Mugabe is shifting policy.

You don’t really hurt Mugabe much by telling him “Mr. Mugabe, you are banned from coming to the EU.” In this era of globalization, Mugabe and Jan Pieter Balkanende can wear similar suits from the same chain, only that Mugabe will buy his in Kuala Lumpur or Shanghai, while Balkanende will get his in The Hague or Amsterdam. Neither do you really expect Mugabe to change policy by telling him “Robert, you are not allowed to open a bank account in the EU.” He will simply say “Okay,” before taking a flight to Singapore. Even better, considering the power he has, there isn’t any need for Mugabe to keep his money and assets in a foreign bank. For him, the state house is perhaps nearer and more convenient. Worse still, Mugabe and his officials have travelled to the EU on several occasions during the sanctions’ five-year tenure, rendering them somewhat pointless. Portugal is reportedly prepared to invite Mugabe to the EU-Africa summit in April because it fears Mugabe’s failure to attend may influence other African nations to boycott. Most recently, the South African President cancelled his plans to attend the French-Africa summit, a day after it was revealed that Mugabe wasn’t invited. Of course Mbeki gave other reasons for a no-show, but some of us who are familiar with the cordial relationship of the two, won’t buy into them.

The Western media, politicians and NGOs working in Zimbabwe at times badly underestimate Mugabe’s support. I know many people will not agree with me, but I am confident when proclaiming that Mugabe has got what it takes to easily win a free and fair election in present day Zimbabwe. Here is how he does it: brainwash people. Mugabe is in control of the media, so it’s easy to indoctrinate them. In 2002, I told my late grandmother to vote for the opposition. You can guess what kind of answer I got. “You want the British to take over Zimbabwe again?” In African politics, rural dwellers should be on your side if you want to win a national election. Nobody knows that more than Mugabe. With a bit of some intimidation, rural folks are given food to vote for Mugabe. Of course, you wouldn’t call this ‘free and fair,’ but it is a tactic which seems acceptable in African politics. While Mugabe’s support is diminishing in big cities such as Harare and Bulawayo, the same cannot be said about the rural areas, where he enjoys huge support.

Then there are those who just support Mugabe for who he is. Mugabe is seen as a liberator, a true freedom fighter who somehow, like South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, fiercely fought for racial equality in Zimbabwe. After many years of white rule, it was Mugabe who in 1980 introduced equal education and healthcare for blacks in Zimbabwe. Although I can safely say he is partially destroying what he built, Mugabe is still seen as a hero by many people in Zimbabwe and beyond. Mugabe’s fierce rhetoric against ‘Western imperialism’ attracts some sympathy and support in Zimbabwe.

In short, sanctions have only helped Mugabe become more stubborn. Buoyed by his ‘Look East’ policy, he is eager to prove to the West that his regime can last as long as those of emerging economies like China exist. I spent two months in Zimbabwe late last year, and I was quite astounded by the ubiquitous presence of Chinese products in the country. Everywhere you go in Zimbabwe, you will be greeted by what locals have termed ‘zhing-zhongs,’ a derogatory word deriding Chinese goods’ lack of quality. With most of the industries closing shop, it was hardly surprising to note that even the toilet paper was coming from Beijing. China has become one of Mugabe’s last remaining friends. Clever as he has always been, Mugabe knows that with China on his side, the UN Security Council cannot question his policy.

So what’s the benefit of talking rather than isolating Mugabe? Perhaps the EU doesn’t realize Mugabe’s influence in African politics. Zimbabwe and Mugabe in particular, was heavily involved in ending the armed conflict in Mozambique in the late 1980s. Why not use Mugabe’s experience to end other conflicts in Africa? Even so, some African leaders feel Africa is incomplete without Zimbabwe, which is why Mugabe will certainly be lobbying for an African boycott of the EU-Africa summit. He has done it before and he will do it again.

Zimbabwe, whose economy also depends on tourism, cannot afford to have negative publicity anymore. Over the years, Western tourists have shunned Zimbabwe and millions working in the industry have lost their jobs. Although he is the target of EU sanctions, Mugabe isn’t affected by that in any way. Talking to him would help improve Zimbabwe’s battered image and bring in badly-needed foreign investors.

Zimbabwe, like the Great Lakes region of Africa and stubborn Sudan in particular, is a trouble spot. The EU’s foreign chief Javier Solana has appointed special representatives in many of these these hot spots, but has left out Zimbabwe. Why? Does that make Zimbabwe less troubled?

It’s not going to be easy to talk to Mugabe, but if the EU has another solution for Zimbabwe, they should table it now. Sanctions might be logical and right, but there are no signs that they will influence policy in Zimbabwe. Instead of isolating Mugabe, the sanctions indirectly isolate the Zimbabwean people. By talking with Mugabe, the EU is at a much better position to influence Zimbabwean policy. Talk to people who have links with Zimbabwe. Most of them will tell you, Zimbabwe will stay the same as long as Mugabe is in power. Negotiating with him may pave the way for his retirement. Talking to Mugabe may also help the position of the remaining 1000 white farmers, whose future looks bleak under his rule. And finally and more importantly, with Mugabe gone, educated professionals like me and over two million Zimbabweans living abroad, will be prepared to go back and rebuild the country that we dearly love and miss.

- This article was first published in the NRC Next (a Dutch national newspaper) on February 21, 2007. It was provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Bruce Mutsvairo.

#21 News from the Delta & Unkosher Oil

No sooner was it known that four members of a notorious militant gang in the Niger Delta, alleged to have been responsible for last year's attack on Mobil Producing Nigeria (a subsidiary of Exxon), have been arrested by men of the State Security Service (SSS), news broke that gunmen in Nigeria's oil region have attacked and killed 12 people including at least four local chiefs.

It appears the attack might in fact not have targeted the oil companies at all this time, but rather is the result of a long-standing chieftaincy vendetta. The chiefs who were killed had been in control in Kula over the past two years, whereas the faction that launched the boat attack are alleged to have been driven out of Kula two years ago. The dispute arose in 2004 when members of the faction challenged the authority of the local chiefs in deciding how to share the money and benefits given by the oil companies. In an apparent bid to re-enter the community, the assailants felt it necessary to dispose of the evil chiefs. As with most things in the Niger Delta, the attacks are directly related to the "blessing" that is oil, which once again highlights the difficulty of instilling anything remotely resembling stability.

Despite the attack not targeting the oil companies, Royal Dutch Shell decided to evacuate staff from two oil installations, leaving "only a skeleton crew" at the two evacuated pipeline hubs, according to Bisi Ojediran, a spokesman for Shell PLC. Production at the sites (approximately 60,000 barrels per day) has not been affected by the attack, however. Nevertheless, the fear that violence will only increase in the run-up to the Nigerian elections in April seems to be manifesting itself.

Besides the many cases of violence and murder, a new report highlights the lack of transparency and corruption that exist in the Nigerian oil sector. A report compiled by the Hart Group - a United Kingdom based audit firm for the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) - found that about 65 million barrels of crude oil could not be accounted for by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) between 1999 and 2004. 65 million barrels of crude oil translates into the kind of money that should normally be able to pay off rebels for long enough to create a viable solution to the region's problems.

Whether it be corruption, mafia style tactics, forced nationalization, extremism, or acts of terror, one thing appears to be certain: the terms kosher and oil rarely go hand in hand. Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Libya, Angola, and Algeria are prime examples. Ironically, the poorest regions in all of these countries happen to be the ones where the bulk of the oil is situated. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are exceptions in this respect, but then again I doubt they would want to be associated with a term like "kosher" anyway. Let's just say that although clearly not in the same league as the aforementioned countries, they still aren't exactly Halal. True exceptions are countries like Norway, the USA, and Canada, but of these three only Norway is a significant net exporter (Canada and the USA consume most of their own production). Perhaps Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and hermit-state Turkmenistan could become shinning examples of kosher oil producers/exporters when they increase production, though this isn't too likely.

It will be interesting to see whether gunmen will attack ethanol producing farms in Brazil any time soon, or whether the end of oil will mean the end of such shenanigans. Sadly, I think we all know that there is no end sabotage, greed, violence, or exploitation.

#18 Spotlight on the Niger Delta

Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and the world's sixth largest exporter, but, apart from an oil boom in the 1970s and once again benefiting from high prices on the world market today, any real progress has been undermined by corruption and mismanagement. Nigeria appears to be one of the many countries for which the blessing of natural resources is not so saintly. The main problems stem from the heart of the Nigerian oil industry in the Niger Delta region, where violence, kidnapping, bombings, and oil siphoning are part of every day life.

Besides the many casualties, the effect of the troubles in the region has now been translated into a tangible figure. At the recent Ministerial Budget Briefing, Nigerian Finance Minister, Mrs. Nenadi Usman, announced that in 2006, the nation lost an estimated 570 billion naira (approximately 4.4bn US dollars and 3.5bn euros) in revenue as a direct result of the protracted crisis in the Niger Delta region. Usman also stated that "the result was that crude oil sale fell by 3.2 percent below our projected target while petroleum profit tax fell by 10.9 percent. Since oil accounts for more than 95 percent of the foreign exchange earnings of Nigeria, any disruption is of major concern.

Concern is justified, given the recent warning by a spokesman for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in an email message to AFP that "we are resuming with our attacks this month and may even take more hostages." This announcement comes at a time when MEND is holding one Lebanese and three Italian oil workers kidnapped on December 7 in the oil-rich southern Bayelsa State. MEND might have already been true to their word, as news just broke that militants took nine South Korean oil workers hostage at a Daewoo oil facility, also in Bayelsa. Five Chinese telecom workers have also been abducted in Rivers State, but MEND denies any involvement in their seizure. Perhaps China's increased involvement in the continent and the region has made the rebels unsure about what their policy should be toward the Chinese for now. Hopefully this is a sign that the Chinese might be able to play a role in bringing some form normalcy to the Nigerian oil business.

What MEND is seeking is a larger share for southern Nigerians in oil revenues, along with compensation for communities affected by oil pollution. More recent demands are that the Nigerian authorities release former Bayelsa State governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, jailed on corruption charges, as well as separatist leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari (he used to be president of the influential Ijaw Youth Council - the ethnic group which makes up the bulk of the Delta's population) and other detainees from the region. MEND is a relatively new organization (emerging late 2005) of which little is known, but their calls for a larger share of oil wealth and environmental improvement echo the demands made by other groups such as Asari's Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM) and the Ogoni Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The difference lies in the sophistication shown by MEND and the ease with which they are able to sabotage oil facilities and make good on threats.

Despite the creation in 2000 of the Niger Delta Development Commission, which has the sole mandate of developing the Niger Delta region, poverty and crime remain rife in the area. In 2005, Shell spent around $80m on projects and scholarships aimed at benefiting the local population, but these aid projects have failed for the most part. For some reason or other, the Delta boasts an unfinished hospital building, a fish processing factory that never went into production, and an abandoned artesian well which now flows with contaminated water. This would seem to insinuate that the majority of the militant movements aren't really seeking improved conditions for their people, but are rather criminal organizations active in oil and weapons trade on the black market. Oil is regularly siphoned illegally (though it is often claimed by the militants that they are merely taking what is rightfully theirs) from the pipelines, while kidnappings are becoming increasingly frequent as a means to attain capital.

While these problems have plagued the Delta for years, they intensified in 2006 and, with the Nigerian elections coming up in April, they seem likely to intensify. The wave of attacks on the oil industry in February 2006 led to the shutting down over 600,000 barrels per day in output, highlighting the immense power rebel groups such as MEND have on oil production. On a human scale, the more than 60 foreign oil workers that have been abducted over the past year and the 37 Nigerian troops and dozens of Nigerian workers (and one Briton) that have been killed tell the story. Besides all this, the local population has very valid grievances, as there is no doubting the deterioration in environmental living conditions and the lack of shared wealth. All in all, another pernicious example of a blessing gone sour.

#13 On Shutting the Kenyan Border

Where there is war, there are inevitably refugees seeking a safe haven in neighbouring countries. This is currently the case in Somalia as well, though the major fighting seems to have ended for now with the apparent defeat by Ethiopia of the Union of Islamic Courts militiamen. Nevertheless, there are still people fleeing the country. One such destination is Kenya. Kenya, however, borders the south of Somalia, which happens to be the part of the country where the Islamists have been pushed back to.

This has created the tricky situation where both genuine refugees and guerilla fighters are attempting to cross the same border. While shutting down the border is perhaps not the most humane action, it seems to be the most logical and effective option when keeping in mind the long term. Somali President Abdillahi Yusuf was thinking exactly that when he recently held talks with Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki at State House, Mombasa, urging Kibaki to prevent fleeing militia from leaving the country.

The two agreed not only to seriously tighten border security, but also to ensure no foreigner is allowed to enter Kenya from Somalia. This was decided after it was found that there are hundreds of foreign fighters near the border, among which an Ethiopian national with a Canadian passport who was the commander of the Ogaden National Liberation Front forces sympathetic to the Islamists. Many Eritreans and some Kenyans are also fighting on behalf of the Islamists, but even militiamen from as far away as Egypt, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been signaled. US marines operating in Lamu have pledged to help the Kenyans guard the border.

By shutting down the Kenyan border, the pursuing Ethiopian forces will find the last remaining UIC fighters all batched up in one area. Due to the superior military power of the Ethiopian forces and the disorientation of the militia, it should be a relatively simple task to round them all up and effectively end any hope they had of staging a counteroffensive. As for the Islamic forces that are already in Kenyan villages, they should be dealt with locally in Kenya and not allowed to re-enter Somalia.

There are two problems left to solve in the Somali conflict: 1. defeating the UIC, 2. building a stable Somalia with an effective central government. By dealing a final blow to the Islamists around Somalia's border with Kenya, one of the two problems will be solved, allowing for complete attention to be on solving the second problem.

#9 Bluff vs Brilliance

The latest news in the conflict in Somalia is that Somali government troops and Ethiopian forces have entered Mogadishu without firing a shot. What's more, interim government Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Gedi was allegedly welcomed to the town of Afgoye on the outskirts of Mogadishu by dozens of clan leaders from the capital. I presume Mr. Gedi has never before felt this powerful. He has only the brilliance of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to thank.

Zenawi said from the start that the aim was to come in with full force, inflict severe damage, if not total defeat on the Islamist fighters, strengthen Gedi and his government, help build an environment conducive for peace, and get out of there as soon as possible. So far Zenawi has been exceptionally effective and appears to be keeping all his promises. Zenawi's latest pledge: "We are discussing what we need to do to make sure Mogadishu does not descend into chaos. We will not let Mogadishu burn."

The Islamists, meanwhile, are threatening an all out "holy war" against Ethiopia with the help of a possibly large number of foreign Mujahideen. According to Islamic leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, the current retreat to the south is only for tactical reasons. This could signal serious conflict and bloodshed in a few days, but it could also be merely a last ditch effort to save face by bluffing. If the latter is the case, then we should logically presume that brilliance will overcome bluff without all too much trouble.

Once the definitive outcome of the direct conflict is known, it will be time to deal with a possibly much more challenging problem: installing an effective government capable of running the entire nation from the capital of Mogadishu.

#6 Welcoming the Ethiopian Infidels

Somalia is perhaps best known for the distinctly graphic First Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which was the basis for the novel and movie Black Hawk Down. By the next year the US had fully disengaged, leaving the country in the chaos that ensued with the ouster of Dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. After years of civil war fueled by rival clans and a number of declarations of newly-independent states (e.g. Somaliland and Puntland), the UN installed a Transitional National Government, but it has failed to assert any real control.

Recently the Islamic Courts Union (UIC) has managed to more or less unite the country, for better or for worse. The Islamic group has taken control over much of Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, bringing a desperately needed sense of order. Let there be no mistake, however: I personally do not support any group that aspires to create a state dictated by Sharia law. A second Taliban playground is not a welcome solution, no matter how much unity it creates in a torn country.

In steps Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is a predominantly Christian nation and a supporter of Somalia's interim government. As such, it is far from being a dear friend of the UIC. With a declaration of "holy war" by the UIC in hand, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced Sunday night that his country had dropped two bombs on Somalia's main airport, while Somali troops, backed by Ethiopian soldiers, captured a key border town (Belet Weyne). According to early reports, there were some celebrations among Somali citizens as government soldiers moved through the town and headed south in pursuit of fleeing Islamic militiamen.

Fighting is expected to continue to escalate, with reports of fierce battles in the main government town of Baidoa and other areas. Fear further exists that Somalia will become a proxy battlefield between Ethiopia (supporting the transitional government) and Eritrea (supporting the Islamists). With regular citings of foreign Islamic fighters and the US desire to stop the UIC, Somalia also looks set to become a key battleground in the War on Terror.

#3 Africa - China's Training Ground

If the term "failed state" is used to define those states where government is unable to perform its basic duties, then Africa could be considered a "failed continent." Indeed, in the 2006 'Failed States Index' published by the US think-tank, The Fund for Peace, and by US magazine, Foreign Policy, 4 out of the top 5 failed states are located in Africa: 1. Sudan, 2. Democratic Republic of Congo, 3. Ivory Coast, 4. Iraq, 5. Zimbabwe.

Africa, however, is blessed with an impressive endowment of mineral wealth, which has not gone by unnoticed by the risk-loving Chinese. China is eager to snatch its share of Africa's near-global monopolies of platinum (89%) and diamonds (60%) and her significant proportion of the world's cobalt (53%), Zirconium (37%), and gold (28%) reserves (Jonah, 2005). Africa further boasts very sizeable reserves of coal, uranium, copper, nickel, natural gas, and most importantly, oil. While Africa currently accounts for 7% of the global total estimated proved oil reserves (EIA, 1999), the region has the potential to supply 25% of the U.S.'s oil imports by 2015 and already accounts for 30% of China’s imports of oil, according to Forbes. In fact, Angola has recently become China’s largest oil supplier, surpassing Saudi Arabia.

While Africa’s natural wealth is not a new phenomenon, China’s significant investments in the continent is. To highlight the stunning growth of trade between China and Africa, in 1999 the value of trade between the two was $2 billion, which grew to $29.6 billion in 2004 and is expected to reach $50 billion by the end of 2006 (IMF). In some countries, China has set up a near-monopoly in trade, importing 81% of Sudan’s global oil exports and 72.5% of Congo’s global exports in metals, while simultaneously accounting for 14.2% of Sudan’s total global imports and 9.1% of Ghana and Tanzania’s total imports (Kaplinsky, 2006).

The phenomenon of China’s trade in Africa presents the continent with a renewed opportunity to climb out of its current misery and forever shed the stigma of failure. What it also presents, however, is a perfect stage on which China can learn the ways of a global superpower. China is able to build her clout relatively quietly, while the old guard focuses their attention elsewhere. Not only is the Middle Kingdom securing crucial resources to sustain her incredible growth, she is also ‘playing the field’ politically. A similar pattern is emerging in Latin America; where China is slowly becoming a pain for the US, as Latin American countries that are fed up with the Americans for whatever reason now see China as the perfect alternative. Chavez’s open flirting with China is a good example of this. Given Chinese support to such rogue regimes as the Sudanese government and Mugabe in Zimbabwe, increased global Chinese influence is sure to rile the US further.

It is therefore imperative that the US takes note of China’s dealings in Africa, as it is sure to be merely the testing ground for further expansion. The US and the EU should engage with China in Africa, rather than compete directly, as it is impossible to beat the conditions given to African nations by the Chinese (China follows a policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and thus pays no mind to issues like corruption). China has already provided crucial infrastructure and real estate in exchange for trade deals and has provided loans and given debt relief to countries such as Angola, which was refused loans by the West unless it met certain governance requirements. Such conditions cannot be provided by the USA, EU or Japan, as it would mean a major loss of credibility, giving China a clear advantage. Only by engaging China in Africa can the US continue to exert influence and retain her credibility in the continent. The ultimate question is how to go about doing this. The US has little leverage in regard to China, seeing as the Chinese are supplying most of the credit to the US. The EU remains the largest investor in Africa, while the US is second and China third, suggesting that Europe should play a key role in engaging China.

One way to do this is by asking China to join the African Partnership Forum (a grouping of key African governments, Western development donors and African and international organizations), as suggested by Leni Wild and David Mepham of the IPPR. China should also be involved in other Western forums concerning Africa, while Europe and the US should ask to join existing Chinese forums discussing various issues with their African partners. The EU/China Co-operation Program should also put the issue on her agenda. It should be made clear to China that her image will be seriously tarnished unless corporate governance is incorporated into her dealings in the African continent. The African Union’s commitment to good governance should help in this respect.

In sum, China’s rising influence in Africa is a topic that consists of many branches (many more than have been touched upon above) and should prove to be of great significance in a global context. Other postings on the Weekend Economist will be sure to cover the issue from different angles.

References

EIA (1999) A snapshot of Oil and Gas in Africa Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, Energy Information Administration

Forbes (2006) http://www.forbes.com/business/energy/2006/10/06/energy-african-oil-biz-energy_cx_jc_1009beijing_energy06.html

IMF Direction of Trade Statistics

Jonah (2005) Presentation by Sam Jonah, former President of AngloGold Ashanti, University of South Africa, unpublished.

Kaplinsky R (2006) Winners and losers: China’s trade threats and opportunities for Africa, The New Sinosphere.