The Weekend Economist "Quaerere Verum"

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Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts

Thursday, April 12, 2007

#57 REPLY to Article #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

As the Iraq War’s broad unpopularity causes a number of governments—including at least one branch in the United States—to consider the political consequences of continued participation, it's important to keep some perspective about the relative importance of the conflicts in which the West is now engaged. While a principled case must be made for continued American involvement in Iraq, it need not be done at the expense of the vital mission being carried out by NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In his March 14 piece for the Weekend Economist (#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?), Westbrook Sullivan argues that the focus of the international community on the war in Afghanistan is disproportionate to that nascent democracy's impact on world affairs. Sullivan tells us that Afghanistan is “impoverished and isolated,” largely irrelevant to America's strategic interests, essentially no more than an inconvenient central Asian backwater. A failed state at the heart of Central Asia, Sullivan contends, “would be an annoyance to America and its allies, [but] would have little more effect than that on the international community.” This assessment could scarcely be more flawed.

There is little doubt that Iraq is the most significant conflict zone in which the U.S. is presently involved, if only as a consequence of the sheer numbers of American troops involved. A successful—or at least not-disastrous—resolution to the sectarian strife and anti-coalition insurgency there is absolutely vital to the maintenance of American security. While arguments abound about the legitimacy or necessity of the initial intervention in Iraq, the fact remains that the total collapse of the American-led enterprise there would have disastrous consequences for regional and global security.

Just the same, those reservations have helped to ensure that the war in Iraq is an American operation. One would be remiss not to mention the contribution of both combat forces and service-support troops from a number of coalition forces, but the fact remains that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would not have taken place without the specifically American rationale presented by the Bush Administration. The time to make he case for multilateral involvement and burden-sharing in Iraq was four years ago, not the spring of 2007. Most governments have long since reached the decision that further contributions to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI) will needlessly erode their popularity without many of the attendant benefits associated with participation in the initial war effort. Americans should not be surprised that the Blair government would draw similar conclusions.

Sullivan dismisses this sort of calculation as nothing more than a form of political self-preservation, dismissing the redeployment of assets from Iraq to Afghanistan is merely a “relatively safe alternative” for politicians “not wanting to look weak on security issues.” How can we criticize the political leadership of another state when a politically expedient course of action also happens to help secure that nation's vital interests? Iraq is a sinking ship, and the UK is one of the last on the lifeboats. Few should be shocked that the Blair government is unwilling to go to the bottom of the sea.

Leaving aside the politically-charged question of whether or not preemptive war in Iraq was justified, one must concede that a great deal of international goodwill and moral force was squandered through the unnecessary and inaccurate conflation of the war in Iraq with the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few nations opposed the bombardment and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, as such action was viewed as a necessary and natural response to the atrocities visited upon the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was considerably less well-received. Even those allies who were convinced to make contributions to the war effort had little reason to suspect that they’d be involved in a multi-year occupation. So why now should those faithful members of the coalition be slandered for re-assessing their priorities? Have the preceding four years not convinced Mr. Sullivan that the U.S. should accept and encourage what contributions other nations choose to make to missions deemed important to American interests?

British patience for the mission in Iraq has waned, but the UK’s contributions in Afghanistan can still be vital. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in that country, composed of troops from 37 nations, not only makes an important contribution to mission accomplishment but also to the prospects of future security burden-sharing. As NATO allies and other states are compelled to develop broader capacity in support of ISAF’s mission, U.S. policymakers can be more confident in the capabilities of partner states when called upon in future conflicts. With a territorial defense mission seemingly obsolescent in the 21st century, NATO’s future utility to its member states will be defined by the ability of multinational, mission-focused task forces to conduct out-of-area operations. Further expansion of the alliance (and the attendant effect on U.S.-Russia relations) is an open question at present. As such, the future of NATO is in the balance; if ISAF fails in Afghanistan, so too does the institution that has formed the bedrock of European security and transatlantic cooperation for the last six decades.

All this considered, the critical question addressed by Sullivan is whether or not a stable and well-governed Afghanistan is vital to international security. We shouldn’t be surprised to find that those who answer the question in the negative do so in the face of a staggeringly broad consensus to the contrary. Documentary filmmaker Sam Kiley, who recently spent time with NATO forces in Afghanistan, puts their mission in stark terms: “NATO and the Afghan government want to win this war to prevent Afghanistan returning to Taliban rule and becoming a base once again used by international terrorists.” There seems very little doubt that ISAF’s failure would result in exactly such a scenario.

American—and global—security is increasingly wedded to the maintenance of state control over territory; the future must be one of less failed states, not more. Sullivan’s dismissive reference to Afghanistan as “almost entirely impoverished and rural” is puzzling; do these two factors somehow render instability in the country less threatening? The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan is very real. Porous borders with Pakistan and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia destabilize important allies in the region, as well as making the task of tracking terrorists’ movement exponentially more difficult. Kidnapping raids launched into Iran by Baloch separatists (like Jundullah, which American intelligence community sources have recently alleged is financially and materially supported by the U.S. government) complicate the already-delicate relationship between Washington and Tehran. Ungoverned territory in Afghanistan provides further opportunity for these groups to take dangerous and destabilizing actions against Iranian targets, increasing tensions and the likelihood of a destructive and unintended war.

Abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, however attractive it may seem in light of the attention and effort commanded by the steady dissolution of the nascent free Iraq, would be a perfect public diplomacy storm of military failure, sacrificed international goodwill, and eroded American credibility. It seems absurd to suggest that the most appropriate way to secure the most robust future contribution of allied support for American interests is to abandon the war widely viewed as just and necessary in favor of the one most reject as an illegitimate flight of neoconservative fancy. The loss of moral force associated with such an abdication of a just and necessary mission is one from which the United States would not soon recover.

- This article was written in response to Westbrook Sullivan's #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?. It was first published on CJMEWETT and provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Christopher Mewett.

Wednesday, April 4, 2007

#53 Ahmadinejad: An Adroit Twerp

Rarely in modern history have there been figures who, like Mahmood Ahmadinejad, have managed to fabricate countless fairy tales, insult millions of people, defy the so-called most powerful international body in the world, laugh in the face of America, pose a serious threat to peace and stability, and get away with it all. It seems no matter how low or how provocative the man becomes, the world refuses to do a thing about it. Mahmood even manages to win a few friends in the process.

Perhaps his most notable feat was accomplished just recently, culminating in the release of the British sailors. Ahmadinejad knew full well that the British would do little more than talk big. I seriously wonder whether the 15 men (including 1 woman) would have been arrested/captured had they been American troops. Then again, given his unpredictability, he might as well have. Either way, it was a serious plus point for Iran that they were British.

The way Ahmadinejad and the rest of the Iranian leadership dealt with the situation was incredibly belligerent, offensive and menacing. And yet, the Iranians scored a major political victory, making the British lose face and appear weak. Not only were "confessions" and "apologies" aired, but Ahmadinejad managed to make it seem as though it was the British who were being arrogant in maintaing they did nothing wrong, while Iran was essentially doing the exact same thing in saying they had every right to arrest the crew. Furthermore, upon releasing the soldiers, Mahmood made it seem as though it was a personal gift to the British. "We have every right to put these people on trial," Mr Ahmadinejad asserted. "But I want to give them as a present to the British people to say they are all free." The occasion? Prophet Muhammad's birthday, the Easter holiday and perhaps even Persian New Year.

Naturally Ahmadinejad was clever enough to give the sailors the absolute best treatment possible in captivity. He can now show the 'stark contrast' between how poor the West treats her Muslim captives versus how benevolently the Iranians treat their Christian prisoners. Of course the apparently wonderful treatment bestowed upon the British is the complete opposite of how the regime treats any Iranian dissidents. But that is not for the outside world to see, as it would hurt the propaganda machine (yes you skeptical reader you; not only the USA has a smoothly flowing propaganda engine). Iran comes out as the more saintly party, which will only further boost her image, particularly in the Muslim world.

After having the heat of the world turned on Iran for the nuclear issue, the arrest of the sailors and the Iranian insistence that they face trail seemed to be enough material to isolate Iran completely. But just two weeks later, nobody is talking about the nuclear standoff and Ahmadinejad is seen smiling and chatting with 15 highly apologetic British servicemen. Could it have gone any better for the Iranians?

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

With the recent announcement by Prime Minister Tony Blair that the English involvement in the American-led Iraq War was entering its final stages, the question of American involvement in an increasingly unpopular war has once again been brought to the front burner. The fact that the English withdrawal coincides with an increase in the troop deployment in Afghanistan highlights the differences between these two theaters of war. With the exception of the United States, the coalition in relation to the Iraq War is fading. Simultaneously, however, the idea that the war in Afghanistan is a ‘just cause’ and one (in the eyes of the rest of the world) worth fighting for has raised some interesting contradictions.

While the obvious links to the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. should not be understated, I am questioning the relevancy of Afghanistan and its role in relation to American strategic interests. Of course Afghanistan is a hot-bed for terrorist activity and has played host to some of the most infamous international terrorists. But so has Pakistan. I contend that even although a failed Afghanistan would be an annoyance to America and its allies, it would have little more effect than that on the international community. In fact, the overall economic and strategic position of Afghanistan is extremely limited. With the exception of Kabul, the country is almost entirely impoverished and rural. Two-thirds of the Afghan population lives on less than two dollars a day and it is estimated that one-third of its economy is based on the production of poppy seeds.

What exactly are we going to accomplish in this impoverished and isolated country of 30 million? The Soviets found that they were unable to accomplish their mission even without the watchful eyes of the international community. Afghanistan’s limited role in Middle East affairs and its virtually non-existent role in international relations, means that even a successful mission by the international community bears no real fruit.

Conversely, the situation in Iraq necessitates the presence of the international community. As a central figure in the Middle East and a major oil producer, the importance of Iraq far exceeds that of Afghanistan. A failure in Iraq would open the door to a new level of anti-American extremism which would in turn threaten the international community at large. Failure would further strengthen the tyrannical regimes of Iran and Syria and lead to an increased likelihood of a prolonged civil war. The consequences to the international community are profound. By removing themselves from Iraq and increasing their presence in Afghanistan, the English have revealed their true colors. The English and the European Community as a whole are once again in the position of transferring the real responsibility to the Americans.

With the international community fleeing Iraq, but not wanting to look weak on security issues, the conflict in Afghanistan is a relatively safe alternative. Dozens of nations continue to support the American-led Afghanistan war and the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Where are the supporters of the Iraq war? While the international community can clean its hands of the Iraq war and not feel the guilt associated with its failure, the long term consequences are severe. The rise of anti-American, anti-war rhetoric concerning the Iraq war may appease some in the international community, but in the end not only fails to solve the problem, but could potentially reinforce it.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Westbrook Sullivan

Wednesday, March 7, 2007

#46 The Trouble with Israeli Apartheid Week

The Oxford University Arab Cultural Society (OUACS) is a society which one presumes exists to celebrate and propagate Arab culture. Odd then, that this week is the amply advertised and broadly publicized Israeli Apartheid Week, brought to Oxford courtesy of the OUACS and constituting its flagship project. One would hope that there is more to Arab culture than antipathy towards Israel and her policies alone, but I suppose the OUACS are in the best position to judge.

What precisely is Israeli Apartheid Week? The plan is to regale audiences over a five day period with various lectures and other events which will convince the attendees that in addition to a host of other sins, Israel is guilty of practicing Apartheid and that it is morally incumbent upon each and every one of us to confront such heinousness and to put a stop to it. In the organizers’ own words, “the aim of Israeli Apartheid Week is to push forward the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and call for a boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign.” Whatever the merit of such an analysis, it is clearly not one given to nuance.

Indeed, nothing about “Israeli Apartheid Week” is even remotely calibrated to dialogue and apolitical study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is very much a partisan event in which no opposing views are to be heard, and this need not be objectionable per se. It is quite obviously a fact that the Palestinian people today is suffering greatly on account of rather many diverse reasons. To the extent that the Palestinians are suffering, it is desirable that we should alleviate their distress. But this end will not be served by an event as politicized as Israeli Apartheid Week.

Let it first be said that the understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being promulgated by the OUACS is at the very least controversial. Although Israel may be guilty of certain condemnable acts and policies, so is the other side in the conflict, a fact left entirely unaddressed by Israeli Apartheid Week. As for allegations of Israeli apartheid, these are belied somewhat by the OUACS’ choice of speakers. Monday evening Jamal Zahalka, an Arab Muslim member of the Israeli parliament, spoke at great length about Israel’s grave discrimination against its Arab citizens. It seems to have escaped him that as an Arab man born in Israel he was able to obtain his B.A., his M.A., and his Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem without any ado, he has been able to write, travel, and freely express his vehemently anti-Israel views, and he has been able to form with other Arab citizens of Israel a political party which he currently represents in Parliament. While doing all of this, the man has not once been beaten, assaulted, or otherwise savaged by the Israeli authorities. Israel’s Arabs may be in many ways disadvantaged, but there is no question of apartheid; another Arab, Ghaleb Majadle, is currently a serving minister in Israel’s government.

Arguments regarding Israeli apartheid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are similarly tenuous. Glaringly, there are no longer Jews in the Gaza Strip, and those synagogues built there have long since been razed to the ground. It seems difficult to maintain an apartheid regime over a territory that one does not control. As for the West Bank, there the situation is significantly more complex and comparisons between Israeli policies and those of apartheid South Africa can appear to have some justification. Proponents of the political view represented by the OUACS point to checkpoints, segregated roads, the security barrier, and other features of Israeli control as racist policies exemplifying Israeli apartheid. What such an interpretation omits entirely is any attempt to distinguish cause from effect: prior to the Intifada, none of these most egregious of examples existed in any way comparable to their present incarnations. If today some roads are reserved for Israeli citizens only, be they Arab or Jewish, then this situation arose as a direct result of frequent shootings on roads that had previously been used by both Israelis and Palestinians. Likewise, the number of checkpoints mushroomed in an effort to inhibit the movement of those seeking to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel and the security barrier was built in order to prevent the infiltration of Israel by these same people. One may take issue with such policies and regard them as too draconian or ineffective, but it cannot be said that Israel set about applying them because of some malicious desire to oppress Arabs. If this were the case, then why do all the most frequently mentioned illustrations of alleged Israeli apartheid postdate the beginning of the occupation by at least thirty years? Occupation is an ugly thing, but that Israel’s policies equate apartheid is by no means a straightforward proposition.

Still, the OUACS is certainly entitled to voice its perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however unbalanced and contentious it may be. Despite this, one is left with the question of why the OUACS has chosen an obviously inflammatory way in which to postulate its case. If there is apartheid in Israel, then let the facts speak for themselves. I wonder if the OUACS would be entirely comfortable with the idea of a Palestinian Terrorism Week with an explicit agenda directed at publicizing the view of Palestinian society as based on the glorification of terrorism and the systematic delegitimization of Israel’s right to exist. Such a week would be no less contentious than Israeli Apartheid Week and it would be equally ill-conceived. One hopes that the OUACS is merely seeking to shed light on the plight of the Palestinians and to espouse the Palestinian cause; why then, did they not organize the Plight of the Palestinians Week or some equivalent thereof? Surely one does not need to be anti-Israel to be pro-Palestine?

Other questions arise. If the OUACS is a political society which seeks to redress the ills suffered by the Arab peoples rather than a purely cultural society, then why has it neither held nor is it planning to hold an Iraq Week or a Darfur Week or a general lack of democracy in the Middle East Week? What, ultimately, does the OUACS intend to achieve beyond a vilification of Israel and the winning of proselytes to a somewhat radical understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? To make any headway at all toward the reconciliation of Arab and Jew in the Holy Land, it is imperative that partisans on both sides of the argument refrain from blatant provocation and seek instead to organize joint events in which civil and cordial debate takes place, giving the audience a fuller picture of the conflict and allowing them the liberty to find their own, more nuanced positions in the dispute. This is in every way preferable to spoonfeeding the public with undiluted partisanship and propaganda, as is the case with the OUACS’ Israeli Apartheid Week.

- This article was written for publication in Cherwell, the Oxford University newspaper, and was provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Jonathan Valk.

Friday, February 16, 2007

#38 Road (Pricing) Rage

It sometimes seems as if things could not get any worse for poor Tony Blair; an endless quagmire in Iraq, embarrassing police interviews, John Prescott (need I elaborate?) and now, yet again, the British public have voiced there disapproval: over 1.65 million people have signed an online e-petition to ‘scrap the planned vehicle tracking and road pricing policy.’

The Great British Motorist, whose rage was last expressed rather visibly in the national fuel protests in 2000, is something of a civil institution in the UK to be roundly whipped into a frenzy by various tabloid and/or political forces, as and when deemed necessary. We, unlike other Europeans, have had a long history of being rather unwilling to accept that motoring and fuel prices should in fact reflect the true socio-ecological costs of the activity itself. Perhaps we feel short changed in the ‘Blood for Oil’ War, with so little to show for it at the pumps.

What startled me most, however, was to receive from my mother one of the multitude of emails urging people to sign the petition. Far from being merely the bugbear of suburban bourgeois motorists (and the Conservative Party), this policy seems to have riled the nation up and down the land – either on the grounds of cost or privacy (as Peter Roberts, author of the petition, has stated, “the idea of tracking every vehicle at all times is sinister and wrong…Road pricing is already here with the high level of taxation on fuel. The more you travel, the more tax you pay”).

The rage was perhaps inevitable. But then again, maybe the shortsightedness and intellectual papacy underpinning it was also to be expected. Yes, there are serious privacy considerations inherent with the proposal, such as who will have access to the data? How will it be regulated? What safe guards will be in place? On closer inspection, however, the fact that the overwhelming majority of people in Britain are ready to accept ID cards, phone tapping, curfews, electronic tagging, the opening of private mail and extensions to detention without charge to fight the rather ethereal threat from the Al-Qaeda bogeyman proves just how hollow this argument is in reality.

Still, bloggers screamed a call to arms, demanding answers to questions like “are we prepared to be taxed for the privilege of going about our business? At what point do we turn round and say that something is a basic right rather than a privilege, and as such not something we expect to be taxed for?” In the process, of course, such outspoken opposition actually illustrated the very reasons why such a policy must, in fact, be implemented. Motoring, at least as it has been historically conceived, really is a privilege, not a right.

Without some kind of action, congestion on Britain’s roads is set to increase by 25% in less than a decade, in a country that has already seen road transport grow by a shocking 81% since 1980. We face a major transportation crisis, made all the more significant by the Stern Report last year that underscored the very grave financial (let alone human, social and environmental) costs of unrestrained global warming - of which transport accounts for 1/5th of all CO2 emitted. The transport study, led by Sir Rod Eddington, recommended a road pricing of around £1.28 per mile in direct recognition of this fact. According to the study, the world needs to "face up to the reality of climate change, and that implies learning to live within a carbon-constrained future.” People need to "feel the consequences of their decisions" and this is, contrary to rage-blinded motorists, neither patronizing nor authoritarian. The European Carbon Trading Scheme is already in place, and it is only a matter of time before this is extended to private individuals in the form of carbon credits.

It is, quite frankly, ridiculous to assert, as Austin Williams did in the Telegraph, that transport policy should follow a ‘predict and provide’ approach. Endlessly expanding the road system is not a sustainable solution. Nor is it morally or intellectually honest to dismiss Eddington’s conclusion that “some of the best projects are small-scale, such as walking and cycling.” Indeed, such changes in habits – requiring as they do first and foremost a change in mentality – will only be achieved with both the carrot and the financial stick. As the Prime Minister's official spokesman pointed out, whilst “people did feel strongly about this issue, feeling strongly was not a substitute for coming up with practical proposals.”

The supreme irony, of course, was in accusing Eddington of ‘Stalinist’ penny pinching, asking “since when have we ever reduced politics to such simple fiscal equations?” Williams himself articulated the crassest form of financial selfishness on behalf of the British Motorist, urging them to “downplay the so-called harm that carbon does” and, despite all the scientific evidence available, stress that global warming is a “potential problem.” Whilst that approach may save many motorists money and, sure, quite possibly a significant amount thereof, it is tantamount to mortgaging our future and gambling with the very sustainability and prosperity of our children, for they are the ones who will have to deal with our legacy of an infatuation with boundless mobility and endless consumption.

“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Albert Einstein

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Stuart Reeve