#57 REPLY to Article #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

As the Iraq War’s broad unpopularity causes a number of governments—including at least one branch in the United States—to consider the political consequences of continued participation, it's important to keep some perspective about the relative importance of the conflicts in which the West is now engaged. While a principled case must be made for continued American involvement in Iraq, it need not be done at the expense of the vital mission being carried out by NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In his March 14 piece for the Weekend Economist (#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?), Westbrook Sullivan argues that the focus of the international community on the war in Afghanistan is disproportionate to that nascent democracy's impact on world affairs. Sullivan tells us that Afghanistan is “impoverished and isolated,” largely irrelevant to America's strategic interests, essentially no more than an inconvenient central Asian backwater. A failed state at the heart of Central Asia, Sullivan contends, “would be an annoyance to America and its allies, [but] would have little more effect than that on the international community.” This assessment could scarcely be more flawed.

There is little doubt that Iraq is the most significant conflict zone in which the U.S. is presently involved, if only as a consequence of the sheer numbers of American troops involved. A successful—or at least not-disastrous—resolution to the sectarian strife and anti-coalition insurgency there is absolutely vital to the maintenance of American security. While arguments abound about the legitimacy or necessity of the initial intervention in Iraq, the fact remains that the total collapse of the American-led enterprise there would have disastrous consequences for regional and global security.

Just the same, those reservations have helped to ensure that the war in Iraq is an American operation. One would be remiss not to mention the contribution of both combat forces and service-support troops from a number of coalition forces, but the fact remains that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would not have taken place without the specifically American rationale presented by the Bush Administration. The time to make he case for multilateral involvement and burden-sharing in Iraq was four years ago, not the spring of 2007. Most governments have long since reached the decision that further contributions to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI) will needlessly erode their popularity without many of the attendant benefits associated with participation in the initial war effort. Americans should not be surprised that the Blair government would draw similar conclusions.

Sullivan dismisses this sort of calculation as nothing more than a form of political self-preservation, dismissing the redeployment of assets from Iraq to Afghanistan is merely a “relatively safe alternative” for politicians “not wanting to look weak on security issues.” How can we criticize the political leadership of another state when a politically expedient course of action also happens to help secure that nation's vital interests? Iraq is a sinking ship, and the UK is one of the last on the lifeboats. Few should be shocked that the Blair government is unwilling to go to the bottom of the sea.

Leaving aside the politically-charged question of whether or not preemptive war in Iraq was justified, one must concede that a great deal of international goodwill and moral force was squandered through the unnecessary and inaccurate conflation of the war in Iraq with the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few nations opposed the bombardment and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, as such action was viewed as a necessary and natural response to the atrocities visited upon the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was considerably less well-received. Even those allies who were convinced to make contributions to the war effort had little reason to suspect that they’d be involved in a multi-year occupation. So why now should those faithful members of the coalition be slandered for re-assessing their priorities? Have the preceding four years not convinced Mr. Sullivan that the U.S. should accept and encourage what contributions other nations choose to make to missions deemed important to American interests?

British patience for the mission in Iraq has waned, but the UK’s contributions in Afghanistan can still be vital. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in that country, composed of troops from 37 nations, not only makes an important contribution to mission accomplishment but also to the prospects of future security burden-sharing. As NATO allies and other states are compelled to develop broader capacity in support of ISAF’s mission, U.S. policymakers can be more confident in the capabilities of partner states when called upon in future conflicts. With a territorial defense mission seemingly obsolescent in the 21st century, NATO’s future utility to its member states will be defined by the ability of multinational, mission-focused task forces to conduct out-of-area operations. Further expansion of the alliance (and the attendant effect on U.S.-Russia relations) is an open question at present. As such, the future of NATO is in the balance; if ISAF fails in Afghanistan, so too does the institution that has formed the bedrock of European security and transatlantic cooperation for the last six decades.

All this considered, the critical question addressed by Sullivan is whether or not a stable and well-governed Afghanistan is vital to international security. We shouldn’t be surprised to find that those who answer the question in the negative do so in the face of a staggeringly broad consensus to the contrary. Documentary filmmaker Sam Kiley, who recently spent time with NATO forces in Afghanistan, puts their mission in stark terms: “NATO and the Afghan government want to win this war to prevent Afghanistan returning to Taliban rule and becoming a base once again used by international terrorists.” There seems very little doubt that ISAF’s failure would result in exactly such a scenario.

American—and global—security is increasingly wedded to the maintenance of state control over territory; the future must be one of less failed states, not more. Sullivan’s dismissive reference to Afghanistan as “almost entirely impoverished and rural” is puzzling; do these two factors somehow render instability in the country less threatening? The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan is very real. Porous borders with Pakistan and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia destabilize important allies in the region, as well as making the task of tracking terrorists’ movement exponentially more difficult. Kidnapping raids launched into Iran by Baloch separatists (like Jundullah, which American intelligence community sources have recently alleged is financially and materially supported by the U.S. government) complicate the already-delicate relationship between Washington and Tehran. Ungoverned territory in Afghanistan provides further opportunity for these groups to take dangerous and destabilizing actions against Iranian targets, increasing tensions and the likelihood of a destructive and unintended war.

Abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, however attractive it may seem in light of the attention and effort commanded by the steady dissolution of the nascent free Iraq, would be a perfect public diplomacy storm of military failure, sacrificed international goodwill, and eroded American credibility. It seems absurd to suggest that the most appropriate way to secure the most robust future contribution of allied support for American interests is to abandon the war widely viewed as just and necessary in favor of the one most reject as an illegitimate flight of neoconservative fancy. The loss of moral force associated with such an abdication of a just and necessary mission is one from which the United States would not soon recover.

- This article was written in response to Westbrook Sullivan's #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?. It was first published on CJMEWETT and provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Christopher Mewett.

#54 A Near Eastern Conundrum

There are few problems that appear as intractable as the Arab-Israeli predicament and fewer still which are liable to produce a pessimism as intense as that which reigns among those individuals involved in attempts to bring about its end. Consequently, even the mere mention of a final peace deal is of sufficient gravity to attract a great deal of media attention and stoke the fires of hope in the hearts of well-meaning people everywhere. This is precisely what has happened in the wake of the decision at the March 27-28 Arab Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to re-endorse the Arab Peace Initiative first launched at the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002.

Amid much fanfare, leading representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab states (Libya having boycotted the event) gathered in the Saudi capital and proceeded unanimously to revive the 2002 Peace Plan. Within moments of this decision, news services throughout the world were leading with stories of a potential breakthrough in the peace process. The Arab half of the Arab-Israeli conflict had come together in support of peace, and the onus was now on Israel to reciprocate. Or was it? Few people seemed to be asking why a peace offer that led nowhere in 2002 should prove more successful in 2007.

Superficially, the Arab Peace Plan is attractive. It demands of Israel that she withdraw in full from all territories occupied in June of 1967, that a just solution be found to the Palestinian Refugee problem, and that a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital be created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return, Arab states are to normalize relations with Israel and establish a comprehensive peace. This rough outline broadly parallels the Clinton Parameters which formed the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and reflects what any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to resemble. Upon closer inspection, however, major problems with the Arab Peace Initiative become apparent.

For one, no scope is provided by which Palestinians and Israelis can agree upon alterations to the border that take into consideration changes on the ground, either in Israel’s favor or in that of the Palestinians. There is no room for what was Israel before 1967 to become part of Palestine or for any of what was the Jordanian West Bank before 1967 to become part of Israel. Similarly, the call for a full return to the 1967 borders deprives Israel of control, shared or otherwise, of Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, leaving them under the complete control of a Palestinian Authority with a very poor record when it comes to respecting Jewish holy places.

Far more seriously, the envisaged “just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem” is linked to two provisos. First, it must be in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which demands that every refugee who wishes to should be able to return to Israel without delay and that those who do not should be given financial compensation. Uniquely, the UN defines a Palestinian refugee as any direct descendant of one who fled what became Israel in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict between 1946 and 1948. According to this exceptionally broad definition which includes those with no more than one Palestinian great-grandparent, there are today over four million registered refugees and many more still who are eligible for the status. The second condition stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative is that every form of Palestinian patriation which is not agreeable to the Arab states be rejected out of hand. That is, no Palestinian refugee can be settled permanently in any Arab country unless that country allows him to do so. Given the Arab record in dealing with Palestinian refugees, this is not very auspicious to say the least.

The rigidity of the Arab Peace plan is a cause for serious concern, especially as there has been no real indication that the Arab states are willing to countenance compromise on any of their demands for peace. For Israel, this is a real problem. Whether one likes it or not, roughly a quarter of a million Israelis live in the West Bank and some 200,000 more live in East Jerusalem. They cannot all be removed with ease from their homes, and evicting them will produce a refugee problem over half the size of the original Palestinian Refugee problem. Fortunately, a majority of these people live in large settlement blocs and minor adjustments to the border can prevent hundreds of thousands of people from being rendered homeless overnight. In return for such border adjustments, Israel might surrender equivalent territories in Israel proper to the Palestinian state or offer financial compensation in some form. Alternatively, Jews living in what might become the Palestinian state could be offered a choice between Palestinian citizenship and relocation, but it does not appear as though any of the Palestinian factions would be well disposed to such suggestions. Either way, unless it becomes possible to discuss such issues and reach perhaps more practical conclusions than those demanded by the Arab Peace Initiative there is little basis for optimism.

Likewise, no real progress can be expected as long as the Arab League continues to insist on a settlement to the Palestinian Refugee problem which includes a full return to Israel proper of those Palestinian refugees wishing to do so. It is striking that the Arab Peace Initiative entirely ignores the fate of upwards of three quarters of a million Jews who were expelled from Arab countries in the last sixty years or so while adopting a maximalist position with regard to Palestinian refugees, all of whom should be in their view repatriated or compensated. Whether as a result of the Arab peace plan four million, two million, or only half a million Palestinian refugees immigrate to Israel is irrelevant, as the consequence will inevitably be to make of Israel a binational state in one fell swoop. One fifth of Israel’s population is already Arab, and the addition of a million or more would paralyze the democratic political system and polarize the country between Jew and Arab.

Surely it is not in the interests of peace to create a new binational state on the model of Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Kosovo? Still more, it seems counterintuitive to bring together two antagonistic peoples in one state when historical precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Turkey/Greece, and India/Pakistan all dictate otherwise. Indeed, Belgium too has in recent decades been home to violent clashes between its Flemish and Wallonian citizens, and one can hardly point to a history of hatred between these two populations akin to that which plagues the Near East. What cause is there then to assume that Jews and Arabs will be able to share power peaceably in one state? Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely correct for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to entail the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with no significant Jewish population alongside a binational Israel with a possible Arab majority. Such a scenario would effectively dismantle the Jewish State of Israel.

Irrespective of these many stumbling blocks, the Arab Peace Initiative remains positive in that it does promise a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only for this reason Israel should have embraced the Arab peace plan in theory, even if with reservations. Israel’s official response to the Arab summit was slow to materialize, but Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did announce within a week of the Arab Summit’s re-endorsement of the 2002 peace initiative that Israel was prepared to enter into negotiations immediately and that he was personally prepared to travel to Riyadh to meet with his Arab counterparts; in case they preferred a different setting, he also extended to them an invitation to come to Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the Arab response has not been conducive to confidence in a renewed peace process.

Even before Israel reacted to the Arab Peace Initiative, both Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that should Israel reject their peace proposals it might trigger a new round of Arab-Israeli war. It is difficult to determine if this threat was simply rhetorical or indicative of a coming confrontation. After all, Hizb-Allah has been rearming diligently, Hamas is militarizing Gaza at an alarming rate, Syria seems to strengthening its military presence near the Golan Heights, and all of this is being directed in some degree by an increasingly outrageous Iranian regime. Even so, Prime Minister Olmert’s positive response to the Arab Peace Initiative has met with little more than skepticism and derision.

As is logical for any representative of the Jewish State, Olmert agreed to commence negotiations in the direction of a final peace settlement but did not endorse without objection the dubious stipulations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Accordingly, his offer to begin peace talks has so far been either ignored or decried, and not one Arab state has welcomed it. Essentially, the Arab message has been that Israel must first accept their peace offer and that only then can talks begin. This is a peculiar way of making peace. Not only that, but it is strange that Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr has thought it helpful to respond to Olmert’s overtures by announcing in Vienna that, “I also believe, I can say here, that at this time we don't have an Israeli partner anymore.”

Without compromise there will be no progress in the struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is impossible in the view of the framers of the Arab Peace Initiative to conclude a settlement with Israel which allows her to continue to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab state, which divides Jerusalem equitably, and which finds a practical and humanistic solution for both the Jews of the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees, then the Arab Peace Initiative is in every respect a false dawn.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk

#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

With the recent announcement by Prime Minister Tony Blair that the English involvement in the American-led Iraq War was entering its final stages, the question of American involvement in an increasingly unpopular war has once again been brought to the front burner. The fact that the English withdrawal coincides with an increase in the troop deployment in Afghanistan highlights the differences between these two theaters of war. With the exception of the United States, the coalition in relation to the Iraq War is fading. Simultaneously, however, the idea that the war in Afghanistan is a ‘just cause’ and one (in the eyes of the rest of the world) worth fighting for has raised some interesting contradictions.

While the obvious links to the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. should not be understated, I am questioning the relevancy of Afghanistan and its role in relation to American strategic interests. Of course Afghanistan is a hot-bed for terrorist activity and has played host to some of the most infamous international terrorists. But so has Pakistan. I contend that even although a failed Afghanistan would be an annoyance to America and its allies, it would have little more effect than that on the international community. In fact, the overall economic and strategic position of Afghanistan is extremely limited. With the exception of Kabul, the country is almost entirely impoverished and rural. Two-thirds of the Afghan population lives on less than two dollars a day and it is estimated that one-third of its economy is based on the production of poppy seeds.

What exactly are we going to accomplish in this impoverished and isolated country of 30 million? The Soviets found that they were unable to accomplish their mission even without the watchful eyes of the international community. Afghanistan’s limited role in Middle East affairs and its virtually non-existent role in international relations, means that even a successful mission by the international community bears no real fruit.

Conversely, the situation in Iraq necessitates the presence of the international community. As a central figure in the Middle East and a major oil producer, the importance of Iraq far exceeds that of Afghanistan. A failure in Iraq would open the door to a new level of anti-American extremism which would in turn threaten the international community at large. Failure would further strengthen the tyrannical regimes of Iran and Syria and lead to an increased likelihood of a prolonged civil war. The consequences to the international community are profound. By removing themselves from Iraq and increasing their presence in Afghanistan, the English have revealed their true colors. The English and the European Community as a whole are once again in the position of transferring the real responsibility to the Americans.

With the international community fleeing Iraq, but not wanting to look weak on security issues, the conflict in Afghanistan is a relatively safe alternative. Dozens of nations continue to support the American-led Afghanistan war and the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Where are the supporters of the Iraq war? While the international community can clean its hands of the Iraq war and not feel the guilt associated with its failure, the long term consequences are severe. The rise of anti-American, anti-war rhetoric concerning the Iraq war may appease some in the international community, but in the end not only fails to solve the problem, but could potentially reinforce it.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Westbrook Sullivan

#32 The Institutionalization of Peacebuilding

The last few decades (especially since the end of the Cold War), has seen a shift from traditional warfare to an increasing number of intrastate violent conflicts. With this shift, a new term has entered the dictionary of supranational organisations to join such institutions as the UN and the EU. The term I am referring to is “Peacebuilding.”

The process of peacebuilding is aimed at the restoring of positive peace on all levels (thus including the local, grassroots level), to ensure that the causes of the conflict are addressed and that the state in question can function peacefully and stable again. This trend has recently been embraced by NGOs, who are increasingly spending their time and resources on various elements of peacebuilding, such as the initiation of processes aimed at facilitating reconciliation.

However, it seems that the larger international community is not practicing what they preach when intervening in a conflict. The attainment of negative peace (the mere absence of overt conflict) seems to have become sufficient for proclaiming that an intervention has been successful. Add to that the imposition of progressive institutions such as a democratically elected government (which is often too weak to function properly) and a tribunal to try the perpetrators of war crimes, and we have been extremely successful in our peacebuilding efforts. Or so the international community shamefully seems to believe, with the US as its main advocator.

This viewpoint, which is rather simplistic even in theory, is all the more a smorgasbord of failure in practice. Peacebuilding has become an institutionalised process, in which it almost seems to be forgotten that institutions do not work without creating a situation in which the successful functioning of these institutions can be safeguarded. The international community – especially the state-actors – is taking a deductive approach to peacebuilding, focusing on what they can offer in short-term transitional measures, thereby disregarding their long-term capacity in the process of conflict resolution. The focus should rather be on an inductive approach, which is more problem-driven and works at addressing the underlying causes of a conflict to ensure the violence does not recur. As John Paul Lederach, one of the leading authors on post-conflict reconciliation, argues, peacebuilding is a structure-process, which involves the necessity of change in attitudes on all levels of society to stop violent behaviour.

The growing institutionalised approach to peacebuilding is detrimental for the attainment of positive peace; a situation in which not only the fighting has stopped, but also the root causes of the former conflict have been dealt with. By focusing too little on the inductive approach, the international community is and has been missing the opportunity to build a sustainable peace and, in fact, is often making things worse for the stability of the international political community in the long run. Take the example of the global rush for democratisation. This is producing many illiberal democracies, where popularly elected leaders disregard civil- and political rights because they act without constraint of functioning institutions or a history of law-based liberalism.

This institutionalisation of peacebuilding has partially been caused by the characteristics of the prevailing conflicts that we nowadays face. The attainment of positive peace has become far more difficult due to the intrastate- and often ethnic nature of these conflicts, which are frequently referred to as the ‘new wars.’ Also, the fact that civilians are often both the victims and the perpetrators of atrocities has made the threshold to reconciliation and the addressing of the root causes of a conflict much higher. Lastly, after these ‘new wars,’ the former conflicting parties often still share the same state or lands, which increases the chances of violence erupting yet again. Due to the fact that the attainment of a positive peace has become so much more difficult than after traditional wars, the focus of peace researchers and other people involved in the process of peacebuilding has simply shifted to focusing merely on the first step of the attainment of a positive peace: the absence of overt conflict. In doing so, the international community (with the exception perhaps of NGOs) seems to have almost forgotten that the absence of overt conflict – negative peace – should only be the first step towards attaining a situation of positive peace.

Fortunately, the situation seems to be improving. The growing attention paid by NGOs to facilitate initiatives at the grassroots level and take a bottom-up instead of a top-down approach, combined with the increasing importance that these organisations are beginning to play in peacebuilding nowadays (compare, for example, NGO involvement in the breakdown of Yugoslavia with the current war in Iraq), is a positive development in the process of peacebuilding. For a truly successful intervention in a conflict, peacebuilding needs to become highly prioritised in the decision making process. The failure of the Iraq invasion is the prefect testimony to this proposition.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Leon Emmen

#25 Are Women Really More Peaceful?

An old theory exists that war and conflict are a product of male genetics. It has long been asserted, for instance, that the male instinct is to compete, while the female policy is to conspire. Therefore, if women were in charge, the world would/should be more likely to attain peace. This theory led me to look at the case of Bangladesh: a predominantly Muslim nation (about 80-85% of the population) where two of the most powerful people happen to be women.

Bangladesh is home to two main political parties: the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The Awami League is led by Sheikh Hasina Wajed, while Begum Khaleda Zia is the BNP honcho. To say the two do not get along is an understatement, yet they actually have a lot in common. Both women became leaders of their respective parties mainly due to nepotism. Khaleda Zia is the widow to the previous BNP leader, while Sheikh Hasina is daughter to the former AL leader and first president of Bangladesh. Both are former prime ministers (Sheikh Hasina from 1996 to 2001 and Khaleda Zia from 1991 to 1996 and then again from 2001 to 2006) and both of their fathers were assassinated. Finally, both leaders are powerful women in a traditionally highly male dominated society.

The rivalry between the two women extends to the two groups of supporters. Every five years during election season it is a safe bet that the two groups of supporters will literally be at each others throats. So too this time around. Since November 2006, about 40 people have died in riots and demonstrations, while millions of dollars of property has been damaged. Interim President Iajuddin Ahmed even felt it necessary to declare a state of emergency and delay the national elections originally scheduled for January 22. This time the trouble started when the AL and her allies announced they would boycott the elections. Sheikh Hasina decided on this measure after Khaleda Zia ended her five-year tenure as prime minister in October and handed power to the interim authority, leaving a number of her cronies in key positions. The AL thus accused interim President Iajuddin of impartiality and favoring Khaleda in the polls, demanding he resign as caretaker president. After weeks of protests, strikes and transport blockades, Iajuddin decided to resign.

Princeton-educated economist, Fakhruddin Ahmed, was appointed chief of the caretaker government on January 12 and immediately announced free and fair elections would be held as soon as possible, after a major crackdown on crime and corruption. Seeing that Bangladesh has been consistently ranked by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt nations every year this century, this is more than just an uphill task.

Either way, the point is that Bangladesh has not become any more quiet, conciliatory or peaceful since Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia began dominating national politics. With an increase in the amounts of female presidents and prime ministers worldwide in countries as diverse as Latvia, New Zeeland, Germany, the Philippines, Liberia, Chile and maybe even the United States in 2008, those who were hoping this might mean a sharp decrease in wars and conflicts will probably find themselves facing a very cold shower. As a firm believer in equal rights, I certainly welcome the increasing participation of women in all levels of society. All I am saying is that this will most probably not translate into a significant shift in global politics, policies, or an increase in the prospect of peace.

#23 Nukes R Us

Of the known nuclear powers (USA, UK, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan), five have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These five certainly do not represent the sole powers of this era, but when including India and Pakistan, they constitute a very interesting mix. The nuclear powers consist of great nations from the old world, from today's world, from the world of the future, and even from a never has been that probably never will be. The UK and especially France are powers of the past, while the USA is modern day's dominant force. China and India represent the future, whereas Russia is a mix of the old, the present and the future. Finally, Pakistan continues to struggle, with significantly less prospects for regional or global dominance than the others.

Besides these known nuclear powers, there is the particular case of Israel, which follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity. The country has been threatened to the extent that if they really were the dreadful killers that a number of people paint them out to be, they might as well have used the nukes by now. Since they have not, this can mean one of two things: either they don't have them, or, more likely, their possession of nuclear weapons does not form a major threat to global security. With the recent "slip of the tongue" by Prime Minister Olmert during a trip to Germany, a stark warning was sent to countries like Iran that Israel will follow a policy of an eye for an eye if warranted, however.

Another interesting case is North Korea, which claims to have successfully conducted a nuclear test on October 9, 2006. This claim is one of the rare statements originating from Pyong Yang that is actually taken seriously by the rest of the world. Besides the above eight, there are a number of countries who have attempted to acquire nuclear weapons but have failed or given up trying for varying reasons. The most famous examples are Libya and Iraq. There are probably few people who would not agree with the notion that their failure to attain these weapons is a good thing. In the case of Iraq, I am of course not referring to the recent allegations in the buildup to the war there, but rather to their nuclear weapon research program during the 1970s and 1980s (which Israel destroyed in 1981).

There also exists a group of four nations, namely South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which at one point possessed nuclear weapons but willingly gave them up (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine transferred the weapons to Russia in 1995 and 1996). Additionally, there are countries such as the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Japan and Germany, who would be able to produce nuclear weapons in a matter of 1 or 2 years, if not months.

Today's most pressing nuclear case is Iran, which claims to be developing a nuclear program for civilian purposes only, but this is widely viewed around the world with distrust. The fear of a nuclear Iran has set the stage for a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East that not even Israel was able to bring about. Predominantly Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt are apprehensive of Shiite Iran's growing regional influence. Add the nuclear bomb to Iran's arsenal and there might really be something to worry about for these nations. Well aware of this fact, Jordan's King Abdullah II followed Egypt and Saudi Arabia's lead recently in saying that in light of current events, Jordan would be looking to develop a nuclear program “for peaceful purposes." Other states that have expressed a sudden interest in nuclear technology are Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

These "peaceful purposes" might sound fine in theory, but in practice it would mean an increase in the plausibility of perhaps the most turbulent region in the world becoming a nuclear arms nest. If the Saudi Royal family or Egypt's President Mubarak and his cronies were to lose power to radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the attained nuclear know-how could be used for particularly nasty purposes. Ironically enough, if the Mullahs in Iran were to give way to the opposition, the likelihood of a nuclear disaster would probably decrease dramatically.

Iran's nuclear program is thus proving to be not only a serious issue for Israel and the United States, but also for Europe, the Middle East and, yes, even for Islam itself. Iraq has involuntarily positioned itself as the center of this battle between Shia and Sunni Islam, but it appears ready to spread rapidly beyond its borders with increasing sophistication and precariousness.

#13 On Shutting the Kenyan Border

Where there is war, there are inevitably refugees seeking a safe haven in neighbouring countries. This is currently the case in Somalia as well, though the major fighting seems to have ended for now with the apparent defeat by Ethiopia of the Union of Islamic Courts militiamen. Nevertheless, there are still people fleeing the country. One such destination is Kenya. Kenya, however, borders the south of Somalia, which happens to be the part of the country where the Islamists have been pushed back to.

This has created the tricky situation where both genuine refugees and guerilla fighters are attempting to cross the same border. While shutting down the border is perhaps not the most humane action, it seems to be the most logical and effective option when keeping in mind the long term. Somali President Abdillahi Yusuf was thinking exactly that when he recently held talks with Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki at State House, Mombasa, urging Kibaki to prevent fleeing militia from leaving the country.

The two agreed not only to seriously tighten border security, but also to ensure no foreigner is allowed to enter Kenya from Somalia. This was decided after it was found that there are hundreds of foreign fighters near the border, among which an Ethiopian national with a Canadian passport who was the commander of the Ogaden National Liberation Front forces sympathetic to the Islamists. Many Eritreans and some Kenyans are also fighting on behalf of the Islamists, but even militiamen from as far away as Egypt, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been signaled. US marines operating in Lamu have pledged to help the Kenyans guard the border.

By shutting down the Kenyan border, the pursuing Ethiopian forces will find the last remaining UIC fighters all batched up in one area. Due to the superior military power of the Ethiopian forces and the disorientation of the militia, it should be a relatively simple task to round them all up and effectively end any hope they had of staging a counteroffensive. As for the Islamic forces that are already in Kenyan villages, they should be dealt with locally in Kenya and not allowed to re-enter Somalia.

There are two problems left to solve in the Somali conflict: 1. defeating the UIC, 2. building a stable Somalia with an effective central government. By dealing a final blow to the Islamists around Somalia's border with Kenya, one of the two problems will be solved, allowing for complete attention to be on solving the second problem.

#9 Bluff vs Brilliance

The latest news in the conflict in Somalia is that Somali government troops and Ethiopian forces have entered Mogadishu without firing a shot. What's more, interim government Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Gedi was allegedly welcomed to the town of Afgoye on the outskirts of Mogadishu by dozens of clan leaders from the capital. I presume Mr. Gedi has never before felt this powerful. He has only the brilliance of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to thank.

Zenawi said from the start that the aim was to come in with full force, inflict severe damage, if not total defeat on the Islamist fighters, strengthen Gedi and his government, help build an environment conducive for peace, and get out of there as soon as possible. So far Zenawi has been exceptionally effective and appears to be keeping all his promises. Zenawi's latest pledge: "We are discussing what we need to do to make sure Mogadishu does not descend into chaos. We will not let Mogadishu burn."

The Islamists, meanwhile, are threatening an all out "holy war" against Ethiopia with the help of a possibly large number of foreign Mujahideen. According to Islamic leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, the current retreat to the south is only for tactical reasons. This could signal serious conflict and bloodshed in a few days, but it could also be merely a last ditch effort to save face by bluffing. If the latter is the case, then we should logically presume that brilliance will overcome bluff without all too much trouble.

Once the definitive outcome of the direct conflict is known, it will be time to deal with a possibly much more challenging problem: installing an effective government capable of running the entire nation from the capital of Mogadishu.

#8 To Defend Oneself or not to Defend Oneself, That is the Question

On the evening of the 26th of December, as a result of one of the incessant rocket barrages on Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip, two teenage boys were seriously injured. One, a thirteen year old, is on his deathbed, and the other is in a stable condition. Another of these Qassam rockets struck a strategic installation in the port city of Ashqelon, causing only minor damage but giving rise to tremendous worry regarding the viability of Israeli communities in the vicinity of the border with Gaza. These tragic incidents follow closely the unexpected rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinian presidency which has led to the dismantlement of 27 roadblocks, the easing of security procedures at a number of checkpoints, and the transfer of USD 100 million to the Palestinian Authority through the offices of its Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas. Indeed, there has even been talk of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails independent of any release of Gilad Shalit from Gaza, to which he was abducted from Israeli territory by Hamas militants in June.

Now that relations between the Israeli government and Mahmoud Abbas seem to be warming, the latter even calling for renewed peace negotiations, should Israel jeopardize the momentary lull in mutual recriminations by pursuing its assailants? After all, it seems clear that the attackers are not associated with Abbas’s Fatah party, and it is unlikely that they are acting under the aegis of Hamas. Given their operating methods, any attack on the Qassam launching cells, many purporting to be from the Islamic Jihad movement, will eventually result in undesired civilian casualties. These casualties will in turn result in a breakdown in confidence between Israel and its Palestinian partners, forcing an untimely end to any nascent peace process. So is it really in Israel’s best interests to seek out and destroy those responsible for launching rockets at it?

Irrespective of the answer, it looks as though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have no choice but to act. Since Israel and the various Palestinian factions agreed upon a cease fire agreement in November, there have been more Qassam rockets fired at Israel than in the preceding months, when Israeli forces actively sought out and frequently destroyed Qassam launching cells. During the so-called cease fire, nurseries, schools, and private homes have been hit in the Israeli town of Sderot, whose population has become accustomed to the constant wailing of sirens and whose streets are becoming increasingly deserted. On more than one occasion, Qassam rockets have come perilously close to striking sensitive strategic facilities in the port city of Ashqelon, and untold damage has been inflicted upon other smaller border communities. In one incident which made headlines in Israel, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz refrained from hitting a Qassam cell which was known to the Israeli Defense Forces in order to preserve the cease-fire.

This dogmatic adherence to the cease fire, however, has become untenable in the face of public outrage at continuing Qassam attacks. Minister of Defense Peretz is now among the most vociferous in calling for limited but effective defensive action against Qassam rockets. Similarly, other incidents of Palestinian violence have further shifted the public mood towards action, not least of which are the frequent shootings at Israeli targets throughout the West Bank. There are also those within the Israeli polity who believe that the renewed cordiality between Abbas and Israel is purely a ploy by which the former can obtain money and weapons from the latter as he struggles against Hamas for control of the Palestinian territories. If this is true, then Israel has little to lose by defending itself. Even if it is untrue, serious questions persist regarding the extent to which negotiating with Abbas is in any way productive; neither he nor his party are in effective control of the Palestinian government and both were handed a resounding defeat when they lost with quite some margin to Hamas in the Palestinian elections. If Abbas is not in control of the Palestinian territories, if he does not command the support of the larger Palestinian public, and if he has no legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of any Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, then what does Israel really have to gain by pursuing dialogue with him and making unrequited concessions to the Palestinians?

The answer to that question may lie in a rather straightforward effort on the part of the Israeli government to strengthen Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, but there is no guarantee that such a strategy will prove fruitful. In supporting Abbas, Israel may well be undermining his credibility among Palestinians generally, who will be reinforced in their belief that he is little more than a stooge of Israel and the West. In clinging to the cease fire, Israel’s government is undermining its own credibility before an Israeli public which has turned against Olmert in the wake of the summer war with Hizballah. The primary responsibility of any government is maintaining the security of its own citizens, and Israel will lose little if it pursues a limited campaign against the Qassam rockets which will not include ground forces. Little wonder, then, that Olmert has this very afternoon announced that he will do just that.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk

#6 Welcoming the Ethiopian Infidels

Somalia is perhaps best known for the distinctly graphic First Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which was the basis for the novel and movie Black Hawk Down. By the next year the US had fully disengaged, leaving the country in the chaos that ensued with the ouster of Dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. After years of civil war fueled by rival clans and a number of declarations of newly-independent states (e.g. Somaliland and Puntland), the UN installed a Transitional National Government, but it has failed to assert any real control.

Recently the Islamic Courts Union (UIC) has managed to more or less unite the country, for better or for worse. The Islamic group has taken control over much of Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, bringing a desperately needed sense of order. Let there be no mistake, however: I personally do not support any group that aspires to create a state dictated by Sharia law. A second Taliban playground is not a welcome solution, no matter how much unity it creates in a torn country.

In steps Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is a predominantly Christian nation and a supporter of Somalia's interim government. As such, it is far from being a dear friend of the UIC. With a declaration of "holy war" by the UIC in hand, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced Sunday night that his country had dropped two bombs on Somalia's main airport, while Somali troops, backed by Ethiopian soldiers, captured a key border town (Belet Weyne). According to early reports, there were some celebrations among Somali citizens as government soldiers moved through the town and headed south in pursuit of fleeing Islamic militiamen.

Fighting is expected to continue to escalate, with reports of fierce battles in the main government town of Baidoa and other areas. Fear further exists that Somalia will become a proxy battlefield between Ethiopia (supporting the transitional government) and Eritrea (supporting the Islamists). With regular citings of foreign Islamic fighters and the US desire to stop the UIC, Somalia also looks set to become a key battleground in the War on Terror.