#83 Japan’s Prodigious Quest for Energy Independence

Dependant on foreign sources for 96% (87% when including nuclear power) of its primary energy needs and practically 100% of its oil and gas supply, Japan is in a unique position. Rising demand for energy resources and increasing volatility in their supply are contributing greatly to Japan’s concerns. Only natural, then, that Japan should seek to secure its own energy interests. But how realistic is this in today’s world?

A major target of Japan’s May 2006 New National Energy Strategy (NES) is to have the ratio of oil developed by Japanese upstream firms ("Hinomaru oil") increase to 40% of Japan’s oil imports by 2030, up from around 15% in 2005. Japanese oil companies are scrambling to meet this seemingly unobtainable target, coquetting potential partners in Africa, Russia, Central Asia and the Gulf. Just how difficult attaining this objective is can be seen in the failure of the Japanese-owned Arabian Oil Company to renew concessions in the Neutral Zone (also known as “Divided Zone”) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 2000 and 2003. The Azadegan oil field in Iran, where Japanese oil company Inpex’s 75% stake was slashed to 10% by the Iranians in October 2006 and eventually frozen, is another case in point. Meanwhile, voices calling for a boycott of Sudanese oil are getting louder and Japan’s projects on the island of Sakhalin have been undergoing some serious turbulence. The news is not all bleak, however. One major success was scored in October 2005 when Japanese oil firms beat their international competitors in bidding for exploration and development rights in six Libyan oilfields; this was the first oil-exploration concession ever given to Japanese firms in Libya.

Another goal of the NES is to lessen Japan’s dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Here too some progress is being booked, with 84.3% of oil imports originating from the Middle East in November 2007, compared to 90.3% in September 2006. However, the figure has been edging back up in the past few months to 86.7% in February 2008.

One way in which Japan is seeking to realize the goals of the NES is by increasing government involvement in the acquisition of energy resources. To offset the advantages enjoyed by state-sponsored Chinese oil firms, the Japanese government is now seeking to increase subsidies (raising the upper limit of its funding to 75% from the previous 50%) to Japanese oil firms such as JOGMEC – which is slowly becoming a carbon copy of the old Japan National Oil Company. Additional assistance is to come in the form of more favorable loans and investment guarantees. In other words, there is little to be left of the free market policies and non interference from the government that former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s liberalization policies set out to engraft.

Despite being the world’s second largest net importer of oil, the third largest consumer of oil, and the largest importer of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Japan’s demand will continue to decline relative to that of emerging markets such as India and China. With the relative decline of Japanese demand come decreases in Japan’s purchasing power, further undermining its position in the international energy market.

This leaves Japan with two options, namely seeking alternative sources of energy and improving energy efficiency. It is in both of these areas that Japan has booked its most impressive results. Energy conservation and environmental protection have improved significantly, leaving Japan with one of the lowest energy intensity levels among the advanced OECD economies. Similarly, Japan has been able to move considerably in the direction of nuclear and LNG derived power, reducing its dependency on oil. The price, of course, has been increasing dependency on gas.

#75 Japan Forced to Rethink Its Energy Policy

The red hot Indian and particularly Chinese economies are unquestionably having a major impact on the world. While discussions often rage about whether or not this is a good thing (e.g. with environmentalists pointing out the devastating effect this is having on the environment and business leaders arguing it provides for opportunities not seen in decades), there are a myriad of micro areas where the effect of their growth is clear for all to see. One such interesting area is in Japan's energy policy.

For centuries Japan has been the largest economy in Asia, as well as the dominant political player (this has more to do with their financial muscle than with actual influence exerted). Subsequently, the country experienced a hunger for natural energy resources such as gas and oil that far surpassed that of any of its neighbors. With the rapid growth of India and China, this is beginning to change. While, according to the CIA World Factbook, Japan is still the world's second largest (after the USA) importer of oil with 5.43 million barrels of oil per day, China follows closely with 3.18 million and India with 2.01 million. More interestingly, China already consumes more oil than Japan, with China's consumption standing at 6.53 million barrels per day, Japan's at 5.6 million and India's at 2.5 million (the USA is still the world's largest consumer of oil). This means an increasingly larger portion of China's oil has to come from abroad, which directly and adversely affects Japan's supply. Given the fact that Japan's demand for oil has remained and, according to projections, will continue to remain steady for the coming years, the country is justifiably worried that it is no longer as interesting a market as the rapidly growing Chinese and Indian ones are for petroleum exporting countries.

Japan imports a whopping 90% of its oil from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia is Japan's largest oil supplier, shipping 458 million barrels, or 30% of Japan’s total import; UAE second with 387 million, or 25.4%; Iran third with 176 million, or 11.5%; and Qatar fourth with 156 million, or 10.2%). Japan - the world's largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) - is similarly dependent on one geographical location for its gas imports (three quarters of Japan's imports come from Australasia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Australia. Qatar is Japan's fourth largest supplier after Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia).

In the meanwhile, China and India have been scavenging the world - particularly Africa - for new areas from which to secure their oil supply. China has been so successful in Africa that it has even managed to create a very balanced oil importing picture (in 2006, the Middle East accounted for 45% of China's crude oil imports, Africa for 32%, the EU and the Americas for 18.3% and Asia Pacific for 4%, according to the Chinese General Administration of Customs). All the while the oil prices have been skyrocketing, allowing for countries like Russia and Venezuela to play their oil cards and flex their muscles.

Given all these worrisome facts, the Japanese government decided it was time to prioritize the securing of the country's energy supply. In May 2006, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published a revealing document entitled "The New Energy Strategy." In it (and in later documents and high level speeches even more so), we find some key shifts away from their old policy. As Jan-Hein Chrisstoffels, a Japan specialist at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, points out, the formerly abundant references to liberalization, globalization and the free market are nowhere to be found. The new pillars are: Strengthening of bilateral relations with oil and gas producing countries; Increasing imports from oil and gas projects that are led by Japanese firms abroad; Decreasing the use of oil in the transport sector; Using more nuclear energy; And cooperation with China in the field of energy.

Another major shift in policy is the increased role that the Japanese government seeks to play. Japan feels Chinese oil firms have an unfair advantage given a government that pumps money into seemingly economically unprofitable extraction projects simply in order to secure supply. Therefore, the Japanese government has now set out to increase subsidies to Japanese oil firms and provide more favorable loans and investment guarantees. In other words, there is to be little left of the free market policies and non interference from the government that took the overtone until now. Much like China - which woos potential oil suppliers by promising preferential loans, the building of large infrastructure projects and a policy of non-interference in internal affairs - Japan has embarked upon a quest of securing her energy supply through tit-for-tat policies. One success story can already be found in former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Kazakhstan in August 2006, followed by Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Amari Akira's visit this year. They ensured that Kazakhstan's (which has the world's second-largest uranium reserves after Australia) current supplies of only 1% of Japan's uranium imports will jump to 30-40% in the near future, in exchange for Japanese expertise in uranium enrichment.

It appears India and especially China are having a major impact on the policies of other nations such as Japan, which in this case can be considered as a blow to proponents of the free market. It is even likely to extend beyond the oil and gas sectors, as this year China - the world's largest consumer of coal - for the first time became a net importer thereof. The country imported 4.7 million metric tons of coal in January, a rise of 81.1% from a year ago, according to figures from the customs bureau. Although Japan is not at all a major consumer of coal, it might very well affect other formerly free market adhering countries.

#72 Bioflation and the Global Eco-Hypocracy

Markets are moving, volatility is up, Forex markets are once again the focus of a broader public. However, instead of being swamped by a myriad of different analyst reports and outlooks, it could be beneficial to look beyond the complex parade, rank and file of charts in order to grasp what is happening under the bonnet of the world economy. Markets are essentially economic battlefields, continuously pulsing and pushing. The force majeure of the world economy - the dollar - has taken a severe beating. With it, volatility has come back into the market and subsequently also some repricing, so far psychologically more than in absolute yield spreads and valuation. All these things are nothing but distractions when put in perspective of the "real" hurricane out there, and that hurricane is a global one: Bioflation.

Bluntly put: Bioflation is what happens when food (that what we put on our dinner plates) ends up as fuel in our gas tanks. When the appetites of automobiles start competing for those of humanity as a result of ethanol/biodiesel mania, we have a problem called bioflation. When food crops such as corn, rapeseed, sunflower, sugarcane as ethanol or biodiesel have to compete with oil on global fuel markets we essentially interlink them on an unprecedented global scale. This has been instrumental in the increase in food commodities worldwide.

In the end the consumer pays the bill in the form of substantially higher prices for tortillas, cornflakes, cola, hamburgers and pizza. Bioflation may be good news for farmers, but not for regular consumers and the world's poor. As a result of bioflation, Mexicans have been rioting due to corn prices going through the roof. The culprit: corn being used as a source of ethanol rather than food. The result: the price of corn and other food substitutes on their way to record heights. The bad news: this is only the beginning.

When food crops become interchangeable as fuel, they have to compete with fuels such as oil. Simpleton economists would say that this is just a cyclical phenomenon and argue that, with food as a substitute, this creates more supply in a market that has very little cushion. But this extra fuel supply comes at a price: bioflation. Opec and other large exporters have enough flexibility to keep prices high. Furthermore, there is more than enough (and still growing) demand from rapidly developing countries such as China and India. So biofuels as substitutes and alternatives to the global petroeconomy are just farts in the wind. Biofuels such only be considered as a steam valve, as part of a transition completely away from a carbon based fuel economy.

Making biofuel from corn is really not very efficient and is turning the US (previously a net exporter of corn) into an importer. The price hike and volatility of corn on global commodity markets is affecting other crops and substitutes as well. The global hike in food commodities shows just why bioflation is not a welcome trend, unless you are a large scale corn farmer or an ethanol refiner. There are other non competitive, non food crops that should be considered if one really desires to shift towards a biofuel economy. Unless we are willing and capable to rise to that challenge, we will live in an inflationary and unstable world of food and energy substitution.

Several UN organizations have already signaled that they are unable to feed the world with the current trends in food prices (as if they were able to feed the world before). However, food prices are not expected to go down as long as they remain connected to the world's energy economy. As global oil output declines and the prospect of food for oil substitution remains an alternative, high food prices are here to stay, and with it hunger on a unprecedented scale.

The cycle is more vicious and cynical than you think: besides high gasoline prices at the pump, fuel for heating and cooking also becomes more expensive. In developing countries this results in increased wood and shrub poaching and increased deforestation. Higher food prices are also going to encourage increased encroachment on existing forests as villagers look to cultivate more land. As peasants cut down local shrubs and trees for fuel, they are also destabilizing the fertile top soils in the surrounding land. Indirectly, high energy prices will lead to increased soil erosion, drastically affecting the fertility and agricultural output of the land.

Bioflation thus leads to a vicious cycle of higher food prices, inflation and lower "real" economic growth. Furthermore, the collusion of the above factors also inherently exacerbates poverty. Therefore, by understanding the dynamics of bioflation, we need to consider the trade off between "biofueling" the economy and empty stomachs world wide. As such, by "biofueling" our mobility, we drive the most vulnerable participants of the world economy into deeper poverty and hunger.

The "inconvenient truth" is that we are heading towards a world where food prices will be held hostage by both higher energy prices as well as global warming. Additionally, in a very perverse way, the Saudis, Putin and Chavez are more capable of determining the price of a big mac than McDonalds itself. Biofuels as the corner stone for energy independence is a green myth that will lead us down to a greater state of (inter)dependence that we cannot even begin to comprehend.

Furthermore, the effects of "bioflation" are not experienced in homogeneously. The effects, although generally detrimental to all, will be different for low income families as opposed to higher income families across different economies and geographical regions. For example, a Mexican laborer just above the poverty line may find him or herself quickly below the poverty line as wage rises don't stay in check with food prices. Bioflation will impact developed economies and families in a higher socio-economic strata as well. On a macro level this will imply lower spending on durable goods which in the long term can shift the global economy itself. For that reason the quest for cheap alternative energy is the most direct challenge of the 21st century, for it determines the fate and prosperity of mankind.

note
* non-food commodity based plants such as jatropha do offer a viable solution as biofuels because they do not directly compete as foodbased output or as food substitutes
* the author is NOT an anti-environmentalist nor a climate change denier