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Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts

Sunday, January 27, 2008

#82 The Palestinian Conflict and Public Opinion

The conflict between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Palestine is certainly not new. It started long before the creation of Israel. And the basis of this conflict, the claim on the same piece of land by two nations, has not changed through the years. The violence produced by this conflict has also been present since the day the first Jewish settlers arrived in what was then an Ottoman province. The number of casualties was lower, but only because the population itself was smaller and because their weapons were less effective.

What has changed is the public opinion expressed by the tone of the UN and the media coverage related to the conflict. At the birth of the State of Israel and until a number of years after the 1967 War the media had a positive attitude towards Israel. It painted a picture of a small country surrounded by far larger enemies that threatened without cease to annihilate it; in this view, brave little Israel was depicted not only as a courageous survivor, but also as a successful reproduction of Western social-democracy and human rights in a sea of despotism. The subject of Israeli-Arab conflict had not yet apportioned to itself more media attention and UN scrutiny than its relative importance implied it should.

The Arab Palestinians that became refugees as a result of the Arab-Jewish struggle for possession of the Holy Land in 1947-8 were the real victims of policies instituted following the war. The policy of the Arab states was to leave the problem unresolved – thereby leaving the question of Palestine open - and Israel could and would not permit the return of large numbers of refugees as such a policy would have undermined the character and security of the nascent Jewish State. The UN has created a special organization, the UNRWA, to aid the Palestinian refugees next to the UNHCR that aids all other refugees with an independent budget larger per capita than that of its sister organization.

Significant interest in the plight of the Palestinian Arabs and changes to the media’s portrayal of the refugee problem began materializing in the seventies. The figure below shows the sharp increase in the percentage of country-specific United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerned with the Middle East in 1970 and continuing over subsequent decades. In 2006 the number of resolutions related to the Palestinian conflict amounted to more than a quarter of all resolutions. During the same period of time the media gradually changed its tone, first depicting Israel as an occupying and aggressive state and later even as an apartheid state and worse. The proportion of anti-Israeli and pro-Arab Palestinian reporting increased, with some news outlets becoming effectively PR agents for the Arab view of events. This change was evident in the many reviews of the Six Day War published in 2007 and is evident currently in the way that the Gaza conflict is being reported. A clear example of such one sided reporting took place in the wake of Israel’s military operations against Qassam rockets in Gaza on the fifteenth of January; in clashes, an estimated seventeen Hamas militants were killed. Media outlets throughout the world were quick to report Palestinian claims of a massacre in Gaza, failing to note entirely or relegating to a trivial detail the fact that these were armed combatants and not civilians. Moreover, they died fighting, so the appellation massacre, although good propaganda, was not appropriate.

The reasons for this change are manifold; most have little to do with the conflict itself. The main contributors are the change in the moral perception of armed conflict by the general public in the west, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of emotive reporting, and the increasing strength of the Arab world and its PR savvy.

When Israel was established, the Second World War has just come to its end and the notion that wars could be just and necessary was still very strong in the public consciousness. There was also a deep feeling of guilt in the West with regard to the Jewish people which made it difficult to criticise the Zionist desire for an independent Jewish state. Furthermore, for nations with Christian cultures the connection between the Jewish people and the land of Palestine was quite obvious. In the 50s and 60s the western public was exposed to a series of independence wars in the European colonies and conflicts like the Vietnam War. The new generation began associating war not with heroic struggles against evil like the Second World War, but rather with petty and cruel conflicts in which superior Western powers sought to crush miserable locals struggling for a better life. For some, it became axiomatic that the West only fought wars to oppress just national liberation struggles out of racist and exploitative motives. When the Six Day War produced enormous territorial gains for Israel, it was easy to associate it with what was now considered despicable colonialism in the Western mindset and to interpret it as an act of premeditated aggression rather than as a defensive war. The rise of a Jewish settlement movement in the conquered territories further reinforced this association. Pro-Palestinian propagandists exploited this development to depict the whole Zionist movement as no more than an instance of Western colonialism. Interestingly, the territories that are now called ‘the occupied territories’ were occupied since 1948 by Arab countries yet never referred to as such until after they passed into Israel’s hands.

When the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli rule, media interest in and access to them increased greatly and their plight was publicised internationally. As a consequence of the violence of the Second Intifada, the Israeli security establishment enacted harsh measures to prevent terrorist attacks. Palestinian freedom of movement within the territories was severely curtailed and access to Israel for work or trade restricted. Life in areas under Palestinian control suffered from infighting and occasional Israeli incursions to limit terrorist activities. Due to the fact that these incursions frequently took place in densely populated residential areas, there were civilian casualties despite efforts to avoid this. Natural sympathy for the weaker party and pictures of seemingly ragtag Palestinian fighters and stone throwing youths confronting an apparently first rate Israeli army created a rich pasture for reporters, producing interesting, often one sided stories that moved public opinion away from Israel. The huge influence of such representations on public opinion is also recognized by the Palestinian PR machine, which has been caught staging scenes and feeding them to media outlets in order to fan hostility against Israel.

An important development of the seventies was the realisation in the Western World that it was strongly dependent on Arab oil. This recognition strongly influenced European Middle East policies and their positions on the Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the emergence of a unified block of Islamic nations under the aegis of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) mobilized the political clout and voices of over a billion people against Israel. These voices were strongly reinforced by the left which has made Israel one of the classics of their ideological struggle, casting it as the evil western/white power against the innocent non-western/non-white power. As a consequence, the Arab Palestinian cause became an integral part of all of their activities, mainly demonstrations and conferences, which are not related at all to Palestine (e.g. anti globalization). Another active channel to anti Israel opinions in the west is created by the millions of Muslim immigrants. All these voices are in turn broadcast through the media and impact public opinion.

Israel is unable to move public opinion towards a more balanced view of the conflict in large measure due to the fact that it is an open society. There is absolute freedom of speech in Israel and thus the views expressed by the media and individuals are very diverse, reflecting not one but many different understandings of the conflict. Instead of providing a clear Israeli position, Israeli society provides a multiplicity of positions which precludes the effective propagation of an official narrative for PR purposes.

As long as there will not be significant changes on the ground (like the establishment of an Arab Palestine living peacefully side by side with Israel), one can expect to continue seeing the shift of public opinion away from support for Israel.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Tamara Fai

Wednesday, June 13, 2007

#70 A Three State Solution?

It has become customary to hear bad news emanating from the Palestinian Territories (mainly from Gaza) and the saying "it can't possibly get any worse than this" is frequently applied to the situation on the ground there. Sadly, it has now really gotten a worse. A lot worse, believe it or not. We now find ourselves in a situation where a week of factional fighting has left at least 100 people dead and Gaza is effectively under Hamas control. To make this point clear, Hamas militants took over a number of key Fatah positions and security headquarters, including one of President Mahmoud Abbas' offices, went through his personal belongings in his bedroom and spray painted "This was the house of the murderer Dahlan that was cleansed by the holy warriors" on the home of Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan, thereafter allowing his property to be looted. Hamas supporters even went so far as to loot the home of deceased leader Yasser Arafat, taking his furniture, wall tiles and personal belongings.

In his first serious response to the tumult in Gaza, Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas (a leading Fatah politician) dissolved the Hamas-led unity government and fired Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (a prominent Hamas figure), appointing former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad in his place. There is also word of revenge attacks on Hamas loyalists in the West Bank by Fatah members in the wake of some brutal executions of their members in Gaza. While Hamas has cemented its control in Gaza, Palestinian Authority security forces, accompanied by Fatah members, have continued the wave of arrests of Hamas members in the West Bank, where Fatah clearly has the upper hand. In the most significant counter-action, Fatah gunmen stormed the Hamas-controlled Palestinian parliament building in Ramallah. An - at least temporary - split between Gaza and the West Bank now appears to have become irreversible.

It is highly likely that Western governments and donors, as well as a number of Arab nations such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will respond by doing all they can to shore up the influence of Abbas, including the resumption of financial aid. Officials in the Israeli government have already suggested Israel will work with President Abbas and a Fatah government in the West Bank, possibly handing over hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenues to Fatah which it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (these had been withheld since Hamas came into power early 2006). Meanwhile, senior Bush administration officials pledged to work quickly to convince the Quartet to remove the restrictions on the Palestinian government now that the unity government had been dissolved and allow a direct transfer of emergency aid to the West Bank. They further stated that the US will continue humanitarian aid to Gaza, but in terms of diplomacy, there is a complete separation between Gaza and the West Bank.

Hamas' dream of establishing an Islamic state in the territories and what is now Israel has taken root with their takeover of Gaza; a very worrying prospect indeed. Israel, which completely withdrew from Gaza last year, now finds itself bordering a re-arming Hezbollah in the North and a free-reigning Hamas in the south. A result of increasing Iranian influence? Perhaps. On the other hand, the good news is that, given a separation between the more radical Gaza and more liberal West Bank, the latter territory will stand a much better chance of prospering. Similarly, if the lives of Gaza residents fail to advance under Hamas rule while their compatriots in the West Bank prosper, a backlash against Hamas is likely. Whether all this means an end to the Palestinian dream of statehood (with Gaza and the West Bank united), nothing more than a delay, or perhaps even the beginning of a three state solution, only time will tell.

Thursday, April 5, 2007

#54 A Near Eastern Conundrum

There are few problems that appear as intractable as the Arab-Israeli predicament and fewer still which are liable to produce a pessimism as intense as that which reigns among those individuals involved in attempts to bring about its end. Consequently, even the mere mention of a final peace deal is of sufficient gravity to attract a great deal of media attention and stoke the fires of hope in the hearts of well-meaning people everywhere. This is precisely what has happened in the wake of the decision at the March 27-28 Arab Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to re-endorse the Arab Peace Initiative first launched at the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002.

Amid much fanfare, leading representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab states (Libya having boycotted the event) gathered in the Saudi capital and proceeded unanimously to revive the 2002 Peace Plan. Within moments of this decision, news services throughout the world were leading with stories of a potential breakthrough in the peace process. The Arab half of the Arab-Israeli conflict had come together in support of peace, and the onus was now on Israel to reciprocate. Or was it? Few people seemed to be asking why a peace offer that led nowhere in 2002 should prove more successful in 2007.

Superficially, the Arab Peace Plan is attractive. It demands of Israel that she withdraw in full from all territories occupied in June of 1967, that a just solution be found to the Palestinian Refugee problem, and that a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital be created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return, Arab states are to normalize relations with Israel and establish a comprehensive peace. This rough outline broadly parallels the Clinton Parameters which formed the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and reflects what any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to resemble. Upon closer inspection, however, major problems with the Arab Peace Initiative become apparent.

For one, no scope is provided by which Palestinians and Israelis can agree upon alterations to the border that take into consideration changes on the ground, either in Israel’s favor or in that of the Palestinians. There is no room for what was Israel before 1967 to become part of Palestine or for any of what was the Jordanian West Bank before 1967 to become part of Israel. Similarly, the call for a full return to the 1967 borders deprives Israel of control, shared or otherwise, of Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, leaving them under the complete control of a Palestinian Authority with a very poor record when it comes to respecting Jewish holy places.

Far more seriously, the envisaged “just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem” is linked to two provisos. First, it must be in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which demands that every refugee who wishes to should be able to return to Israel without delay and that those who do not should be given financial compensation. Uniquely, the UN defines a Palestinian refugee as any direct descendant of one who fled what became Israel in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict between 1946 and 1948. According to this exceptionally broad definition which includes those with no more than one Palestinian great-grandparent, there are today over four million registered refugees and many more still who are eligible for the status. The second condition stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative is that every form of Palestinian patriation which is not agreeable to the Arab states be rejected out of hand. That is, no Palestinian refugee can be settled permanently in any Arab country unless that country allows him to do so. Given the Arab record in dealing with Palestinian refugees, this is not very auspicious to say the least.

The rigidity of the Arab Peace plan is a cause for serious concern, especially as there has been no real indication that the Arab states are willing to countenance compromise on any of their demands for peace. For Israel, this is a real problem. Whether one likes it or not, roughly a quarter of a million Israelis live in the West Bank and some 200,000 more live in East Jerusalem. They cannot all be removed with ease from their homes, and evicting them will produce a refugee problem over half the size of the original Palestinian Refugee problem. Fortunately, a majority of these people live in large settlement blocs and minor adjustments to the border can prevent hundreds of thousands of people from being rendered homeless overnight. In return for such border adjustments, Israel might surrender equivalent territories in Israel proper to the Palestinian state or offer financial compensation in some form. Alternatively, Jews living in what might become the Palestinian state could be offered a choice between Palestinian citizenship and relocation, but it does not appear as though any of the Palestinian factions would be well disposed to such suggestions. Either way, unless it becomes possible to discuss such issues and reach perhaps more practical conclusions than those demanded by the Arab Peace Initiative there is little basis for optimism.

Likewise, no real progress can be expected as long as the Arab League continues to insist on a settlement to the Palestinian Refugee problem which includes a full return to Israel proper of those Palestinian refugees wishing to do so. It is striking that the Arab Peace Initiative entirely ignores the fate of upwards of three quarters of a million Jews who were expelled from Arab countries in the last sixty years or so while adopting a maximalist position with regard to Palestinian refugees, all of whom should be in their view repatriated or compensated. Whether as a result of the Arab peace plan four million, two million, or only half a million Palestinian refugees immigrate to Israel is irrelevant, as the consequence will inevitably be to make of Israel a binational state in one fell swoop. One fifth of Israel’s population is already Arab, and the addition of a million or more would paralyze the democratic political system and polarize the country between Jew and Arab.

Surely it is not in the interests of peace to create a new binational state on the model of Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Kosovo? Still more, it seems counterintuitive to bring together two antagonistic peoples in one state when historical precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Turkey/Greece, and India/Pakistan all dictate otherwise. Indeed, Belgium too has in recent decades been home to violent clashes between its Flemish and Wallonian citizens, and one can hardly point to a history of hatred between these two populations akin to that which plagues the Near East. What cause is there then to assume that Jews and Arabs will be able to share power peaceably in one state? Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely correct for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to entail the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with no significant Jewish population alongside a binational Israel with a possible Arab majority. Such a scenario would effectively dismantle the Jewish State of Israel.

Irrespective of these many stumbling blocks, the Arab Peace Initiative remains positive in that it does promise a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only for this reason Israel should have embraced the Arab peace plan in theory, even if with reservations. Israel’s official response to the Arab summit was slow to materialize, but Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did announce within a week of the Arab Summit’s re-endorsement of the 2002 peace initiative that Israel was prepared to enter into negotiations immediately and that he was personally prepared to travel to Riyadh to meet with his Arab counterparts; in case they preferred a different setting, he also extended to them an invitation to come to Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the Arab response has not been conducive to confidence in a renewed peace process.

Even before Israel reacted to the Arab Peace Initiative, both Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that should Israel reject their peace proposals it might trigger a new round of Arab-Israeli war. It is difficult to determine if this threat was simply rhetorical or indicative of a coming confrontation. After all, Hizb-Allah has been rearming diligently, Hamas is militarizing Gaza at an alarming rate, Syria seems to strengthening its military presence near the Golan Heights, and all of this is being directed in some degree by an increasingly outrageous Iranian regime. Even so, Prime Minister Olmert’s positive response to the Arab Peace Initiative has met with little more than skepticism and derision.

As is logical for any representative of the Jewish State, Olmert agreed to commence negotiations in the direction of a final peace settlement but did not endorse without objection the dubious stipulations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Accordingly, his offer to begin peace talks has so far been either ignored or decried, and not one Arab state has welcomed it. Essentially, the Arab message has been that Israel must first accept their peace offer and that only then can talks begin. This is a peculiar way of making peace. Not only that, but it is strange that Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr has thought it helpful to respond to Olmert’s overtures by announcing in Vienna that, “I also believe, I can say here, that at this time we don't have an Israeli partner anymore.”

Without compromise there will be no progress in the struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is impossible in the view of the framers of the Arab Peace Initiative to conclude a settlement with Israel which allows her to continue to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab state, which divides Jerusalem equitably, and which finds a practical and humanistic solution for both the Jews of the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees, then the Arab Peace Initiative is in every respect a false dawn.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk

Friday, December 29, 2006

#10 A True Man of Peace

A recently declassified document by the US State Department reveals that Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Yassir Arafat was not always so peace loving (whether he ever was is something I leave up to each of your own individual judgments). On March 1, 1973, Arafat ordered the Black September Organization members who seized the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, to kill the United States ambassador, his deputy, and a Belgian diplomat. At the time there was a diplomatic reception at the Saudi embassy honoring the departing US Deputy Chief of Mission.

It is interesting to note that another Peace Laureate who is today trying increasingly hard to play a part in the Middle East peace process, Jimmy Carter, considered Arafat a "dear friend." One might expect that, given this new information, Carter's legitimacy should now be undermined in the eyes of US government officials. Sadly, this probably won't happen, given the fact that this is not entirely a new story. In fact, Kenneth R. Timmerman reported on this event back in June 25, 2001, but never found many ears that were willing to listen. You can find his report on the following website: http://www.john-loftus.com/welsh1.asp.

Given the fact that it has always been preferred by top officials to see Arafat as a man wanting nothing more than peace, this would be news is really worth little more than a shrug. This is especially so now hat he is no longer among us. I mean, why tamper with a noble (or should I say nobel) martyr? Although Abu Mazen (President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas) has been accused of funding the Munich massacres, his slate record is virgin-like compared to Arafat's. Not to mention compared to that of any Hamas official. As such, I continue to place my hopes on Abbas, albeit skeptically due to the precariousness of his position.
The actual document from the Department of State can be found here: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/67584.pdf

Thursday, December 28, 2006

#8 To Defend Oneself or not to Defend Oneself, That is the Question

On the evening of the 26th of December, as a result of one of the incessant rocket barrages on Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip, two teenage boys were seriously injured. One, a thirteen year old, is on his deathbed, and the other is in a stable condition. Another of these Qassam rockets struck a strategic installation in the port city of Ashqelon, causing only minor damage but giving rise to tremendous worry regarding the viability of Israeli communities in the vicinity of the border with Gaza. These tragic incidents follow closely the unexpected rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinian presidency which has led to the dismantlement of 27 roadblocks, the easing of security procedures at a number of checkpoints, and the transfer of USD 100 million to the Palestinian Authority through the offices of its Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas. Indeed, there has even been talk of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails independent of any release of Gilad Shalit from Gaza, to which he was abducted from Israeli territory by Hamas militants in June.

Now that relations between the Israeli government and Mahmoud Abbas seem to be warming, the latter even calling for renewed peace negotiations, should Israel jeopardize the momentary lull in mutual recriminations by pursuing its assailants? After all, it seems clear that the attackers are not associated with Abbas’s Fatah party, and it is unlikely that they are acting under the aegis of Hamas. Given their operating methods, any attack on the Qassam launching cells, many purporting to be from the Islamic Jihad movement, will eventually result in undesired civilian casualties. These casualties will in turn result in a breakdown in confidence between Israel and its Palestinian partners, forcing an untimely end to any nascent peace process. So is it really in Israel’s best interests to seek out and destroy those responsible for launching rockets at it?

Irrespective of the answer, it looks as though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have no choice but to act. Since Israel and the various Palestinian factions agreed upon a cease fire agreement in November, there have been more Qassam rockets fired at Israel than in the preceding months, when Israeli forces actively sought out and frequently destroyed Qassam launching cells. During the so-called cease fire, nurseries, schools, and private homes have been hit in the Israeli town of Sderot, whose population has become accustomed to the constant wailing of sirens and whose streets are becoming increasingly deserted. On more than one occasion, Qassam rockets have come perilously close to striking sensitive strategic facilities in the port city of Ashqelon, and untold damage has been inflicted upon other smaller border communities. In one incident which made headlines in Israel, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz refrained from hitting a Qassam cell which was known to the Israeli Defense Forces in order to preserve the cease-fire.

This dogmatic adherence to the cease fire, however, has become untenable in the face of public outrage at continuing Qassam attacks. Minister of Defense Peretz is now among the most vociferous in calling for limited but effective defensive action against Qassam rockets. Similarly, other incidents of Palestinian violence have further shifted the public mood towards action, not least of which are the frequent shootings at Israeli targets throughout the West Bank. There are also those within the Israeli polity who believe that the renewed cordiality between Abbas and Israel is purely a ploy by which the former can obtain money and weapons from the latter as he struggles against Hamas for control of the Palestinian territories. If this is true, then Israel has little to lose by defending itself. Even if it is untrue, serious questions persist regarding the extent to which negotiating with Abbas is in any way productive; neither he nor his party are in effective control of the Palestinian government and both were handed a resounding defeat when they lost with quite some margin to Hamas in the Palestinian elections. If Abbas is not in control of the Palestinian territories, if he does not command the support of the larger Palestinian public, and if he has no legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of any Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, then what does Israel really have to gain by pursuing dialogue with him and making unrequited concessions to the Palestinians?

The answer to that question may lie in a rather straightforward effort on the part of the Israeli government to strengthen Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, but there is no guarantee that such a strategy will prove fruitful. In supporting Abbas, Israel may well be undermining his credibility among Palestinians generally, who will be reinforced in their belief that he is little more than a stooge of Israel and the West. In clinging to the cease fire, Israel’s government is undermining its own credibility before an Israeli public which has turned against Olmert in the wake of the summer war with Hizballah. The primary responsibility of any government is maintaining the security of its own citizens, and Israel will lose little if it pursues a limited campaign against the Qassam rockets which will not include ground forces. Little wonder, then, that Olmert has this very afternoon announced that he will do just that.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk