#82 The Palestinian Conflict and Public Opinion

The conflict between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Palestine is certainly not new. It started long before the creation of Israel. And the basis of this conflict, the claim on the same piece of land by two nations, has not changed through the years. The violence produced by this conflict has also been present since the day the first Jewish settlers arrived in what was then an Ottoman province. The number of casualties was lower, but only because the population itself was smaller and because their weapons were less effective.

What has changed is the public opinion expressed by the tone of the UN and the media coverage related to the conflict. At the birth of the State of Israel and until a number of years after the 1967 War the media had a positive attitude towards Israel. It painted a picture of a small country surrounded by far larger enemies that threatened without cease to annihilate it; in this view, brave little Israel was depicted not only as a courageous survivor, but also as a successful reproduction of Western social-democracy and human rights in a sea of despotism. The subject of Israeli-Arab conflict had not yet apportioned to itself more media attention and UN scrutiny than its relative importance implied it should.

The Arab Palestinians that became refugees as a result of the Arab-Jewish struggle for possession of the Holy Land in 1947-8 were the real victims of policies instituted following the war. The policy of the Arab states was to leave the problem unresolved – thereby leaving the question of Palestine open - and Israel could and would not permit the return of large numbers of refugees as such a policy would have undermined the character and security of the nascent Jewish State. The UN has created a special organization, the UNRWA, to aid the Palestinian refugees next to the UNHCR that aids all other refugees with an independent budget larger per capita than that of its sister organization.

Significant interest in the plight of the Palestinian Arabs and changes to the media’s portrayal of the refugee problem began materializing in the seventies. The figure below shows the sharp increase in the percentage of country-specific United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerned with the Middle East in 1970 and continuing over subsequent decades. In 2006 the number of resolutions related to the Palestinian conflict amounted to more than a quarter of all resolutions. During the same period of time the media gradually changed its tone, first depicting Israel as an occupying and aggressive state and later even as an apartheid state and worse. The proportion of anti-Israeli and pro-Arab Palestinian reporting increased, with some news outlets becoming effectively PR agents for the Arab view of events. This change was evident in the many reviews of the Six Day War published in 2007 and is evident currently in the way that the Gaza conflict is being reported. A clear example of such one sided reporting took place in the wake of Israel’s military operations against Qassam rockets in Gaza on the fifteenth of January; in clashes, an estimated seventeen Hamas militants were killed. Media outlets throughout the world were quick to report Palestinian claims of a massacre in Gaza, failing to note entirely or relegating to a trivial detail the fact that these were armed combatants and not civilians. Moreover, they died fighting, so the appellation massacre, although good propaganda, was not appropriate.

The reasons for this change are manifold; most have little to do with the conflict itself. The main contributors are the change in the moral perception of armed conflict by the general public in the west, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of emotive reporting, and the increasing strength of the Arab world and its PR savvy.

When Israel was established, the Second World War has just come to its end and the notion that wars could be just and necessary was still very strong in the public consciousness. There was also a deep feeling of guilt in the West with regard to the Jewish people which made it difficult to criticise the Zionist desire for an independent Jewish state. Furthermore, for nations with Christian cultures the connection between the Jewish people and the land of Palestine was quite obvious. In the 50s and 60s the western public was exposed to a series of independence wars in the European colonies and conflicts like the Vietnam War. The new generation began associating war not with heroic struggles against evil like the Second World War, but rather with petty and cruel conflicts in which superior Western powers sought to crush miserable locals struggling for a better life. For some, it became axiomatic that the West only fought wars to oppress just national liberation struggles out of racist and exploitative motives. When the Six Day War produced enormous territorial gains for Israel, it was easy to associate it with what was now considered despicable colonialism in the Western mindset and to interpret it as an act of premeditated aggression rather than as a defensive war. The rise of a Jewish settlement movement in the conquered territories further reinforced this association. Pro-Palestinian propagandists exploited this development to depict the whole Zionist movement as no more than an instance of Western colonialism. Interestingly, the territories that are now called ‘the occupied territories’ were occupied since 1948 by Arab countries yet never referred to as such until after they passed into Israel’s hands.

When the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli rule, media interest in and access to them increased greatly and their plight was publicised internationally. As a consequence of the violence of the Second Intifada, the Israeli security establishment enacted harsh measures to prevent terrorist attacks. Palestinian freedom of movement within the territories was severely curtailed and access to Israel for work or trade restricted. Life in areas under Palestinian control suffered from infighting and occasional Israeli incursions to limit terrorist activities. Due to the fact that these incursions frequently took place in densely populated residential areas, there were civilian casualties despite efforts to avoid this. Natural sympathy for the weaker party and pictures of seemingly ragtag Palestinian fighters and stone throwing youths confronting an apparently first rate Israeli army created a rich pasture for reporters, producing interesting, often one sided stories that moved public opinion away from Israel. The huge influence of such representations on public opinion is also recognized by the Palestinian PR machine, which has been caught staging scenes and feeding them to media outlets in order to fan hostility against Israel.

An important development of the seventies was the realisation in the Western World that it was strongly dependent on Arab oil. This recognition strongly influenced European Middle East policies and their positions on the Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the emergence of a unified block of Islamic nations under the aegis of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) mobilized the political clout and voices of over a billion people against Israel. These voices were strongly reinforced by the left which has made Israel one of the classics of their ideological struggle, casting it as the evil western/white power against the innocent non-western/non-white power. As a consequence, the Arab Palestinian cause became an integral part of all of their activities, mainly demonstrations and conferences, which are not related at all to Palestine (e.g. anti globalization). Another active channel to anti Israel opinions in the west is created by the millions of Muslim immigrants. All these voices are in turn broadcast through the media and impact public opinion.

Israel is unable to move public opinion towards a more balanced view of the conflict in large measure due to the fact that it is an open society. There is absolute freedom of speech in Israel and thus the views expressed by the media and individuals are very diverse, reflecting not one but many different understandings of the conflict. Instead of providing a clear Israeli position, Israeli society provides a multiplicity of positions which precludes the effective propagation of an official narrative for PR purposes.

As long as there will not be significant changes on the ground (like the establishment of an Arab Palestine living peacefully side by side with Israel), one can expect to continue seeing the shift of public opinion away from support for Israel.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Tamara Fai

#70 A Three State Solution?

It has become customary to hear bad news emanating from the Palestinian Territories (mainly from Gaza) and the saying "it can't possibly get any worse than this" is frequently applied to the situation on the ground there. Sadly, it has now really gotten a worse. A lot worse, believe it or not. We now find ourselves in a situation where a week of factional fighting has left at least 100 people dead and Gaza is effectively under Hamas control. To make this point clear, Hamas militants took over a number of key Fatah positions and security headquarters, including one of President Mahmoud Abbas' offices, went through his personal belongings in his bedroom and spray painted "This was the house of the murderer Dahlan that was cleansed by the holy warriors" on the home of Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan, thereafter allowing his property to be looted. Hamas supporters even went so far as to loot the home of deceased leader Yasser Arafat, taking his furniture, wall tiles and personal belongings.

In his first serious response to the tumult in Gaza, Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas (a leading Fatah politician) dissolved the Hamas-led unity government and fired Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (a prominent Hamas figure), appointing former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad in his place. There is also word of revenge attacks on Hamas loyalists in the West Bank by Fatah members in the wake of some brutal executions of their members in Gaza. While Hamas has cemented its control in Gaza, Palestinian Authority security forces, accompanied by Fatah members, have continued the wave of arrests of Hamas members in the West Bank, where Fatah clearly has the upper hand. In the most significant counter-action, Fatah gunmen stormed the Hamas-controlled Palestinian parliament building in Ramallah. An - at least temporary - split between Gaza and the West Bank now appears to have become irreversible.

It is highly likely that Western governments and donors, as well as a number of Arab nations such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will respond by doing all they can to shore up the influence of Abbas, including the resumption of financial aid. Officials in the Israeli government have already suggested Israel will work with President Abbas and a Fatah government in the West Bank, possibly handing over hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenues to Fatah which it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (these had been withheld since Hamas came into power early 2006). Meanwhile, senior Bush administration officials pledged to work quickly to convince the Quartet to remove the restrictions on the Palestinian government now that the unity government had been dissolved and allow a direct transfer of emergency aid to the West Bank. They further stated that the US will continue humanitarian aid to Gaza, but in terms of diplomacy, there is a complete separation between Gaza and the West Bank.

Hamas' dream of establishing an Islamic state in the territories and what is now Israel has taken root with their takeover of Gaza; a very worrying prospect indeed. Israel, which completely withdrew from Gaza last year, now finds itself bordering a re-arming Hezbollah in the North and a free-reigning Hamas in the south. A result of increasing Iranian influence? Perhaps. On the other hand, the good news is that, given a separation between the more radical Gaza and more liberal West Bank, the latter territory will stand a much better chance of prospering. Similarly, if the lives of Gaza residents fail to advance under Hamas rule while their compatriots in the West Bank prosper, a backlash against Hamas is likely. Whether all this means an end to the Palestinian dream of statehood (with Gaza and the West Bank united), nothing more than a delay, or perhaps even the beginning of a three state solution, only time will tell.

#54 A Near Eastern Conundrum

There are few problems that appear as intractable as the Arab-Israeli predicament and fewer still which are liable to produce a pessimism as intense as that which reigns among those individuals involved in attempts to bring about its end. Consequently, even the mere mention of a final peace deal is of sufficient gravity to attract a great deal of media attention and stoke the fires of hope in the hearts of well-meaning people everywhere. This is precisely what has happened in the wake of the decision at the March 27-28 Arab Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to re-endorse the Arab Peace Initiative first launched at the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002.

Amid much fanfare, leading representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab states (Libya having boycotted the event) gathered in the Saudi capital and proceeded unanimously to revive the 2002 Peace Plan. Within moments of this decision, news services throughout the world were leading with stories of a potential breakthrough in the peace process. The Arab half of the Arab-Israeli conflict had come together in support of peace, and the onus was now on Israel to reciprocate. Or was it? Few people seemed to be asking why a peace offer that led nowhere in 2002 should prove more successful in 2007.

Superficially, the Arab Peace Plan is attractive. It demands of Israel that she withdraw in full from all territories occupied in June of 1967, that a just solution be found to the Palestinian Refugee problem, and that a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital be created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return, Arab states are to normalize relations with Israel and establish a comprehensive peace. This rough outline broadly parallels the Clinton Parameters which formed the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and reflects what any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to resemble. Upon closer inspection, however, major problems with the Arab Peace Initiative become apparent.

For one, no scope is provided by which Palestinians and Israelis can agree upon alterations to the border that take into consideration changes on the ground, either in Israel’s favor or in that of the Palestinians. There is no room for what was Israel before 1967 to become part of Palestine or for any of what was the Jordanian West Bank before 1967 to become part of Israel. Similarly, the call for a full return to the 1967 borders deprives Israel of control, shared or otherwise, of Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, leaving them under the complete control of a Palestinian Authority with a very poor record when it comes to respecting Jewish holy places.

Far more seriously, the envisaged “just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem” is linked to two provisos. First, it must be in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which demands that every refugee who wishes to should be able to return to Israel without delay and that those who do not should be given financial compensation. Uniquely, the UN defines a Palestinian refugee as any direct descendant of one who fled what became Israel in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict between 1946 and 1948. According to this exceptionally broad definition which includes those with no more than one Palestinian great-grandparent, there are today over four million registered refugees and many more still who are eligible for the status. The second condition stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative is that every form of Palestinian patriation which is not agreeable to the Arab states be rejected out of hand. That is, no Palestinian refugee can be settled permanently in any Arab country unless that country allows him to do so. Given the Arab record in dealing with Palestinian refugees, this is not very auspicious to say the least.

The rigidity of the Arab Peace plan is a cause for serious concern, especially as there has been no real indication that the Arab states are willing to countenance compromise on any of their demands for peace. For Israel, this is a real problem. Whether one likes it or not, roughly a quarter of a million Israelis live in the West Bank and some 200,000 more live in East Jerusalem. They cannot all be removed with ease from their homes, and evicting them will produce a refugee problem over half the size of the original Palestinian Refugee problem. Fortunately, a majority of these people live in large settlement blocs and minor adjustments to the border can prevent hundreds of thousands of people from being rendered homeless overnight. In return for such border adjustments, Israel might surrender equivalent territories in Israel proper to the Palestinian state or offer financial compensation in some form. Alternatively, Jews living in what might become the Palestinian state could be offered a choice between Palestinian citizenship and relocation, but it does not appear as though any of the Palestinian factions would be well disposed to such suggestions. Either way, unless it becomes possible to discuss such issues and reach perhaps more practical conclusions than those demanded by the Arab Peace Initiative there is little basis for optimism.

Likewise, no real progress can be expected as long as the Arab League continues to insist on a settlement to the Palestinian Refugee problem which includes a full return to Israel proper of those Palestinian refugees wishing to do so. It is striking that the Arab Peace Initiative entirely ignores the fate of upwards of three quarters of a million Jews who were expelled from Arab countries in the last sixty years or so while adopting a maximalist position with regard to Palestinian refugees, all of whom should be in their view repatriated or compensated. Whether as a result of the Arab peace plan four million, two million, or only half a million Palestinian refugees immigrate to Israel is irrelevant, as the consequence will inevitably be to make of Israel a binational state in one fell swoop. One fifth of Israel’s population is already Arab, and the addition of a million or more would paralyze the democratic political system and polarize the country between Jew and Arab.

Surely it is not in the interests of peace to create a new binational state on the model of Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Kosovo? Still more, it seems counterintuitive to bring together two antagonistic peoples in one state when historical precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Turkey/Greece, and India/Pakistan all dictate otherwise. Indeed, Belgium too has in recent decades been home to violent clashes between its Flemish and Wallonian citizens, and one can hardly point to a history of hatred between these two populations akin to that which plagues the Near East. What cause is there then to assume that Jews and Arabs will be able to share power peaceably in one state? Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely correct for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to entail the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with no significant Jewish population alongside a binational Israel with a possible Arab majority. Such a scenario would effectively dismantle the Jewish State of Israel.

Irrespective of these many stumbling blocks, the Arab Peace Initiative remains positive in that it does promise a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only for this reason Israel should have embraced the Arab peace plan in theory, even if with reservations. Israel’s official response to the Arab summit was slow to materialize, but Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did announce within a week of the Arab Summit’s re-endorsement of the 2002 peace initiative that Israel was prepared to enter into negotiations immediately and that he was personally prepared to travel to Riyadh to meet with his Arab counterparts; in case they preferred a different setting, he also extended to them an invitation to come to Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the Arab response has not been conducive to confidence in a renewed peace process.

Even before Israel reacted to the Arab Peace Initiative, both Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that should Israel reject their peace proposals it might trigger a new round of Arab-Israeli war. It is difficult to determine if this threat was simply rhetorical or indicative of a coming confrontation. After all, Hizb-Allah has been rearming diligently, Hamas is militarizing Gaza at an alarming rate, Syria seems to strengthening its military presence near the Golan Heights, and all of this is being directed in some degree by an increasingly outrageous Iranian regime. Even so, Prime Minister Olmert’s positive response to the Arab Peace Initiative has met with little more than skepticism and derision.

As is logical for any representative of the Jewish State, Olmert agreed to commence negotiations in the direction of a final peace settlement but did not endorse without objection the dubious stipulations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Accordingly, his offer to begin peace talks has so far been either ignored or decried, and not one Arab state has welcomed it. Essentially, the Arab message has been that Israel must first accept their peace offer and that only then can talks begin. This is a peculiar way of making peace. Not only that, but it is strange that Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr has thought it helpful to respond to Olmert’s overtures by announcing in Vienna that, “I also believe, I can say here, that at this time we don't have an Israeli partner anymore.”

Without compromise there will be no progress in the struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is impossible in the view of the framers of the Arab Peace Initiative to conclude a settlement with Israel which allows her to continue to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab state, which divides Jerusalem equitably, and which finds a practical and humanistic solution for both the Jews of the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees, then the Arab Peace Initiative is in every respect a false dawn.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk

#46 The Trouble with Israeli Apartheid Week

The Oxford University Arab Cultural Society (OUACS) is a society which one presumes exists to celebrate and propagate Arab culture. Odd then, that this week is the amply advertised and broadly publicized Israeli Apartheid Week, brought to Oxford courtesy of the OUACS and constituting its flagship project. One would hope that there is more to Arab culture than antipathy towards Israel and her policies alone, but I suppose the OUACS are in the best position to judge.

What precisely is Israeli Apartheid Week? The plan is to regale audiences over a five day period with various lectures and other events which will convince the attendees that in addition to a host of other sins, Israel is guilty of practicing Apartheid and that it is morally incumbent upon each and every one of us to confront such heinousness and to put a stop to it. In the organizers’ own words, “the aim of Israeli Apartheid Week is to push forward the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and call for a boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign.” Whatever the merit of such an analysis, it is clearly not one given to nuance.

Indeed, nothing about “Israeli Apartheid Week” is even remotely calibrated to dialogue and apolitical study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is very much a partisan event in which no opposing views are to be heard, and this need not be objectionable per se. It is quite obviously a fact that the Palestinian people today is suffering greatly on account of rather many diverse reasons. To the extent that the Palestinians are suffering, it is desirable that we should alleviate their distress. But this end will not be served by an event as politicized as Israeli Apartheid Week.

Let it first be said that the understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being promulgated by the OUACS is at the very least controversial. Although Israel may be guilty of certain condemnable acts and policies, so is the other side in the conflict, a fact left entirely unaddressed by Israeli Apartheid Week. As for allegations of Israeli apartheid, these are belied somewhat by the OUACS’ choice of speakers. Monday evening Jamal Zahalka, an Arab Muslim member of the Israeli parliament, spoke at great length about Israel’s grave discrimination against its Arab citizens. It seems to have escaped him that as an Arab man born in Israel he was able to obtain his B.A., his M.A., and his Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem without any ado, he has been able to write, travel, and freely express his vehemently anti-Israel views, and he has been able to form with other Arab citizens of Israel a political party which he currently represents in Parliament. While doing all of this, the man has not once been beaten, assaulted, or otherwise savaged by the Israeli authorities. Israel’s Arabs may be in many ways disadvantaged, but there is no question of apartheid; another Arab, Ghaleb Majadle, is currently a serving minister in Israel’s government.

Arguments regarding Israeli apartheid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are similarly tenuous. Glaringly, there are no longer Jews in the Gaza Strip, and those synagogues built there have long since been razed to the ground. It seems difficult to maintain an apartheid regime over a territory that one does not control. As for the West Bank, there the situation is significantly more complex and comparisons between Israeli policies and those of apartheid South Africa can appear to have some justification. Proponents of the political view represented by the OUACS point to checkpoints, segregated roads, the security barrier, and other features of Israeli control as racist policies exemplifying Israeli apartheid. What such an interpretation omits entirely is any attempt to distinguish cause from effect: prior to the Intifada, none of these most egregious of examples existed in any way comparable to their present incarnations. If today some roads are reserved for Israeli citizens only, be they Arab or Jewish, then this situation arose as a direct result of frequent shootings on roads that had previously been used by both Israelis and Palestinians. Likewise, the number of checkpoints mushroomed in an effort to inhibit the movement of those seeking to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel and the security barrier was built in order to prevent the infiltration of Israel by these same people. One may take issue with such policies and regard them as too draconian or ineffective, but it cannot be said that Israel set about applying them because of some malicious desire to oppress Arabs. If this were the case, then why do all the most frequently mentioned illustrations of alleged Israeli apartheid postdate the beginning of the occupation by at least thirty years? Occupation is an ugly thing, but that Israel’s policies equate apartheid is by no means a straightforward proposition.

Still, the OUACS is certainly entitled to voice its perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however unbalanced and contentious it may be. Despite this, one is left with the question of why the OUACS has chosen an obviously inflammatory way in which to postulate its case. If there is apartheid in Israel, then let the facts speak for themselves. I wonder if the OUACS would be entirely comfortable with the idea of a Palestinian Terrorism Week with an explicit agenda directed at publicizing the view of Palestinian society as based on the glorification of terrorism and the systematic delegitimization of Israel’s right to exist. Such a week would be no less contentious than Israeli Apartheid Week and it would be equally ill-conceived. One hopes that the OUACS is merely seeking to shed light on the plight of the Palestinians and to espouse the Palestinian cause; why then, did they not organize the Plight of the Palestinians Week or some equivalent thereof? Surely one does not need to be anti-Israel to be pro-Palestine?

Other questions arise. If the OUACS is a political society which seeks to redress the ills suffered by the Arab peoples rather than a purely cultural society, then why has it neither held nor is it planning to hold an Iraq Week or a Darfur Week or a general lack of democracy in the Middle East Week? What, ultimately, does the OUACS intend to achieve beyond a vilification of Israel and the winning of proselytes to a somewhat radical understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? To make any headway at all toward the reconciliation of Arab and Jew in the Holy Land, it is imperative that partisans on both sides of the argument refrain from blatant provocation and seek instead to organize joint events in which civil and cordial debate takes place, giving the audience a fuller picture of the conflict and allowing them the liberty to find their own, more nuanced positions in the dispute. This is in every way preferable to spoonfeeding the public with undiluted partisanship and propaganda, as is the case with the OUACS’ Israeli Apartheid Week.

- This article was written for publication in Cherwell, the Oxford University newspaper, and was provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Jonathan Valk.

#40 Iran as the Real Israel

The common belief around the world (with some exceptions), is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the root of instability in the wider Middle East. Others go so far as to say the existence of the state of Israel is the cause of all that's wrong in the region. Indeed, Israel is used as a tool to strengthen government support in most, if not all Arab and even non-Arab Muslim countries on a daily basis. By depicting Israel as an incessant aggressor with aims of expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates and exterminating anyone that stands in its way (most notably the brave Palestinians), governments are able to draw attention away from internal societal ills and retain power. Today, however, the cracks in this flawed policy are beginning to show, as influential figures in the Middle East are openly speaking of a more serious threat; the Iranian threat.

Shiite Iran is increasingly becoming a rather aching sore in the behind of a number of predominantly Sunni nations. As duly noted by Judith Kipper, a Middle East expert at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, "What really concerns pro-U.S. Arab states is that Iran is setting the political agenda in the region." A rising Iran is not in the interest of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This has even led to public gestures and overtures by Arab states to Israel; the sworn enemy of the Iranian regime.

Senior Egyptian journalist Youssef Ibrahim, who served for 24 years as a senior reporter for the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, and has interviewed almost every Arab leader, recently wrote in a letter that "the Arab world can continue to stand by the Palestinians ‘until it is blue in the face,’ but most ‘clever’ Arabs have abandoned the notion of the Palestinian conflict and the eternal struggle against Israel. In other words, the notion that Israel is here to stay is slowly gaining a foothold in the upper intellectual levels of Arab society. At even higher levels - at the end of a Spanish-Arab conference in Madrid - the Foreign Ministers of seven Arab countries (Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia) issued a joint statement expressing their desire to "advance together toward recognition and normalization of relations with Israel."

The fear of a powerful and nuclear Iran has even set the stage for a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Jordan's King Abdullah II followed Egypt and Saudi Arabia's lead a few months ago in saying that in light of current events, Jordan would be looking to develop a nuclear program “for peaceful purposes." Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, as well as Gulf States such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have also expressed a sudden interest in nuclear technology. In the almost 60 years that Israel has been enemy number one in the Middle East - and quite possibly already in possession of nuclear weapons - there was never such widespread talk of nuclear proliferation. This inadvertently shows the true colors of Arab leader's opinions, who apparently have always known that Israel is not a real threat to them.

Other signs that Arab nations view Israel more favorably than Iran include an incident in January this year, when Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's departing ambassador to the United States, attended a Washington reception sponsored by American Jewish organizations. The appearance of a Saudi diplomat at such an event is a first in Saudi history. Besides Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also quietly stepped up contacts with Israel and pro-Israel Jewish groups in the USA. For example, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres met the Emir of Qatar in Doha after taking part in a debate organized by the BBC in the Qatari capital.

Despite the recent signals, however, there is still a very long way to go. For one, only three of 21 Arab nations recognize Israel: Egypt, Jordan and Mauritania. Furthermore, a very real hatred for the state of Israel exists in the region, thanks to decades of indoctrination. Israel remains a unifying factor for the diverse religious factions in the Middle East. Although some Sunni leaders have equated Shiites with the lowest form of being (كفّار kuffār; unbeliever), both sects would agree that the true enemy is Medinat Yisra'el. The Eilat bombings prove this as well, for just one day after the bombing, Hamas and Fatah managed to achieve what they hadn't been able to during the relative lull with the Israelis; namely implement a cease-fire.

Despite the difficulty in fostering healthy relationships between all countries of the Middle East, one thing has become clear: the fear of Iran at the top level of Arab politics is much more real than all the chewed up rhetoric about the 'Zionist entity.'

Please also have a look at the article "Israel as a Factor of Regional Stability" for examples of how the state has unified groups and nations that otherwise have few points of agreement.

#23 Nukes R Us

Of the known nuclear powers (USA, UK, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan), five have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These five certainly do not represent the sole powers of this era, but when including India and Pakistan, they constitute a very interesting mix. The nuclear powers consist of great nations from the old world, from today's world, from the world of the future, and even from a never has been that probably never will be. The UK and especially France are powers of the past, while the USA is modern day's dominant force. China and India represent the future, whereas Russia is a mix of the old, the present and the future. Finally, Pakistan continues to struggle, with significantly less prospects for regional or global dominance than the others.

Besides these known nuclear powers, there is the particular case of Israel, which follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity. The country has been threatened to the extent that if they really were the dreadful killers that a number of people paint them out to be, they might as well have used the nukes by now. Since they have not, this can mean one of two things: either they don't have them, or, more likely, their possession of nuclear weapons does not form a major threat to global security. With the recent "slip of the tongue" by Prime Minister Olmert during a trip to Germany, a stark warning was sent to countries like Iran that Israel will follow a policy of an eye for an eye if warranted, however.

Another interesting case is North Korea, which claims to have successfully conducted a nuclear test on October 9, 2006. This claim is one of the rare statements originating from Pyong Yang that is actually taken seriously by the rest of the world. Besides the above eight, there are a number of countries who have attempted to acquire nuclear weapons but have failed or given up trying for varying reasons. The most famous examples are Libya and Iraq. There are probably few people who would not agree with the notion that their failure to attain these weapons is a good thing. In the case of Iraq, I am of course not referring to the recent allegations in the buildup to the war there, but rather to their nuclear weapon research program during the 1970s and 1980s (which Israel destroyed in 1981).

There also exists a group of four nations, namely South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which at one point possessed nuclear weapons but willingly gave them up (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine transferred the weapons to Russia in 1995 and 1996). Additionally, there are countries such as the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Japan and Germany, who would be able to produce nuclear weapons in a matter of 1 or 2 years, if not months.

Today's most pressing nuclear case is Iran, which claims to be developing a nuclear program for civilian purposes only, but this is widely viewed around the world with distrust. The fear of a nuclear Iran has set the stage for a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East that not even Israel was able to bring about. Predominantly Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt are apprehensive of Shiite Iran's growing regional influence. Add the nuclear bomb to Iran's arsenal and there might really be something to worry about for these nations. Well aware of this fact, Jordan's King Abdullah II followed Egypt and Saudi Arabia's lead recently in saying that in light of current events, Jordan would be looking to develop a nuclear program “for peaceful purposes." Other states that have expressed a sudden interest in nuclear technology are Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

These "peaceful purposes" might sound fine in theory, but in practice it would mean an increase in the plausibility of perhaps the most turbulent region in the world becoming a nuclear arms nest. If the Saudi Royal family or Egypt's President Mubarak and his cronies were to lose power to radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the attained nuclear know-how could be used for particularly nasty purposes. Ironically enough, if the Mullahs in Iran were to give way to the opposition, the likelihood of a nuclear disaster would probably decrease dramatically.

Iran's nuclear program is thus proving to be not only a serious issue for Israel and the United States, but also for Europe, the Middle East and, yes, even for Islam itself. Iraq has involuntarily positioned itself as the center of this battle between Shia and Sunni Islam, but it appears ready to spread rapidly beyond its borders with increasing sophistication and precariousness.

#16 Preparation Time

It might be that the recent headlines are just empty rumors, but if they are actually based on true substance, then it seems 2007 might become a year of muscle flexing, it not tangible action. I am talking about two recent headlines: 1. "Israel to nuke Iranian nukes" and 2. "Japan, U.S. upgrading military emergency plan."

The first report comes from the British Sunday Times, who cite "several Israeli military sources" as proclaiming Israel has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities with tactical nuclear weapons. The strikes concern an enrichment plant in Natanz, a heavy water plant in Arak, and a uranium conversion plant in Isfahan. The first would be targeted using low-yield nuclear bunker busters, while conventional bombs would suffice in destroying the other two.

If true, this is spectacular news. If untrue, it is yet another shoddy attempt by the Sunday Times to grab global headlines. Either way, it is a story that I would rather not have seen published, as it informs the Iranian government of possible action for which they can now prepare themselves. I also personally don't think the Mullahs will be hesitant to continue with their nuclear enrichment plans after hearing this news, thus nullifying any preemptive purpose for leaking it. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council voted unanimously last month to slap sanctions on Iran to try to stop uranium enrichment, the UN has shown itself to be categorically incompetent when dealing with Iran (and a host of other issues for that matter). In that sense it could be the best alternative for Israel to follow through with such a plan; especially if the success of the 1981 air strike against an atomic reactor in Iraq can be emulated. Nevertheless I am vacillating on the matter, as there are so many factors at play when Iran is concerned.

The second headline worth focusing on is the upgrading of the US-Japan joint operation plans for a possible contingency on the Korean Peninsula. In 2002 the two countries signed a conceptual plan code-named "5055" which only mentions basic principles, numbers of necessary facilities and other information in each category of the joint operations. The new joint operational plan calls on Japan to provide logistics support for U.S. troops, including the use of specific ports and hospitals in cases of a military emergency in or around Japan. This will significantly enhance Japan's role in the event of a crisis or war, thereby freeing US resources. This will unconstrain the Americans and provide them with more leeway in dealing with other hotbeds simultaneously (e.g. Iraq and Iran).

If the stories above are all true, then it looks like 2007 is shaping up to be a year of tacit alliances, contingency planning and outright action. I just hope the Iranians will be unable to attain their nuclear ambitions and that the US will attempt direct talks with the North Koreans. Both conflicts should be solved without military intervention, though this seems more plausible in the North Korean case. If action is indeed necessary, then a swift, painless strike as outlined by the Sunday Times is clearly preferable.

#8 To Defend Oneself or not to Defend Oneself, That is the Question

On the evening of the 26th of December, as a result of one of the incessant rocket barrages on Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip, two teenage boys were seriously injured. One, a thirteen year old, is on his deathbed, and the other is in a stable condition. Another of these Qassam rockets struck a strategic installation in the port city of Ashqelon, causing only minor damage but giving rise to tremendous worry regarding the viability of Israeli communities in the vicinity of the border with Gaza. These tragic incidents follow closely the unexpected rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinian presidency which has led to the dismantlement of 27 roadblocks, the easing of security procedures at a number of checkpoints, and the transfer of USD 100 million to the Palestinian Authority through the offices of its Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas. Indeed, there has even been talk of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails independent of any release of Gilad Shalit from Gaza, to which he was abducted from Israeli territory by Hamas militants in June.

Now that relations between the Israeli government and Mahmoud Abbas seem to be warming, the latter even calling for renewed peace negotiations, should Israel jeopardize the momentary lull in mutual recriminations by pursuing its assailants? After all, it seems clear that the attackers are not associated with Abbas’s Fatah party, and it is unlikely that they are acting under the aegis of Hamas. Given their operating methods, any attack on the Qassam launching cells, many purporting to be from the Islamic Jihad movement, will eventually result in undesired civilian casualties. These casualties will in turn result in a breakdown in confidence between Israel and its Palestinian partners, forcing an untimely end to any nascent peace process. So is it really in Israel’s best interests to seek out and destroy those responsible for launching rockets at it?

Irrespective of the answer, it looks as though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have no choice but to act. Since Israel and the various Palestinian factions agreed upon a cease fire agreement in November, there have been more Qassam rockets fired at Israel than in the preceding months, when Israeli forces actively sought out and frequently destroyed Qassam launching cells. During the so-called cease fire, nurseries, schools, and private homes have been hit in the Israeli town of Sderot, whose population has become accustomed to the constant wailing of sirens and whose streets are becoming increasingly deserted. On more than one occasion, Qassam rockets have come perilously close to striking sensitive strategic facilities in the port city of Ashqelon, and untold damage has been inflicted upon other smaller border communities. In one incident which made headlines in Israel, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz refrained from hitting a Qassam cell which was known to the Israeli Defense Forces in order to preserve the cease-fire.

This dogmatic adherence to the cease fire, however, has become untenable in the face of public outrage at continuing Qassam attacks. Minister of Defense Peretz is now among the most vociferous in calling for limited but effective defensive action against Qassam rockets. Similarly, other incidents of Palestinian violence have further shifted the public mood towards action, not least of which are the frequent shootings at Israeli targets throughout the West Bank. There are also those within the Israeli polity who believe that the renewed cordiality between Abbas and Israel is purely a ploy by which the former can obtain money and weapons from the latter as he struggles against Hamas for control of the Palestinian territories. If this is true, then Israel has little to lose by defending itself. Even if it is untrue, serious questions persist regarding the extent to which negotiating with Abbas is in any way productive; neither he nor his party are in effective control of the Palestinian government and both were handed a resounding defeat when they lost with quite some margin to Hamas in the Palestinian elections. If Abbas is not in control of the Palestinian territories, if he does not command the support of the larger Palestinian public, and if he has no legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of any Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, then what does Israel really have to gain by pursuing dialogue with him and making unrequited concessions to the Palestinians?

The answer to that question may lie in a rather straightforward effort on the part of the Israeli government to strengthen Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, but there is no guarantee that such a strategy will prove fruitful. In supporting Abbas, Israel may well be undermining his credibility among Palestinians generally, who will be reinforced in their belief that he is little more than a stooge of Israel and the West. In clinging to the cease fire, Israel’s government is undermining its own credibility before an Israeli public which has turned against Olmert in the wake of the summer war with Hizballah. The primary responsibility of any government is maintaining the security of its own citizens, and Israel will lose little if it pursues a limited campaign against the Qassam rockets which will not include ground forces. Little wonder, then, that Olmert has this very afternoon announced that he will do just that.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk