The events of the recent weeks surrounding the scandalous closure (and the reopening of its unfortunately less far-reaching and accessible cable/satellite version) of an opposition-leaning Venezuelan TV channel, RCTV have revealed that, in addition to Mr. Chavez showing alliance propensity gyrating around controversial nuclear ambitions, weapons, oil and even gas arrangements with the aspirant “outsiders” such as China, Iran and Russia, lately he also proved to employ, even though in a somewhat maladroit approach, some of those countries’ leaders’ “tried-and-proved” censorship maneuvers.
In the midst of the RCTV crisis, hardly anybody seemed to recall a similar - though more perversely masked as compared to Chavez’ frankness - scandal that revolved in 2000-2001 around a privately held Russian TV channel, NTV.
The evolvement of the Russian, much more craftily performed analogue, started in June 2000 with the controversially executed arrest ordered by the prosecutor-general of Vladimir Gusinsky - charged with embezzlement - head of the Media-Most group that owned NTV (Russia’s first independent TV station), a newspaper and an openly opposition-leaning radio “Echo Moskvy,” which even President Bill Clinton favored during his visit to Moscow earlier that month, ignoring any Russian state-run radio or television during his visit. Media-Most publications, especially through its most widely accessible and highly popular TV channel NTV, had at the time openly refused to be loyal to the Kremlin. NTV, through its daily news, political programs, and a satirical puppet show, has broadly criticized the policies of the Kremlin and president Vladimir Putin, brought to light alleged atrocities during the Chechen war and other social issues in Russian life often ignored by state-owned channels.
A month later, in an informal deal, the charges against Gusinsky were dropped after signing an agreement with the minister of media, under which Gusinsky was to sell Media-Most to a state-dominated Gazprom, which already possessed a 30% share in NTV since 1996, for a price forced by Gazprom, in return for a guarantee that Gusinsky would not be prosecuted. After Media-Most itself refused to comply with the agreement, Gazprom publicly announced its acquisition of a controlling stake in NTV and the voting rights of a minority stake held by Media Most were frozen by a court decision.
Almost a year later, in April 2001 Gazprom took over NTV's old board of directors by force in a boardroom coup and replaced its director. Fearing that the Gazprom takeover would lead to government censorship, demonstrations of several thousand people in Moscow and St. Petersburg showed their support for NTV staff. Although the protests were weak when compared to the recent Caracas’ demonstration, they were incredibly brave by the practically non-existent Russian protest standards. Nevertheless, the majority of the prominent journalists have since left the channel, while the rest were been fired soon afterwards. Furthermore, rather conspicuously, two other independent channels were shut down in the next several years.
These events, which were critically commented on by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the Council of Europe, and by former White House spokesman Joe Lockhart, for some reason have been swiftly forgiven of Putin.
How damaging are such freedom of speech crackdowns for the future of these countries?
The answer most likely lies in the countries’ past. A principle difference between the two is that since 1958 Venezuela has been evolving under an incessant period of democratic government; whilst Russia, except for a short period of Yeltsin’s laissez-faire unprecedented freedom (which was most likely due not to his proclaimed democratic aspirations, but to his inability to adequately manage the Russian chaos of the 1990’s), have been living under constant, multi-dimensional fear and rigid totalitarianism for at least the last 80 years. As opposed to the turmoil of the past decade, Putin brought in “order” – an archaically authoritarian “order” the nostalgic Russians are willing to give up many freedoms for; freedoms they probably never even owned in the period of modern history.
Thus, while Chavez acted in a military-background induced, atrociously blunt, and prospectively self-detrimental manner, having openly and ruthlessly commented on and pronounced the (upcoming) closure, Putin, owing to his KGB - the single most efficient Soviet-generated structure - experience, proceeded more furtively, and consequently more “effectively” in the long run, which makes it even more appalling and daunting.
Since this cunning de facto elimination of the only opposition-channel almost 8 years ago, there have virtually been no more attempts to reinstate any similar channels in Russia ever since; and no remembrance of these events, as if they were something insignificant, seems to currently permeate the discontent of the existing opposition.
Compared to Putin’s slyness and carefully premeditated conspirative approach, Chavez’ clumsy shutting of a dissident channel from the public system, which triumphantly reemerged soon afterwards in independent cable broadcasting (and even YouTube) following the logically predictable strong international reaction, seems just a poorly calculated whim, regardless of how intrinsically erroneous it is.
What is obvious is easier to confront and has a tendency to backfire eventually.
Optimistically, the support for Chavez and his “revolutionary” policies is just a temporary Venezuelan poor’s “nervous breakdown” and the nouveau riches’ “folly” that - under favorable circumstances of the opposition’s effort supported by a strong-willed, though diminishing, middle class that has been manifesting great dissatisfaction with and spirit to oppose Chavez - can theoretically be reversed.
Unfortunately for the Russians - even the younger and notably increasingly more prosperous ones - continuing complacence with a latent, concealed and consequently more enduringly perilous governmental “iron-fist” seems to be metaphorically an almost genetically inherent mentality trait.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Julia Socolov
In the midst of the RCTV crisis, hardly anybody seemed to recall a similar - though more perversely masked as compared to Chavez’ frankness - scandal that revolved in 2000-2001 around a privately held Russian TV channel, NTV.
The evolvement of the Russian, much more craftily performed analogue, started in June 2000 with the controversially executed arrest ordered by the prosecutor-general of Vladimir Gusinsky - charged with embezzlement - head of the Media-Most group that owned NTV (Russia’s first independent TV station), a newspaper and an openly opposition-leaning radio “Echo Moskvy,” which even President Bill Clinton favored during his visit to Moscow earlier that month, ignoring any Russian state-run radio or television during his visit. Media-Most publications, especially through its most widely accessible and highly popular TV channel NTV, had at the time openly refused to be loyal to the Kremlin. NTV, through its daily news, political programs, and a satirical puppet show, has broadly criticized the policies of the Kremlin and president Vladimir Putin, brought to light alleged atrocities during the Chechen war and other social issues in Russian life often ignored by state-owned channels.
A month later, in an informal deal, the charges against Gusinsky were dropped after signing an agreement with the minister of media, under which Gusinsky was to sell Media-Most to a state-dominated Gazprom, which already possessed a 30% share in NTV since 1996, for a price forced by Gazprom, in return for a guarantee that Gusinsky would not be prosecuted. After Media-Most itself refused to comply with the agreement, Gazprom publicly announced its acquisition of a controlling stake in NTV and the voting rights of a minority stake held by Media Most were frozen by a court decision.
Almost a year later, in April 2001 Gazprom took over NTV's old board of directors by force in a boardroom coup and replaced its director. Fearing that the Gazprom takeover would lead to government censorship, demonstrations of several thousand people in Moscow and St. Petersburg showed their support for NTV staff. Although the protests were weak when compared to the recent Caracas’ demonstration, they were incredibly brave by the practically non-existent Russian protest standards. Nevertheless, the majority of the prominent journalists have since left the channel, while the rest were been fired soon afterwards. Furthermore, rather conspicuously, two other independent channels were shut down in the next several years.
These events, which were critically commented on by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the Council of Europe, and by former White House spokesman Joe Lockhart, for some reason have been swiftly forgiven of Putin.
How damaging are such freedom of speech crackdowns for the future of these countries?
The answer most likely lies in the countries’ past. A principle difference between the two is that since 1958 Venezuela has been evolving under an incessant period of democratic government; whilst Russia, except for a short period of Yeltsin’s laissez-faire unprecedented freedom (which was most likely due not to his proclaimed democratic aspirations, but to his inability to adequately manage the Russian chaos of the 1990’s), have been living under constant, multi-dimensional fear and rigid totalitarianism for at least the last 80 years. As opposed to the turmoil of the past decade, Putin brought in “order” – an archaically authoritarian “order” the nostalgic Russians are willing to give up many freedoms for; freedoms they probably never even owned in the period of modern history.
Thus, while Chavez acted in a military-background induced, atrociously blunt, and prospectively self-detrimental manner, having openly and ruthlessly commented on and pronounced the (upcoming) closure, Putin, owing to his KGB - the single most efficient Soviet-generated structure - experience, proceeded more furtively, and consequently more “effectively” in the long run, which makes it even more appalling and daunting.
Since this cunning de facto elimination of the only opposition-channel almost 8 years ago, there have virtually been no more attempts to reinstate any similar channels in Russia ever since; and no remembrance of these events, as if they were something insignificant, seems to currently permeate the discontent of the existing opposition.
Compared to Putin’s slyness and carefully premeditated conspirative approach, Chavez’ clumsy shutting of a dissident channel from the public system, which triumphantly reemerged soon afterwards in independent cable broadcasting (and even YouTube) following the logically predictable strong international reaction, seems just a poorly calculated whim, regardless of how intrinsically erroneous it is.
What is obvious is easier to confront and has a tendency to backfire eventually.
Optimistically, the support for Chavez and his “revolutionary” policies is just a temporary Venezuelan poor’s “nervous breakdown” and the nouveau riches’ “folly” that - under favorable circumstances of the opposition’s effort supported by a strong-willed, though diminishing, middle class that has been manifesting great dissatisfaction with and spirit to oppose Chavez - can theoretically be reversed.
Unfortunately for the Russians - even the younger and notably increasingly more prosperous ones - continuing complacence with a latent, concealed and consequently more enduringly perilous governmental “iron-fist” seems to be metaphorically an almost genetically inherent mentality trait.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Julia Socolov
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