#47 Chavez vs Bush

It is nearly impossible these days to escape the continuous taunting of US President Bush by Venezuelan President Chavez. A large portion (in any case a very loud portion) of the world seems to be squarely on the side of the Venezuelan leader, either because they truly agree with his Socialist policies or simply out of blind disgust for anything Bush-related. Both leaders are currently on a tour of Latin America, with the not all too subtle aim of beating out the other in the eyes of the local populace. While Bush is in Brazil and Uruguay, Chavez is in Argentina; Bush in Colombia, Chavez in Bolivia; Bush in Guatemala, Chavez in Haiti. Again, whether justified or not, it seems Chavez has a clear advantage, though Bush certainly wins the award for most dignified demeanor.

Indeed, by repeating calls like "Gringo go home!" and "Yankee go home!" Chavez is using highly irresponsible terminology that creates hate for an entire nation, rather than only for the man Chavez claims to be taking aim at. "Gringo" and "Yankee" have evolved into highly derogative slurs, which, coupled with the use of terms such as "devil," are nutrients for widespread incitement. Accusatory calls that the CIA is plotting to assassinate him will also do little good for US sentiment in Venezuela and beyond. Chavez recently repeated this allegation, saying "Who did they swear in at the White House as deputy secretary of state? A professional killer: John Negroponte...They have assigned special units of the CIA, true assassins, who go around not only here in Venezuela, but in Central America, in South America."

Chavez's calls resonate in the region, however, with anti-US sentiment quite possibly at an all-time high. Wherever Bush visits, he is welcomed by major protests and often violent demonstrations. Mayan priests in Guatemala have even promised to purify a sacred archaeological site to eliminate "bad spirits" after President Bush visits. Chavez easily garners tens of thousands of supporters at "anti-imperialist" rallies in any given Latin American nation.

Rather than yelling back with slogans of his own and organizing rallies (granted, it seems highly unlikely that Bush would be able to attract enough supporters to his rally), Bush remains cool, proclaiming "I bring the goodwill of the United States to South America and Central America. That's why I'm here." He rightfully notes that bilateral aid has doubled under his presidency from 800 billion to 1.6 billion and stressed "I don't think America gets enough credit for trying to help improve people's lives. And so my trip is to explain, as clearly as I can, that our nation is generous and compassionate." In this respect Bush is wise to ignore Chavez's provocations and not stooping to his level. This might count for something in time to come.

Besides the ethanol deal, Bush has pledged medical aid in the form of a new project that dispatches a Navy medical ship to 13 countries in the area in order to treat the poor. Millions have also been made available for affordable housing for the poor, while a new initiative was also presented in which $75 million is to be made available to help Latin American youth learn English and study in the United States.

Chavez, in turn, is offering free goodies such as sending doctors and teachers to allies such as Bolivia, providing an oil refinery and a highway free of charge to Nicaragua, and paying off billions of Argentina's debt. Chavez has also pledged $15 million in aid for flood victims in Bolivia, including a squadron of helicopters to deliver food to remote villages, making the $1.5 million sent by the US pale in insignificance.

In terms of direct aid, Chavez has a slight upper hand overall in Latin America today, but the years of US aid added together dwarf anything Venezuela or Chavez can dream of offering. When it comes to public opinion and image, Bush doesn't stand a chance next to Chavez. However, Bush has managed to retain his dignity in the face of ridiculous taunts and accusations. For example, the world praises Brazil for their advanced use of alternative fuels and urges the world's greatest polluter to follow suit. With the newly signed ethanol (a bio-fuel made from sugar cane or corn) deal between Brazil and the US, Bush is doing precisely this. Unsurprisingly, Chavez found a way to turn this around, saying "the US is taking food from the poor and giving it to vehicles instead." With this kind of logic, you can criticize everything and anything, of course.

The Bush vs. Chavez rivalry is far from over and is sure to provide enough interesting material for future reference.

#46 The Trouble with Israeli Apartheid Week

The Oxford University Arab Cultural Society (OUACS) is a society which one presumes exists to celebrate and propagate Arab culture. Odd then, that this week is the amply advertised and broadly publicized Israeli Apartheid Week, brought to Oxford courtesy of the OUACS and constituting its flagship project. One would hope that there is more to Arab culture than antipathy towards Israel and her policies alone, but I suppose the OUACS are in the best position to judge.

What precisely is Israeli Apartheid Week? The plan is to regale audiences over a five day period with various lectures and other events which will convince the attendees that in addition to a host of other sins, Israel is guilty of practicing Apartheid and that it is morally incumbent upon each and every one of us to confront such heinousness and to put a stop to it. In the organizers’ own words, “the aim of Israeli Apartheid Week is to push forward the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and call for a boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign.” Whatever the merit of such an analysis, it is clearly not one given to nuance.

Indeed, nothing about “Israeli Apartheid Week” is even remotely calibrated to dialogue and apolitical study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is very much a partisan event in which no opposing views are to be heard, and this need not be objectionable per se. It is quite obviously a fact that the Palestinian people today is suffering greatly on account of rather many diverse reasons. To the extent that the Palestinians are suffering, it is desirable that we should alleviate their distress. But this end will not be served by an event as politicized as Israeli Apartheid Week.

Let it first be said that the understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being promulgated by the OUACS is at the very least controversial. Although Israel may be guilty of certain condemnable acts and policies, so is the other side in the conflict, a fact left entirely unaddressed by Israeli Apartheid Week. As for allegations of Israeli apartheid, these are belied somewhat by the OUACS’ choice of speakers. Monday evening Jamal Zahalka, an Arab Muslim member of the Israeli parliament, spoke at great length about Israel’s grave discrimination against its Arab citizens. It seems to have escaped him that as an Arab man born in Israel he was able to obtain his B.A., his M.A., and his Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem without any ado, he has been able to write, travel, and freely express his vehemently anti-Israel views, and he has been able to form with other Arab citizens of Israel a political party which he currently represents in Parliament. While doing all of this, the man has not once been beaten, assaulted, or otherwise savaged by the Israeli authorities. Israel’s Arabs may be in many ways disadvantaged, but there is no question of apartheid; another Arab, Ghaleb Majadle, is currently a serving minister in Israel’s government.

Arguments regarding Israeli apartheid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are similarly tenuous. Glaringly, there are no longer Jews in the Gaza Strip, and those synagogues built there have long since been razed to the ground. It seems difficult to maintain an apartheid regime over a territory that one does not control. As for the West Bank, there the situation is significantly more complex and comparisons between Israeli policies and those of apartheid South Africa can appear to have some justification. Proponents of the political view represented by the OUACS point to checkpoints, segregated roads, the security barrier, and other features of Israeli control as racist policies exemplifying Israeli apartheid. What such an interpretation omits entirely is any attempt to distinguish cause from effect: prior to the Intifada, none of these most egregious of examples existed in any way comparable to their present incarnations. If today some roads are reserved for Israeli citizens only, be they Arab or Jewish, then this situation arose as a direct result of frequent shootings on roads that had previously been used by both Israelis and Palestinians. Likewise, the number of checkpoints mushroomed in an effort to inhibit the movement of those seeking to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel and the security barrier was built in order to prevent the infiltration of Israel by these same people. One may take issue with such policies and regard them as too draconian or ineffective, but it cannot be said that Israel set about applying them because of some malicious desire to oppress Arabs. If this were the case, then why do all the most frequently mentioned illustrations of alleged Israeli apartheid postdate the beginning of the occupation by at least thirty years? Occupation is an ugly thing, but that Israel’s policies equate apartheid is by no means a straightforward proposition.

Still, the OUACS is certainly entitled to voice its perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however unbalanced and contentious it may be. Despite this, one is left with the question of why the OUACS has chosen an obviously inflammatory way in which to postulate its case. If there is apartheid in Israel, then let the facts speak for themselves. I wonder if the OUACS would be entirely comfortable with the idea of a Palestinian Terrorism Week with an explicit agenda directed at publicizing the view of Palestinian society as based on the glorification of terrorism and the systematic delegitimization of Israel’s right to exist. Such a week would be no less contentious than Israeli Apartheid Week and it would be equally ill-conceived. One hopes that the OUACS is merely seeking to shed light on the plight of the Palestinians and to espouse the Palestinian cause; why then, did they not organize the Plight of the Palestinians Week or some equivalent thereof? Surely one does not need to be anti-Israel to be pro-Palestine?

Other questions arise. If the OUACS is a political society which seeks to redress the ills suffered by the Arab peoples rather than a purely cultural society, then why has it neither held nor is it planning to hold an Iraq Week or a Darfur Week or a general lack of democracy in the Middle East Week? What, ultimately, does the OUACS intend to achieve beyond a vilification of Israel and the winning of proselytes to a somewhat radical understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? To make any headway at all toward the reconciliation of Arab and Jew in the Holy Land, it is imperative that partisans on both sides of the argument refrain from blatant provocation and seek instead to organize joint events in which civil and cordial debate takes place, giving the audience a fuller picture of the conflict and allowing them the liberty to find their own, more nuanced positions in the dispute. This is in every way preferable to spoonfeeding the public with undiluted partisanship and propaganda, as is the case with the OUACS’ Israeli Apartheid Week.

- This article was written for publication in Cherwell, the Oxford University newspaper, and was provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Jonathan Valk.

#45 Eternal Leaders Part 2 - Mobutu

In this first analysis of a number of the 'eternal leaders,' the track record of former heavyweight Mobutu Sese Seko (former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; then known as the Republic of Zaire) will be analyzed. Mobutu might very well be one of history's most brutal and miserable dictators, bringing his country's economy to ruin and implementing a reign of fear.

Born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu on October 14, 1930, Mobutu Sese Seko - as he later became known - would grow up to brutally lead the Republic of Zaire for 32 years (1965-1997). Through his career in Journalism, Mobutu met future Prime Minister of Belgian Congo (as the nation was called at the time) Patrice Lumumba in Belgium in the late 1950s. The two got along well and, upon return to Belgian Congo, Mobutu was offered the position of colonel and chief of staff of the Congolese army, following the granting of independence on June 30, 1960. From this day forward, Mobutu's true character came to light. He first deceived his friend Lumumba within months of his appointment, siding with President Joseph Kasavubu and deposing of Lumumba in a coup d'état. Lumumba would later be captured by soldiers loyal to Mobutu, beaten in plain sight of television cameras on a number of occasions (including in Mobutu's villa), and was finally executed.

Not long after, on November 25, 1965, the army took over power and Mobutu's 32 year reign began. Opponents were taken out and a cult of personality ensued. His Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) Party became the only legal political party in 1967, all unions were put under government control and in 1970, legislative and presidential "elections" were held, where voting was compulsory and Mobutu was the sole candidate. He won with 99% of the popular votes. Having crushed an attempted coup in 1967, co-opted or murdered his opponents, Mobutu now had a solid grip on power.

This led to experimentation with far-reaching policies such as renaming the country the Republic of Zaire in October 1971, ordering citizens to drop their Christian names for African ones (he named himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga - "The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake" - in 1972), imprisoning priests for baptizing a Zairian child with a Christian name, banning Western attire and ties, and forcing men to wear an abacost (a lightweight short-sleeved suit, worn without a tie).

Economically, Mobutu was a disaster, and a highly corrupt one at that. In 1973 Mobutu decided to nationalize all economic assets owned by foreigners, leading to a catastrophic decline in national productivity and wealth. The major failure of this policy eventually led Mobutu to return farms and factories to their original owners in 1977, but it was too little too late. While the country suffered major economic woes, Mobutu allegedly had amassed a fortune estimated to amount to US$5 billion in 1984, according to Fortune magazine. He also owned and traveled in his fleet of Mercedes-Benz vehicles and numerous palaces, while infrastructure virtually collapsed and public service workers went months without being paid. Inflation was a direct result of his policies, which was only exacerbated by the equally prevalent kleptochratic environment and nepotism.

In terms of foreign policy, Mobutu proved to be a relatively reliable ally for the West (mainly the US) in the Cold War. Nevertheless, Communist leader of Romania, tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu, was a close friend of Mobutu's, while Zaire also enjoyed good relations with China. Western disgust of Mobutu became apparent after the end of the Cold War, however, when he was no longer needed, shunning him in a rather hypocritical fashion.

After superficially agreeing to end the ban on other political parties and appointing a transitional government that would lead to promised elections in 1990, Mobutu retained power for another seven years, when he was overthrown in the First Congo War by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1997. This was a direct result of his support for Rwandan Hutus in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when Mobutu issued an order in November 1996 forcing Tutsis to leave Zaire on penalty of death. Kabila was supported by the Tutsi governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda and got rid of the ailing Mobutu in a quick and effective manner. Mobutu died soon after in Morocco, where he lies buried in, ironically, a Christian cemetery.

Although having economically ruined a resource-rich nation, butchering thousands and embezzling billions of dollars, Mobutu can be credited for maintaining the peace in Zaire. In the 5 years of independence before his rule, almost one million Congolese had died in conflict. His hard hand ensured that high profile torturing and assassinations of dissidents instilled a fear of the military and government that would prevent any such recurrence of violence. No matter how you look at him, he certainly qualifies as an "eternal leader."

Please have a look at #43 Eternal Leaders Part 1 for the list of the world's longest serving leaders.

#44 How Democracy and Diplomacy Can Solve the Iranian Nuclear Issue

The idea I will put forth in this article may raise a couple of eyebrows around the world. Iran’s record in the field of human rights and democracy is terrible; certainly when compared to Western countries. However, in the Islamic world, it is actually one of the democratic front-runners. The 2006 local elections demonstrated that Iran is not as totalitarian as we all like to believe. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the Iranian people do not wish for a collision course, nor do they want any further humiliation of their country. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States re-starts diplomatic relations with Iran and that it returns to the negotiating table. It is the only option left to solve the current nuclear crisis.

The sore wounds left by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis still guide American response to Iran’s actions. The United States has always relied on its unmatched military might to influence relations with Teheran. However, with Iraq sliding more and more into outright chaos and the United States’ military still tied down there, the Pentagon’s plans to use force against Iran could be of better use in Hollywood as an interesting movie script. This leaves diplomacy as the only feasible measure to provide a solution to the urgent problem, because every day that inaction dominates Western policy, Iran is coming closer to a nuclear weapon.

The argument for diplomacy actually lies in the reasons why Iran wants to obtain a nuclear weapon. It is not for offensive purposes that Iran wants a nuke, because offensive use of the weapon would be suicidal. It is simply not possible for Iran to obtain enough nuclear weapons to conduct an offensive doctrine. However, the weapon would be very useful in diplomatic relations, as a nuclear weapon would demand instant international respect.

It is exactly the aforementioned respect that Iran is after. Ever since the Teheran hostage crisis, the US has not conducted any diplomatic relations with Iran. It has also imposed a strict sanctions regime on Iran, which lays a heavy burden on Iran’s unstable economy. Therefore, the UN-imposed sanctions of December 2006 will have little effect; they will only strengthen the feeling amongst Iranians that the whole world is against them. And the Iranian people are actually the key to success in diplomacy.

The power of the Iranian people is not to be underestimated. In 2006, president Ahmadinejad suffered a remarkable defeat in the local elections. The Iranian people clearly spoke out against his hard-line anti-Israel and nuclear stances. With the 2008 parliamentary elections in mind, Ahmadinejad will have to moderate his position on the nuclear issue. Key here is a respectful and decent offer at the negotiations table. The Iranian people will not tolerate a rejection of such an offer and they will punish the president once again in the 2008 parliamentary election. However, continuation of the current policy against Iran and the threat of force will unify the Iranians once again behind their leaders and it will empower them to continue their enrichment program.

Therefore, the time for diplomacy is now. If the United States accepts that it cannot resolve this issue with force and actually makes a sincere attempt at the negotiating table, the Iranian government will have to come forward as well, making a speedy and desirable solution of the issue a more feasible outcome. It may seem like a paradox, but it will be internal democratic accountability, and not sanctions, that will force the Iranian leaders to concede.

- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jorik Reijmer

#43 Eternal Leaders Part 1

Countries who are used to proper functioning Democracies with limited re-electability enshrined in the law are used to seeing new faces as head of state. This does not apply to a significant number of countries in the world, however. In fact, having leaders in power for over 30 years in a row is not as uncommon as one might expect. This series will look at the performance of a number of these "eternal" leaders. Part 1 provides the list of the longest serving 25 heads of state currently still in office, while the subsequent parts will take a closer look at the results of their leadership.

The list excludes royalty and heads of state who have no real power, comprising mainly of leaders who are Prime Minister or President of their respective countries. For example, Malietoa Tanumafili II, who has been head of state of Samoa since January 1, 1962, is excluded from the list because his post is largely ceremonial (true power lies with the Prime Minister). Similarly, famous royals such as Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom (1952-currently) and King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand (1946-currently) are excluded from the list. Furthermore, only leaders of the 20th and 21st Century are taken into account.

Before presenting the list, it is also interesting to have a look at some of the longest ever serving heads of state. A number of these leaders will also be profiled in this leadership series.

President Kim Il Sung: 1945-1994, 49 years (North Korea)
Emperor Haile Selassie: 1930-1974, 44 years (Ethiopia)
King Hassan II: 1961-1999, 38 years (Morocco)
President Gnassingbe Eyadema: 1967-2005, 38 years (Togo)
General Secretary Enver Hoxha: 1948-1985, 37 years (Albania)
General Francisco Franco: 1939-1975, 36 years (Spain)
President Alfredo Stroessner: 1954-1989, 35 years (Paraguay)
President Mobutu Sese Seko: 1965-1997, 32 years (former Republic of Zaire)
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew: 1959-1990, 31 years (Singapore)

Now it's time to look at the main list. Below are the top 25 longest serving world leaders currently still in power. The position in office is written first, followed by the name and date the leader in question took office. In brackets you will find the country where they reign freely.

0. President Fidel Castro: February 16, 1959 (Cuba)
1. Prime Minister Hassanal Bolkiah: October 5, 1967 (Brunei)
2. President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba: April 14, 1967 (Gabon)
3. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi: September 1, 1969 (Libya)
4. Prime Minister Khalifa ibn Salman Al Khalifa: 1970 (Bahrain)
5. Prime Minister Qaboos ibn Sa'id Al 'Bu Sa'id: July 23, 1970 (Oman)
6. President Ali Abdallah Saleh: July 17, 1978 (Yemen)
7. President Muamoon Abdul Gayoom: November 11, 1978 (Maldives)
8. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo: August 3, 1979 (Equatorial Guinea)
9. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos: September 10, 1979 (Angola)
10. President Robert Mugabe: March 4, 1980 (Zimbabwe)
11. President Hosni Mubarak: October 14, 1981 (Egypt)
12. President Paul Biya: November 6, 1982 (Cameroon)
13. President Nursultan Nazarbayev: March 22, 1984 (Kazakhstan)
14. President Lansana Conte: April 3, 1984 (Guinea)
15. Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen: 1985 (Cambodia)
16. President Yoweri Museveni: January 29, 1986 (Uganda)
17. King Mswati III: April 25, 1986 (Swaziland)
18. President Blaise Compaore: October 15, 1987 (Burkina Faso)
19. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali: November 7, 1987 (Tunisia)
20. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: June 4, 1989 (Iran)
21. President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir: June 30, 1989 (Sudan)
22. President Islam Karimov: March 24, 1990 (Uzbekistan)
23. President Idriss Deby: December 2, 1990 (Chad)
24. Prime MInister Meles Zenawi: May 28, 1991 (Ethiopia)
25. President Isaias Afewerki: May 29, 1991 (Eritrea)

Please have a look at #45 Eternal Leaders Part 2 - Mobutu for an analysis of the leadership of former Republic of Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko

#42 A Soft Landing in Venezuela?

When it comes to oil, there is hardly ever a moment of quiet. If there is, it most likely represents the equivalent as terrestrial quiet does in an earthquake prone country: preparation for a major eruption. In that sense, the latest from Venezuela might be good news. Rather than a sudden, very damaging bang, the nationalization of Venezuelan oil projects will be gradual.

Now ruling by decree, Chavez announced that state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) will take at least a 60 percent stake in the Orinoco river region oil projects, proclaiming that "by May 1, we will occupy these oil fields and have the national flag flying on them." Chavez is referring to four heavy oil-upgrading projects run by BP, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Total and Statoil. Thus far, foreign companies running smaller projects in various industries have been compensated less than they would have liked perhaps, but clearly more than they had expected. The Orinoco oil fields, however, involve a much larger sum of money.

In light of the announcement, it has not been made clear how the government expects to be able to pay for its increased share in the huge projects (the foreign companies are estimated to have invested some $17 billion). Indeed, a big issue is money. Whereas the average price for the Venezuelan “basket” of crudes in 2006 was $56 a barrel, according to the Economist, last month, that figure was about $46. Nationalization of the oil fields has been made a pertinent part of the 'Socialist Revolution,' but in order to keep the revolutionary engine running, a high oil price is absolutely essential. If prices do not stop declining, there will be a very serious problem for Chavez. The countless subsidised programs are key for popular support. Furthermore, Chavez decided that it would be worthwhile for Venezuela to sell its oil at discount prices to 'friendly' nations, in order to spread the revolution and drum up support. A halting of this philanthropic policy would quite possibly mean a loss of 'good friends.'

With comments from Chavez such as "I am going to send some sulfur to Lula for when the little gentleman comes so that he can place it out there in Brasilia" (in reference to Bush's - who he refers to as the devil - upcoming visit to Brazil), it has become evident that political tact is not his strongest point. Nevertheless, he is no idiot. He will be careful not to end up without friends and stuck with oil fields that cannot be run without help from the outside. His talk is big, but it seems the means employed on the ground will be more docile. While the revolutionary policies will most probably not yield significant positive long term results, the pain at least appears limited.

#41 Making Money From Hot Air

Ever since the implementation of phase one of the Kyoto Protocol, the right to release CO2 into the air has become commodified. In Europe alone, there were 24 billion dollars worth of CO2 deals; indicating a booming trend.

Traditional banks and brokerages have been relatively quick to follow suit, albeit with mixed success. For one, the dynamics of the CO2 market are not as straightforward as they are in other markets. CO2 prices have been volatile, arguably for the reason that these markets are not by definition efficient and mature. One major factor in CO2 pricing is weather; when the cold sets in, energy consumption goes up, and with it the need for emission rights.

The mild winter resulted in lower energy consumption, which in turn resulted in both lower energy and CO2 emission prices. CO2 prices are actually fairly correlated to a basket of fuel indexes such as Coal, Oil, Gas, etc. The relationship between coal consumption and CO2 is one of the strongest, as it produces the most CO2, thus requiring more emission rights. With Kyoto in place, there is finally a financial incentive to move towards reducing CO2 emissions. Furthermore, with CO2 pricing, there is a benchmark that can be used to calculate returns on investing in alternatives that reduce the overall CO2 emissions exposure.

There remain some issues to be worked out; notably the pricing of emission contracts remains a tricky endeavor. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the CO2 trading platform remains a young market in its adolescence, meaning there remain considerable arbitrage opportunities. Academically and professionally there is no real simple uniform pricing model for CO2 emission in the way that the financial world has embraced the Black & Scholes option pricing model or the Capital Asset Pricing Model.

Other factors bringing uncertainty to the whole affair (excluding energy dynamics) are the different political organs and processes that determine the emission ceilings of different countries. When emission ceilings move arbitrarily - for the most part downward - this creates much volatility in the market. With CO2 allowances set to tighten in Europe as we move towards phase 2 of the Kyoto Protocol, it is expected that prices are set to rise once again. Looking at the future, there is definitively money to made from hot air and, in doing so, arguably stemming global warming.

Kyoto opponents, for whatever reason or motivation, may laugh at the whole "pseudo" CO2 market phenomenon. Nevertheless, its significance (aside from scientific debate on global warming) can by no means be ignored. Non-Kyoto signatory countries are going to face significant pressure in the near future. French President Chirac was already bold enough to suggest putting an import tax on countries that have not signed Kyoto. This sends a clear message to the U.S., Australia and China, who, even without signing and accepting environmental responsibility, will face a steep price to pay for their environmental desecration.