#57 REPLY to Article #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?

As the Iraq War’s broad unpopularity causes a number of governments—including at least one branch in the United States—to consider the political consequences of continued participation, it's important to keep some perspective about the relative importance of the conflicts in which the West is now engaged. While a principled case must be made for continued American involvement in Iraq, it need not be done at the expense of the vital mission being carried out by NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In his March 14 piece for the Weekend Economist (#50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?), Westbrook Sullivan argues that the focus of the international community on the war in Afghanistan is disproportionate to that nascent democracy's impact on world affairs. Sullivan tells us that Afghanistan is “impoverished and isolated,” largely irrelevant to America's strategic interests, essentially no more than an inconvenient central Asian backwater. A failed state at the heart of Central Asia, Sullivan contends, “would be an annoyance to America and its allies, [but] would have little more effect than that on the international community.” This assessment could scarcely be more flawed.

There is little doubt that Iraq is the most significant conflict zone in which the U.S. is presently involved, if only as a consequence of the sheer numbers of American troops involved. A successful—or at least not-disastrous—resolution to the sectarian strife and anti-coalition insurgency there is absolutely vital to the maintenance of American security. While arguments abound about the legitimacy or necessity of the initial intervention in Iraq, the fact remains that the total collapse of the American-led enterprise there would have disastrous consequences for regional and global security.

Just the same, those reservations have helped to ensure that the war in Iraq is an American operation. One would be remiss not to mention the contribution of both combat forces and service-support troops from a number of coalition forces, but the fact remains that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would not have taken place without the specifically American rationale presented by the Bush Administration. The time to make he case for multilateral involvement and burden-sharing in Iraq was four years ago, not the spring of 2007. Most governments have long since reached the decision that further contributions to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI) will needlessly erode their popularity without many of the attendant benefits associated with participation in the initial war effort. Americans should not be surprised that the Blair government would draw similar conclusions.

Sullivan dismisses this sort of calculation as nothing more than a form of political self-preservation, dismissing the redeployment of assets from Iraq to Afghanistan is merely a “relatively safe alternative” for politicians “not wanting to look weak on security issues.” How can we criticize the political leadership of another state when a politically expedient course of action also happens to help secure that nation's vital interests? Iraq is a sinking ship, and the UK is one of the last on the lifeboats. Few should be shocked that the Blair government is unwilling to go to the bottom of the sea.

Leaving aside the politically-charged question of whether or not preemptive war in Iraq was justified, one must concede that a great deal of international goodwill and moral force was squandered through the unnecessary and inaccurate conflation of the war in Iraq with the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few nations opposed the bombardment and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, as such action was viewed as a necessary and natural response to the atrocities visited upon the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was considerably less well-received. Even those allies who were convinced to make contributions to the war effort had little reason to suspect that they’d be involved in a multi-year occupation. So why now should those faithful members of the coalition be slandered for re-assessing their priorities? Have the preceding four years not convinced Mr. Sullivan that the U.S. should accept and encourage what contributions other nations choose to make to missions deemed important to American interests?

British patience for the mission in Iraq has waned, but the UK’s contributions in Afghanistan can still be vital. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in that country, composed of troops from 37 nations, not only makes an important contribution to mission accomplishment but also to the prospects of future security burden-sharing. As NATO allies and other states are compelled to develop broader capacity in support of ISAF’s mission, U.S. policymakers can be more confident in the capabilities of partner states when called upon in future conflicts. With a territorial defense mission seemingly obsolescent in the 21st century, NATO’s future utility to its member states will be defined by the ability of multinational, mission-focused task forces to conduct out-of-area operations. Further expansion of the alliance (and the attendant effect on U.S.-Russia relations) is an open question at present. As such, the future of NATO is in the balance; if ISAF fails in Afghanistan, so too does the institution that has formed the bedrock of European security and transatlantic cooperation for the last six decades.

All this considered, the critical question addressed by Sullivan is whether or not a stable and well-governed Afghanistan is vital to international security. We shouldn’t be surprised to find that those who answer the question in the negative do so in the face of a staggeringly broad consensus to the contrary. Documentary filmmaker Sam Kiley, who recently spent time with NATO forces in Afghanistan, puts their mission in stark terms: “NATO and the Afghan government want to win this war to prevent Afghanistan returning to Taliban rule and becoming a base once again used by international terrorists.” There seems very little doubt that ISAF’s failure would result in exactly such a scenario.

American—and global—security is increasingly wedded to the maintenance of state control over territory; the future must be one of less failed states, not more. Sullivan’s dismissive reference to Afghanistan as “almost entirely impoverished and rural” is puzzling; do these two factors somehow render instability in the country less threatening? The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan is very real. Porous borders with Pakistan and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia destabilize important allies in the region, as well as making the task of tracking terrorists’ movement exponentially more difficult. Kidnapping raids launched into Iran by Baloch separatists (like Jundullah, which American intelligence community sources have recently alleged is financially and materially supported by the U.S. government) complicate the already-delicate relationship between Washington and Tehran. Ungoverned territory in Afghanistan provides further opportunity for these groups to take dangerous and destabilizing actions against Iranian targets, increasing tensions and the likelihood of a destructive and unintended war.

Abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, however attractive it may seem in light of the attention and effort commanded by the steady dissolution of the nascent free Iraq, would be a perfect public diplomacy storm of military failure, sacrificed international goodwill, and eroded American credibility. It seems absurd to suggest that the most appropriate way to secure the most robust future contribution of allied support for American interests is to abandon the war widely viewed as just and necessary in favor of the one most reject as an illegitimate flight of neoconservative fancy. The loss of moral force associated with such an abdication of a just and necessary mission is one from which the United States would not soon recover.

- This article was written in response to Westbrook Sullivan's #50 Is Afghanistan the Right War?. It was first published on CJMEWETT and provided to the Weekend Economist by the author, Christopher Mewett.