There are few problems that appear as intractable as the Arab-Israeli predicament and fewer still which are liable to produce a pessimism as intense as that which reigns among those individuals involved in attempts to bring about its end. Consequently, even the mere mention of a final peace deal is of sufficient gravity to attract a great deal of media attention and stoke the fires of hope in the hearts of well-meaning people everywhere. This is precisely what has happened in the wake of the decision at the March 27-28 Arab Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to re-endorse the Arab Peace Initiative first launched at the Beirut Arab Summit of 2002.
Amid much fanfare, leading representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab states (Libya having boycotted the event) gathered in the Saudi capital and proceeded unanimously to revive the 2002 Peace Plan. Within moments of this decision, news services throughout the world were leading with stories of a potential breakthrough in the peace process. The Arab half of the Arab-Israeli conflict had come together in support of peace, and the onus was now on Israel to reciprocate. Or was it? Few people seemed to be asking why a peace offer that led nowhere in 2002 should prove more successful in 2007.
Superficially, the Arab Peace Plan is attractive. It demands of Israel that she withdraw in full from all territories occupied in June of 1967, that a just solution be found to the Palestinian Refugee problem, and that a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital be created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return, Arab states are to normalize relations with Israel and establish a comprehensive peace. This rough outline broadly parallels the Clinton Parameters which formed the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and reflects what any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to resemble. Upon closer inspection, however, major problems with the Arab Peace Initiative become apparent.
For one, no scope is provided by which Palestinians and Israelis can agree upon alterations to the border that take into consideration changes on the ground, either in Israel’s favor or in that of the Palestinians. There is no room for what was Israel before 1967 to become part of Palestine or for any of what was the Jordanian West Bank before 1967 to become part of Israel. Similarly, the call for a full return to the 1967 borders deprives Israel of control, shared or otherwise, of Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, leaving them under the complete control of a Palestinian Authority with a very poor record when it comes to respecting Jewish holy places.
Far more seriously, the envisaged “just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem” is linked to two provisos. First, it must be in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which demands that every refugee who wishes to should be able to return to Israel without delay and that those who do not should be given financial compensation. Uniquely, the UN defines a Palestinian refugee as any direct descendant of one who fled what became Israel in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict between 1946 and 1948. According to this exceptionally broad definition which includes those with no more than one Palestinian great-grandparent, there are today over four million registered refugees and many more still who are eligible for the status. The second condition stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative is that every form of Palestinian patriation which is not agreeable to the Arab states be rejected out of hand. That is, no Palestinian refugee can be settled permanently in any Arab country unless that country allows him to do so. Given the Arab record in dealing with Palestinian refugees, this is not very auspicious to say the least.
The rigidity of the Arab Peace plan is a cause for serious concern, especially as there has been no real indication that the Arab states are willing to countenance compromise on any of their demands for peace. For Israel, this is a real problem. Whether one likes it or not, roughly a quarter of a million Israelis live in the West Bank and some 200,000 more live in East Jerusalem. They cannot all be removed with ease from their homes, and evicting them will produce a refugee problem over half the size of the original Palestinian Refugee problem. Fortunately, a majority of these people live in large settlement blocs and minor adjustments to the border can prevent hundreds of thousands of people from being rendered homeless overnight. In return for such border adjustments, Israel might surrender equivalent territories in Israel proper to the Palestinian state or offer financial compensation in some form. Alternatively, Jews living in what might become the Palestinian state could be offered a choice between Palestinian citizenship and relocation, but it does not appear as though any of the Palestinian factions would be well disposed to such suggestions. Either way, unless it becomes possible to discuss such issues and reach perhaps more practical conclusions than those demanded by the Arab Peace Initiative there is little basis for optimism.
Likewise, no real progress can be expected as long as the Arab League continues to insist on a settlement to the Palestinian Refugee problem which includes a full return to Israel proper of those Palestinian refugees wishing to do so. It is striking that the Arab Peace Initiative entirely ignores the fate of upwards of three quarters of a million Jews who were expelled from Arab countries in the last sixty years or so while adopting a maximalist position with regard to Palestinian refugees, all of whom should be in their view repatriated or compensated. Whether as a result of the Arab peace plan four million, two million, or only half a million Palestinian refugees immigrate to Israel is irrelevant, as the consequence will inevitably be to make of Israel a binational state in one fell swoop. One fifth of Israel’s population is already Arab, and the addition of a million or more would paralyze the democratic political system and polarize the country between Jew and Arab.
Surely it is not in the interests of peace to create a new binational state on the model of Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Kosovo? Still more, it seems counterintuitive to bring together two antagonistic peoples in one state when historical precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Turkey/Greece, and India/Pakistan all dictate otherwise. Indeed, Belgium too has in recent decades been home to violent clashes between its Flemish and Wallonian citizens, and one can hardly point to a history of hatred between these two populations akin to that which plagues the Near East. What cause is there then to assume that Jews and Arabs will be able to share power peaceably in one state? Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely correct for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to entail the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with no significant Jewish population alongside a binational Israel with a possible Arab majority. Such a scenario would effectively dismantle the Jewish State of Israel.
Irrespective of these many stumbling blocks, the Arab Peace Initiative remains positive in that it does promise a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only for this reason Israel should have embraced the Arab peace plan in theory, even if with reservations. Israel’s official response to the Arab summit was slow to materialize, but Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did announce within a week of the Arab Summit’s re-endorsement of the 2002 peace initiative that Israel was prepared to enter into negotiations immediately and that he was personally prepared to travel to Riyadh to meet with his Arab counterparts; in case they preferred a different setting, he also extended to them an invitation to come to Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the Arab response has not been conducive to confidence in a renewed peace process.
Even before Israel reacted to the Arab Peace Initiative, both Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that should Israel reject their peace proposals it might trigger a new round of Arab-Israeli war. It is difficult to determine if this threat was simply rhetorical or indicative of a coming confrontation. After all, Hizb-Allah has been rearming diligently, Hamas is militarizing Gaza at an alarming rate, Syria seems to strengthening its military presence near the Golan Heights, and all of this is being directed in some degree by an increasingly outrageous Iranian regime. Even so, Prime Minister Olmert’s positive response to the Arab Peace Initiative has met with little more than skepticism and derision.
As is logical for any representative of the Jewish State, Olmert agreed to commence negotiations in the direction of a final peace settlement but did not endorse without objection the dubious stipulations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Accordingly, his offer to begin peace talks has so far been either ignored or decried, and not one Arab state has welcomed it. Essentially, the Arab message has been that Israel must first accept their peace offer and that only then can talks begin. This is a peculiar way of making peace. Not only that, but it is strange that Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr has thought it helpful to respond to Olmert’s overtures by announcing in Vienna that, “I also believe, I can say here, that at this time we don't have an Israeli partner anymore.”
Without compromise there will be no progress in the struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is impossible in the view of the framers of the Arab Peace Initiative to conclude a settlement with Israel which allows her to continue to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab state, which divides Jerusalem equitably, and which finds a practical and humanistic solution for both the Jews of the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees, then the Arab Peace Initiative is in every respect a false dawn.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk
Amid much fanfare, leading representatives of twenty-one of the twenty-two Arab states (Libya having boycotted the event) gathered in the Saudi capital and proceeded unanimously to revive the 2002 Peace Plan. Within moments of this decision, news services throughout the world were leading with stories of a potential breakthrough in the peace process. The Arab half of the Arab-Israeli conflict had come together in support of peace, and the onus was now on Israel to reciprocate. Or was it? Few people seemed to be asking why a peace offer that led nowhere in 2002 should prove more successful in 2007.
Superficially, the Arab Peace Plan is attractive. It demands of Israel that she withdraw in full from all territories occupied in June of 1967, that a just solution be found to the Palestinian Refugee problem, and that a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital be created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return, Arab states are to normalize relations with Israel and establish a comprehensive peace. This rough outline broadly parallels the Clinton Parameters which formed the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000 and reflects what any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to resemble. Upon closer inspection, however, major problems with the Arab Peace Initiative become apparent.
For one, no scope is provided by which Palestinians and Israelis can agree upon alterations to the border that take into consideration changes on the ground, either in Israel’s favor or in that of the Palestinians. There is no room for what was Israel before 1967 to become part of Palestine or for any of what was the Jordanian West Bank before 1967 to become part of Israel. Similarly, the call for a full return to the 1967 borders deprives Israel of control, shared or otherwise, of Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, leaving them under the complete control of a Palestinian Authority with a very poor record when it comes to respecting Jewish holy places.
Far more seriously, the envisaged “just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem” is linked to two provisos. First, it must be in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which demands that every refugee who wishes to should be able to return to Israel without delay and that those who do not should be given financial compensation. Uniquely, the UN defines a Palestinian refugee as any direct descendant of one who fled what became Israel in the course of Arab-Israeli conflict between 1946 and 1948. According to this exceptionally broad definition which includes those with no more than one Palestinian great-grandparent, there are today over four million registered refugees and many more still who are eligible for the status. The second condition stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative is that every form of Palestinian patriation which is not agreeable to the Arab states be rejected out of hand. That is, no Palestinian refugee can be settled permanently in any Arab country unless that country allows him to do so. Given the Arab record in dealing with Palestinian refugees, this is not very auspicious to say the least.
The rigidity of the Arab Peace plan is a cause for serious concern, especially as there has been no real indication that the Arab states are willing to countenance compromise on any of their demands for peace. For Israel, this is a real problem. Whether one likes it or not, roughly a quarter of a million Israelis live in the West Bank and some 200,000 more live in East Jerusalem. They cannot all be removed with ease from their homes, and evicting them will produce a refugee problem over half the size of the original Palestinian Refugee problem. Fortunately, a majority of these people live in large settlement blocs and minor adjustments to the border can prevent hundreds of thousands of people from being rendered homeless overnight. In return for such border adjustments, Israel might surrender equivalent territories in Israel proper to the Palestinian state or offer financial compensation in some form. Alternatively, Jews living in what might become the Palestinian state could be offered a choice between Palestinian citizenship and relocation, but it does not appear as though any of the Palestinian factions would be well disposed to such suggestions. Either way, unless it becomes possible to discuss such issues and reach perhaps more practical conclusions than those demanded by the Arab Peace Initiative there is little basis for optimism.
Likewise, no real progress can be expected as long as the Arab League continues to insist on a settlement to the Palestinian Refugee problem which includes a full return to Israel proper of those Palestinian refugees wishing to do so. It is striking that the Arab Peace Initiative entirely ignores the fate of upwards of three quarters of a million Jews who were expelled from Arab countries in the last sixty years or so while adopting a maximalist position with regard to Palestinian refugees, all of whom should be in their view repatriated or compensated. Whether as a result of the Arab peace plan four million, two million, or only half a million Palestinian refugees immigrate to Israel is irrelevant, as the consequence will inevitably be to make of Israel a binational state in one fell swoop. One fifth of Israel’s population is already Arab, and the addition of a million or more would paralyze the democratic political system and polarize the country between Jew and Arab.
Surely it is not in the interests of peace to create a new binational state on the model of Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or even Kosovo? Still more, it seems counterintuitive to bring together two antagonistic peoples in one state when historical precedents like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Turkey/Greece, and India/Pakistan all dictate otherwise. Indeed, Belgium too has in recent decades been home to violent clashes between its Flemish and Wallonian citizens, and one can hardly point to a history of hatred between these two populations akin to that which plagues the Near East. What cause is there then to assume that Jews and Arabs will be able to share power peaceably in one state? Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely correct for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to entail the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with no significant Jewish population alongside a binational Israel with a possible Arab majority. Such a scenario would effectively dismantle the Jewish State of Israel.
Irrespective of these many stumbling blocks, the Arab Peace Initiative remains positive in that it does promise a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only for this reason Israel should have embraced the Arab peace plan in theory, even if with reservations. Israel’s official response to the Arab summit was slow to materialize, but Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did announce within a week of the Arab Summit’s re-endorsement of the 2002 peace initiative that Israel was prepared to enter into negotiations immediately and that he was personally prepared to travel to Riyadh to meet with his Arab counterparts; in case they preferred a different setting, he also extended to them an invitation to come to Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the Arab response has not been conducive to confidence in a renewed peace process.
Even before Israel reacted to the Arab Peace Initiative, both Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that should Israel reject their peace proposals it might trigger a new round of Arab-Israeli war. It is difficult to determine if this threat was simply rhetorical or indicative of a coming confrontation. After all, Hizb-Allah has been rearming diligently, Hamas is militarizing Gaza at an alarming rate, Syria seems to strengthening its military presence near the Golan Heights, and all of this is being directed in some degree by an increasingly outrageous Iranian regime. Even so, Prime Minister Olmert’s positive response to the Arab Peace Initiative has met with little more than skepticism and derision.
As is logical for any representative of the Jewish State, Olmert agreed to commence negotiations in the direction of a final peace settlement but did not endorse without objection the dubious stipulations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Accordingly, his offer to begin peace talks has so far been either ignored or decried, and not one Arab state has welcomed it. Essentially, the Arab message has been that Israel must first accept their peace offer and that only then can talks begin. This is a peculiar way of making peace. Not only that, but it is strange that Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr has thought it helpful to respond to Olmert’s overtures by announcing in Vienna that, “I also believe, I can say here, that at this time we don't have an Israeli partner anymore.”
Without compromise there will be no progress in the struggle to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. If it is impossible in the view of the framers of the Arab Peace Initiative to conclude a settlement with Israel which allows her to continue to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian Arab state, which divides Jerusalem equitably, and which finds a practical and humanistic solution for both the Jews of the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees, then the Arab Peace Initiative is in every respect a false dawn.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk
3 comments:
Thanks you for a very thorough analysis of the situation.
I would like to add some more comments that reinforce your pessimistic conclusions. A quotation from Dar Al-Hayat, 5th of April on the same subject:
"Olmert tried to deal with this Initiative through words that overtly open to it and covertly reject it. The Initiative, as the Arab Summit wanted it, is not a mechanism for negotiation. It provides for minimal principles for recognizing Israel as a State in the region: withdrawal from the Arab lands occupied in the 1967 War, the establishment of a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, and solving the refugees' issue according to Resolution 194 [details in article #54]. However, negotiations with Israel will not be held in light of these principles, but rather on how to implement them. After implementation, there will be normalization. It seems that Olmert is not interested in this aspect of the Initiative, which he knows well that it will be categorically rejected by the Arabs.
Olmert's words about his readiness to meet the Arab leaders were tantamount to a preemptive attack on the Initiative. This allows the US to restore some of its lost balance and paves the way in advance for forestalling the Arab action at the international level through claiming that he is ready for peace, but the Arabs are stubborn in their conditions”. [this is not a claim – this is stated in the first paragraph]
I think this says it all:
• There is no negotiation possible – take it or leave it
• The offer is inherently dangerous as it could mean an influx of Palestinians that would fundamentally alter the demographics of Israel, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character and its existence as a whole
• Any attempt to negotiate will be taken as unwillingness to accept peace and provide a reason to go to war to the Arab side (as was declared at the conference)
Taking all this into consideration, it sounds more like a declaration of war then a call for peace…..
The Palestinians have a inalienable right to the lands which they were forced of. So naturally any piece plan would have to encompass a settlement on that issue.
Stubbornness is on both sides Jew and Arab. I found that this article is somewhat biased to the Israeli perspective, but that is my own "Arab" opinion. I respect both the claims of both sides, but without a viable compromise the more blood will be spilled for the sake of stubbornness.
The situation needs enlightend leadership on both sides. Leadership that can stand above the political biases that so strongly subvert and undermine the chance of peace in the region.
I completely agree with your comment. One of the corenrstones of a solution should be a fair solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. But the solution must not be such that it potentially destroys Israel. So this is a point for negotiations.
And yes, what is needed is enlightened leaders on both sides with open minds and empowerment to be able to make decisions.
If that will happen, perhaps I can be again an optmist with no adjectives :))...
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