On the evening of the 26th of December, as a result of one of the incessant rocket barrages on Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip, two teenage boys were seriously injured. One, a thirteen year old, is on his deathbed, and the other is in a stable condition. Another of these Qassam rockets struck a strategic installation in the port city of Ashqelon, causing only minor damage but giving rise to tremendous worry regarding the viability of Israeli communities in the vicinity of the border with Gaza. These tragic incidents follow closely the unexpected rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinian presidency which has led to the dismantlement of 27 roadblocks, the easing of security procedures at a number of checkpoints, and the transfer of USD 100 million to the Palestinian Authority through the offices of its Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas. Indeed, there has even been talk of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails independent of any release of Gilad Shalit from Gaza, to which he was abducted from Israeli territory by Hamas militants in June.
Now that relations between the Israeli government and Mahmoud Abbas seem to be warming, the latter even calling for renewed peace negotiations, should Israel jeopardize the momentary lull in mutual recriminations by pursuing its assailants? After all, it seems clear that the attackers are not associated with Abbas’s Fatah party, and it is unlikely that they are acting under the aegis of Hamas. Given their operating methods, any attack on the Qassam launching cells, many purporting to be from the Islamic Jihad movement, will eventually result in undesired civilian casualties. These casualties will in turn result in a breakdown in confidence between Israel and its Palestinian partners, forcing an untimely end to any nascent peace process. So is it really in Israel’s best interests to seek out and destroy those responsible for launching rockets at it?
Irrespective of the answer, it looks as though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have no choice but to act. Since Israel and the various Palestinian factions agreed upon a cease fire agreement in November, there have been more Qassam rockets fired at Israel than in the preceding months, when Israeli forces actively sought out and frequently destroyed Qassam launching cells. During the so-called cease fire, nurseries, schools, and private homes have been hit in the Israeli town of Sderot, whose population has become accustomed to the constant wailing of sirens and whose streets are becoming increasingly deserted. On more than one occasion, Qassam rockets have come perilously close to striking sensitive strategic facilities in the port city of Ashqelon, and untold damage has been inflicted upon other smaller border communities. In one incident which made headlines in Israel, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz refrained from hitting a Qassam cell which was known to the Israeli Defense Forces in order to preserve the cease-fire.
This dogmatic adherence to the cease fire, however, has become untenable in the face of public outrage at continuing Qassam attacks. Minister of Defense Peretz is now among the most vociferous in calling for limited but effective defensive action against Qassam rockets. Similarly, other incidents of Palestinian violence have further shifted the public mood towards action, not least of which are the frequent shootings at Israeli targets throughout the West Bank. There are also those within the Israeli polity who believe that the renewed cordiality between Abbas and Israel is purely a ploy by which the former can obtain money and weapons from the latter as he struggles against Hamas for control of the Palestinian territories. If this is true, then Israel has little to lose by defending itself. Even if it is untrue, serious questions persist regarding the extent to which negotiating with Abbas is in any way productive; neither he nor his party are in effective control of the Palestinian government and both were handed a resounding defeat when they lost with quite some margin to Hamas in the Palestinian elections. If Abbas is not in control of the Palestinian territories, if he does not command the support of the larger Palestinian public, and if he has no legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of any Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, then what does Israel really have to gain by pursuing dialogue with him and making unrequited concessions to the Palestinians?
The answer to that question may lie in a rather straightforward effort on the part of the Israeli government to strengthen Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, but there is no guarantee that such a strategy will prove fruitful. In supporting Abbas, Israel may well be undermining his credibility among Palestinians generally, who will be reinforced in their belief that he is little more than a stooge of Israel and the West. In clinging to the cease fire, Israel’s government is undermining its own credibility before an Israeli public which has turned against Olmert in the wake of the summer war with Hizballah. The primary responsibility of any government is maintaining the security of its own citizens, and Israel will lose little if it pursues a limited campaign against the Qassam rockets which will not include ground forces. Little wonder, then, that Olmert has this very afternoon announced that he will do just that.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk
Now that relations between the Israeli government and Mahmoud Abbas seem to be warming, the latter even calling for renewed peace negotiations, should Israel jeopardize the momentary lull in mutual recriminations by pursuing its assailants? After all, it seems clear that the attackers are not associated with Abbas’s Fatah party, and it is unlikely that they are acting under the aegis of Hamas. Given their operating methods, any attack on the Qassam launching cells, many purporting to be from the Islamic Jihad movement, will eventually result in undesired civilian casualties. These casualties will in turn result in a breakdown in confidence between Israel and its Palestinian partners, forcing an untimely end to any nascent peace process. So is it really in Israel’s best interests to seek out and destroy those responsible for launching rockets at it?
Irrespective of the answer, it looks as though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will have no choice but to act. Since Israel and the various Palestinian factions agreed upon a cease fire agreement in November, there have been more Qassam rockets fired at Israel than in the preceding months, when Israeli forces actively sought out and frequently destroyed Qassam launching cells. During the so-called cease fire, nurseries, schools, and private homes have been hit in the Israeli town of Sderot, whose population has become accustomed to the constant wailing of sirens and whose streets are becoming increasingly deserted. On more than one occasion, Qassam rockets have come perilously close to striking sensitive strategic facilities in the port city of Ashqelon, and untold damage has been inflicted upon other smaller border communities. In one incident which made headlines in Israel, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz refrained from hitting a Qassam cell which was known to the Israeli Defense Forces in order to preserve the cease-fire.
This dogmatic adherence to the cease fire, however, has become untenable in the face of public outrage at continuing Qassam attacks. Minister of Defense Peretz is now among the most vociferous in calling for limited but effective defensive action against Qassam rockets. Similarly, other incidents of Palestinian violence have further shifted the public mood towards action, not least of which are the frequent shootings at Israeli targets throughout the West Bank. There are also those within the Israeli polity who believe that the renewed cordiality between Abbas and Israel is purely a ploy by which the former can obtain money and weapons from the latter as he struggles against Hamas for control of the Palestinian territories. If this is true, then Israel has little to lose by defending itself. Even if it is untrue, serious questions persist regarding the extent to which negotiating with Abbas is in any way productive; neither he nor his party are in effective control of the Palestinian government and both were handed a resounding defeat when they lost with quite some margin to Hamas in the Palestinian elections. If Abbas is not in control of the Palestinian territories, if he does not command the support of the larger Palestinian public, and if he has no legitimacy as the ultimate arbiter of any Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, then what does Israel really have to gain by pursuing dialogue with him and making unrequited concessions to the Palestinians?
The answer to that question may lie in a rather straightforward effort on the part of the Israeli government to strengthen Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, but there is no guarantee that such a strategy will prove fruitful. In supporting Abbas, Israel may well be undermining his credibility among Palestinians generally, who will be reinforced in their belief that he is little more than a stooge of Israel and the West. In clinging to the cease fire, Israel’s government is undermining its own credibility before an Israeli public which has turned against Olmert in the wake of the summer war with Hizballah. The primary responsibility of any government is maintaining the security of its own citizens, and Israel will lose little if it pursues a limited campaign against the Qassam rockets which will not include ground forces. Little wonder, then, that Olmert has this very afternoon announced that he will do just that.
- This article was written for and provided to the Weekend Economist by Jonathan Valk
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